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The Development and Mitigation (DevMit) Forum
was held in Cape Town, South Africa from 27–29
January 2014. It was hosted as a partnership between
the Mitigation Actions Plans and Scenarios (MAPS)
programme and the Energy Research Centre (ERC) at
the University of Cape Town both based in Cape
Town, with the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in
New Delhi, India. 
The current framing of mitigation in the domestic
policy of most developing countries is not enabling
sufficiently ambitious mitigation action, and may even
be hindering the identification of synergies, points of
contact and leverage between mitigation and devel-
opment goals. All too often mitigation is pitted against
development, as being an either / or choice, which
then means mitigation inevitably loses out. This fram-
ing also does not assist in ensuring that policy
responses to development challenges do not under-
mine the sustained growth and development of devel-
oping countries in a carbon constrained future.
The ‘right to develop’ is the overriding policy pri-
ority in developing countries albeit expressed and
implemented in varying ways. This development
imperative then becomes the critical factor when con-
sidering climate mitigation efforts within these coun-
tries. Although the issue is well understood,
researched and analysed in the context of internation-
al climate mitigation policy negotiations, it is perhaps
less so from the domestic perspective of developing
countries. The DevMit Forum took this as its starting
point and focus: How can developing countries devel-
op in the context of a carbon-constrained future? 
The objective of the Forum was to enhance an
understanding of how developing countries can effec-
tively internalise mitigation activities into their devel-
opment priorities and approaches. The Forum provid-
ed a space for climate mitigation and development
researchers, practitioners and experts from the devel-
oping world to present and discuss their work and
experiences in this complex contemporary challenge.
The event comprised an extensive compilation of
activities, including the presentation of twelve aca-
demic papers, nine of which are the offered in these
proceedings. The papers covered topics across the
development and mitigation nexus and reflected
experience of a range of developing countries in the
formulation of actions to mitigate climate change.
Further information on the Forum and its other out-
puts can be found online at http://devmitforum.ercre-
sources.org.za.
Methodology underpinning the review process
for DevMit Forum
The academic review of papers
A rigorous blind review process underpinned the com-
pilation of the academic papers for the event. This
included four main phases, namely: 1) the selection of
a Forum Review Committee (FRC) and the call for
abstracts; 2) the screening of abstracts by the FRC; 3)
the receipt and review of the draft papers; 4) the
receipt, compliance check and quality and language
editing of final papers by the internal Cape Town-
based FRC (CT-FRC). Only when the accepted papers
were finalised and made available on the Forum web-
site and in hard copy at the event was the FRC aware
of the identity of the authors. The integrity of the blind
review process was maintained throughout. 
Selection of the FRC and the call for abstracts
FRC members were selected from developing country
climate change mitigation experts familiar to the ERC
and MAPS. An effort was made to select FRC mem-
bers with familiarity on the topics evidencing them-
selves from the abstracts submitted, and from a vari-
ety of countries. The final FRC comprised experts
from across the developing world including China,
India, South Africa, Zambia, Brazil, Chile and
Argentina. Brief biographies of the FRC are included
in the following section.
The CT-FRC comprised certain members of the
FRC who operate from Cape Town as well as addi-
tional experts drawn both from within the ERC and its
networks. It was led by Meagan Jooste as Forum
Academic Lead, in consultation with Emily Tyler as
overall Forum Lead. Again, brief biographies are
included in the following section.
A call for abstracts was circulated in July 2013 with
topics invited from within the development and miti-
gation research theme, including specific sub-themes
such as poverty and inequality, climate finance, gov-
ernance, mitigation activities, co-benefits of mitigation
activities, energy security, competitiveness, national
planning for a low carbon future, process experiences,
tools and alternative development paths.




The intention of this process was to utilise the sectoral
knowledge and expertise of the FRC to screen both
the quality and relevance of the abstracts for develop-
ment into papers to be presented at the Forum. This
process was thereby designed to check for the appro-
priateness of abstracts in relation to the overarching
objectives of the Forum as well as to ensure the
abstracts matched academic standards.
Forty-nine abstracts were received within the stipu-
lated timeframe. FRC members were requested to
review approximately ten abstracts, and each abstract
was reviewed by at least two FRC members to allow
for an objective perspective and to provide the CT-
FRC the opportunity to track any major concerns
raised. Of the forty-nine, thirty-one authors were invit-
ed to write and submit full papers.
Receipt and review of draft papers
In anticipation of the receipt of draft papers in October
2013, the CT-FRC designed a review assessment form
and corresponding review guidelines against which
the FRC could assess the draft papers. The review
assessment form in particular probed the blind FRC
reviewer to report their feedback on the basis of a
number of criteria including acceptability, relevance,
quality and clarity. Reviewers were also afforded the
opportunity to provide suggestions for the improve-
ment of the paper to make it worthy of inclusion in the
Forum proceedings. 
In practice, fourteen draft papers were received in
October 2013 and one blind FRC reviewer was
assigned per paper. While in most instances this was
the only reviewer assigned to a paper, where the first
reviewer proposed an additional review (due to, for
example, their limited knowledge on the methodology
applied in a paper), or raised a large-scale concern of
the acceptability of the paper, this was taken up by the
CT-FRC. In such instances the CT-FRC chose to assign
a second blind reviewer to assess the paper to meet
the reviewer’s suggestion or to acquire a second-opin-
ion on the paper to compare to the first reviewer’s per-
spective. While every effort was made to assign a
reviewer from within the FRC itself, the CT-FRC also
had to utilise its research and sector specific networks
to assign reviewers beyond the FRC who could pro-
vide inputs based on their specific expertise, or who
could avail themselves at short notice to fulfil this duty
in a timely manner.
Once the full set of review feedback was acquired
from the reviewers, these were then consolidated and
transferred to authors in December 2013. Of the four-
teen papers reviewed, only twelve papers were select-
ed for invitation to submit a revised final paper due to
explicit quality and relevance concerns raised on two
of the draft papers. The selected authors were then
advised to resubmit their papers by early January
2014 in order to facilitate the finalisation of the papers
prior to the Forum. Authors were carefully briefed to
submit according to the assigned author guidelines
and to provide commentary to show how they specif-
ically addressed the review feedback.
Compliance and quality screening, and final
language editing 
In early January 2014, the twelve revised papers were
received. In order to ensure that the papers were in
good standing for inclusion in the proceedings, a two-
stage process was enacted. The first stage in the
process involved the CT-FRC carefully screening each
of the twelve papers and cross-checking the amend-
ments made by authors (which in all except one case
were done in track change format) to validate author
compliance with reviewer feedback or at the very
least, a response to why the author could not, or
chose not to, undertake the reviewer’s suggested
changes. Whilst this was a relatively straightforward
process, it did require some authors revisiting their
paper to either match the reviewer’s suggestions or to
apply changes proposed by the CT-FRC on their
review of the paper. 
Once the CT-FRC was content that the papers met
their required standing for inclusion in the proceed-
ings, they were progressively relayed to the ERC lan-
guage-editing team to complete a final language,
quality and formatting check on the papers to prepare
them for, firstly, hard copy provision at the Forum
and, secondly, for inclusion in this Forum proceedings
document. It is notable that while twelve papers were
finalised in this manner, not all papers could be
included in the proceedings due to publishing con-
straints of three of the twelve authors. All twelve
papers were presented and made available in hard
copy format at the Forum and all contributed to stim-
ulating discussions at the event. 
At the final stage of the review process, authors
were afforded the opportunity to quality check the
language and format-edited versions of their papers in
hard copy at the Forum. Where authors identified
errors or proposed further formatting or language
edits, these were then undertaken after the Forum to
ensure the paper matched the author(s) and the CT-
FRC’s expectations.
Forum Review Committee biographies
Forum Review Committee
Chandra Bhushan (India) is the Deputy Director
General of the Centre for Science and Environment,
one of India’s leading public interest research institu-
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tions. Bhushan has a diverse and distinguished track
record in research, writing and policy advocacy. He
has researched and written about issues ranging from
industrial pollution to energy security and climate
change and from water crisis in the Indian sub-conti-
nent to the political economy of natural resource
extraction. His academic qualifications include bache-
lors degrees in civil engineering and masters degrees
in environmental planning and technology. Bhushan
has many books and publications to his credit. His
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Hernan Carlino (Argentina) is a climate policy spe-
cialist, with a background in economics, negotiations,
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years of experience in the area of environmental eco-
nomics and regulation. For the last 16 years he has
worked directly on policy negotiations at the
Argentine and international levels on climate change,
including REDD. He has also worked directly on UN-
level carbon market regulation, as a member of the
CDM Executive Board and the CDM Accreditation
Panel. He also has experience in designing and imple-
menting projects mainstreaming climate change in
national strategies and plans, internalising climate
issues and elaborating scenarios, as well in-depth
practical knowledge of Latin America and the
Caribbean region.
Kim Coetzee (South Africa) is a PhD and MAPS
Researcher at the Energy Research Centre, University
of Cape Town. Kim’s research interests lie in global
environmental governance, specifically the overlap
between the trade and climate change regimes, low-
carbon development strategies, and the role of alter-
native ideational constructs in the governance of cli-
mate change. She holds an MSocSc in International
Relations, and an Honours degree from the Open
University, London.
Navroz K Dubash (India) is a Senior Fellow at the
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, where he
works on climate change governance at global,
national and sub-national levels, the political econo-
my of energy in India and Asia, and the role of civil
society in global environmental governance. He is a
lead author and a member of the Synthesis Report-
writing team for the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, has
been a member of India’s Expert Committee on Low
Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, and served
on numerous energy and water related expert groups
of the Government of India’s Planning Commission.
He serves on the editorial boards of several interna-
tional journals including Global Environmental
Politics, Climate Policy, the Journal of Environment
and Development, and the newly-launched Energy
Research and Social Science. His recent publications
include an edited Handbook of Climate Change and
India: Development, Politics and Governance, a co-
edited special issue of Climate Policy entitled ‘Beyond
Copenhagen’, and a co-edited special issue of Global
Policy on ‘Global energy governance’. He has a long
history of engagement with civil society organizations,
including being the first international coordinator of
the Climate Action Network, from 1990–1992.
Navroz holds PhD and MA degrees in Energy and
Resources from the University of California, Berkeley,
and an AB in Public and International Affairs from
Princeton University.
Rodrigo Palma-Behnke (Chile) is an IEEE senior
member and associate professor in the Electrical
Engineering Department of the University of Chile,
Santiago. He received his BSc and MSc in Electrical
Engineering from the Pontificia Universidad Católica
de Chile and a Dr-Ing from the University of
Dortmund, Germany. His research field is the plan-
ning and operation of electrical systems in competitive
power markets, new technologies, microgrids, and
power system education. He is the Director of the
Energy Center and the Solar Energy Research Center
SERC-Chile. He is the research leader of the MAPS-
Chile project.
Amaro Pereira (Brazil) is a graduate in economics at
Universidade Federal Fluminense, with an MSc in
Energy Planning and a PhD in Energy Planning, both
from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He has
been technical advisor of the Energy Research
Company and is currently Associate Professor of the
Energy Planning Program at COPPE / UFRJ and
director of ILUMINA (Instituto de Desenvolvimento
Estratégico do Setor Energético). He is also a
researcher at CentroClima/ LIMA/COPPE/UFRJ. He
has experience in energy and environmental model-
ling, besides working in subjects such as energy sector
regulation, analyses of new technologies and different
energy sources and in issues related to climate
change.
Joyashree Roy (India) is a Professor of Economics
and currently ICSSR National Fellow at Jadavpur
University, Kolkata. She initiated and also coordinates
the Global Change Programme (www.juglob-
alchangeprogram.org) which focuses on climate
change research and beyond. She also directs Ryoichi
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Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund Project
(www.jusylffprogram.org) on ‘Tradition, social change
and sustainable development: A holistic approach’ at
Jadavpur University. She was a Ford Foundation Post-
doctoral Fellow in Environmental Economics at the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, California,
USA. She is among the network of scientists who
shared in the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). She is
co-sharer of the Prince Sultan Bin Aziz Prize for water,
2012. She has been involved in preparation of the
Stern Review Report, Global Energy Assessment and
many other national and global reports. She is on the
steering committees of several national and interna-
tional science-policy interactive platforms and on the
editorial boards of many international journals. In her
independent research capacity she has authored or
co-authored a number of books and written some 75
articles in leading professional journals and books.
She is interested in multidisciplinary approaches to
understanding development challenges. She has
widely travelled for research collaborations and
research capacity-building. Current research interests
are the economics of climate change; modelling ener-
gy demand; economy-wide modelling exercises for
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modelling; water pricing; sustainable indicator estima-
tion; natural resource accounting; valuing environ-
mental services; and developmental and environmen-
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Richard Sherman (South Africa) is a Technical
advisor at SouthSouth North. Richard serves as a
technical advisor on multilateral environmental agree-
ments, international environmental governance, cli-
mate change and sustainable development. He is a
member of South Africa’s official negotiating delega-
tion to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, where he focuses on issues relating
to climate finance and governance. He is currently the
Advisor to the Co-Chair of the Board of the Green
Climate Fund and is the convenor of the African
Group of Negotiators Finance Working Group.
PR Shukla (India) is a Professor in the Public
Systems Group at the Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad, India. He holds a PhD from Stanford
University, USA. Prof Shukla is a member of several
international teams working on energy and environ-
ment modelling and policy assessments. He has co-
authored several reports commissioned by interna-
tional agencies on energy and environment. He has
been a co-coordinating lead author and lead author
of ten reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Prof Shukla has served as a member
of committees appointed by the government of India
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provided research, consulting and advisory services to
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member of several global modelling teams making
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National Institute of Environment Studies, Japan),
GCAM and SGM (developed by PNNL, USA) and
IMACLIM (developed by CIRED, France). He is on
the editorial board of several journals in the areas of
energy, environment and sustainable development.
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opment, energy, environment and climate change
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Abstract
The actual contribution of mitigation initiatives to national sustainable development (SD) has
been widely debated amongst scholars. The operationalisation of Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) could help in reconciling two of the main thrusts of the UNFCCC; its
emissions reduction and SD objectives. However, limited attempts have been made to explic-
itly link the two concepts through integrated approaches. The present paper discusses the
existing theoretical considerations on sustainability assessments, as a similar exercise on
NAMAs, by reviewing the relevant literature pertaining to the two bodies of knowledge. A
number of features have been identified as conducive to easing the assessment of the SD
impacts of NAMAs. These include a classification of NAMAs that favour Measurement,
Reporting and Verification, requirements for a combination of ex-ante and ex-post assess-
ments, adoption of the Bellagio Principles in the framing of sustainability indicators, freedom
for countries to define their own sustainable development vision and methodologies while
recognising the limitations in the adoption of any chosen approach, framing of a minimum set
of sustainability dimensions, integration of transformational change considerations in the
design of NAMAs and the need for informed deliberative discourse at country level while
defining SD through the use of Multi-Criteria Analysis. The paper concludes with requirements
for further research geared towards comparing and applying the use of similar approaches
and methodologies across technologies, sectors and countries, as well as further clarity on
conceptualising transformational change within the NAMA debate.
Keywords: sustainable development, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, methodolo-
gies, sustainability assessment, co-benefits
A review of sustainable development assessment
literature that could be applied to NAMAs
Zyaad Boodoo




The adoption of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has
spurred a variety of climate change policies and initia-
tives across the globe. However, scientific studies and
reports published thereafter have hinted that meas-
ures taken globally have not set the world on a devel-
opment path that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system as delin-
eated by the UNFCCC convention text (UNEP 2012;
Bernstein et al. 2007).
During the series of complex climate negotiations,
Parties to the UNFCCC have agreed to set a long-
term global goal of emissions reduction as part of a
shared vision of long-term cooperative action, with
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
contributing to this goal. To enhance the crucial par-
ticipation of developing countries in global mitigation
efforts, it was also agreed that NAMAs should be sup-
ported, and that support be subject to Measurement,
Reporting and Verification (MRV), along with the set-
ting up of a registry of NAMAs (UNFCCC 2011). 
It can be argued that such MRV requirements
require a minimum of structure and rigor in terms of
methodology so as to facilitate the assessment of the
likely impacts of NAMA initiatives prior to implemen-
tation, as well as their actual efficiency throughout
their lifetime to provide for analysis of results obtained
and strategic re-orientations, if needed. Moreover,
improved methodological requirements will improve
transparency and hence credibility in the process,
enabling a fair channelling of financial and technical
resources from donors to recipients from developing
countries. 
However, adjustments made to accommodate the
varying viewpoints of different UNFCCC Parties, cou-
pled with the concise nature of the wording utilised,
have led to wide understanding of the agreement
related to NAMAs (Linnér & Pahuja 2012). Issues
have thus been raised in relation to their operational-
isation, including support, MRV mechanisms and
accounting. Moreover, the decision on an essential
NAMA registry has not included criteria for sustain-
able development (SD) but rather encourages coun-
tries to develop their low carbon development strate-
gies ‘in the context of sustainable development’
(UNFCCC 2011). This oversight could hinder the
design of an effective NAMA registry – a flaw that
would prevent the assessment of the sustainable
development and other co-benefits of NAMAs.
Experiences from the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) have also shown that leaving SD to be defined
at the national level has not facilitated SD dimensions
to be fully taken into consideration in CDM projects
(Olsen & Fenhann 2008), with the limited capacities
of developing nations as well as opposing agendas of
different CDM stakeholders being cited one of the rea-
sons (Kim 2003).
Though SD criteria have not yet been included in
core NAMA proposals, the latter should be under-
stood in context of SD, in line with Article 3.4 of the
UNFCCC Convention text (Linnér & Pahuja 2012).
With NAMAs aspiring to be game changers, Parties
could be expected to explain how NAMAs could con-
tribute to systemic change by promoting SD and
reducing emissions. 
As a relatively newly framed mechanism, literature
that explicitly relates NAMAs and their SD impacts is
scarce and fragmented, with a wide range of
approaches being used by authors (Winkler et al.
2007); Winkler et al. 2008); (Román 2012; Dubash et
al. 2013; Garibaldi et al. 2013; Olsen 2013; Tyler et
al. 2013). Expanding the screening process to previ-
ous assessments of sustainable development benefits
of a wider range of mitigation measures reveals a
majority of studies that have either focussed on the
CDM, taken a sectoral approach or both (Huq 2002;
Olsen 2006; Schmitz 2006; Heuberger et al. 2007;
Olsen 2007; Sutter & Parreño 2007; Olsen &
Fenhann 2008; Musango & Brent 2011). In this con-
text, it can be argued that the body of knowledge on
NAMAs could be enriched by taking a bird’s eye per-
spective of sustainability assessments of NAMAs
through adopting an integrated approach that could
address the following research question; how can
existing theoretical considerations on sustainability
assessments inform a similar exercise applied to
NAMAs?
On top of contributing to the body of knowledge
regarding expanding theoretical considerations and
viewpoints on NAMA linkages with sustainable devel-
opment, such an exploration has a number of empir-
ical advantages, as highlighted by scholars (Bakker &
Huizenga 2010, Lütken et al. 2011, Hinostroza et al.
2012, Linnér & Pahuja 2012, and van Tilburg et al.
2012); such as 
a) SD Assessment of NAMAs could help track their
successes, build domestic political support, and
monitor wider benefits given the broad and trans-
formative nature of NAMAs,
b) contributing towards the establishment of method-
ologies for MRV of those NAMAs wherein direct
quantification of emissions reduction is not direct
e.g. by providing options for other processes or
proxy indicators,
c) informing discussions at climate negotiations
regarding methodologies for ex-ante estimations of
SD and co-benefits of NAMAs, 
d) providing additional guidance through clear and
transparent criteria from prospective funders to
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make NAMA proposals more bankable while
attending to the needs and circumstances of devel-
oping countries,
e) providing guidance to a potential new Executive
Board for NAMAs under the UNFCCC, similar to
the CDM Executive Board, informing its possible
methodology panel on what seems to pose diffi-
culties for countries when proposing NAMAs and
which tools might be helpful.
As a further guide to the review, the above empir-
ical considerations have been considered as expected
outcomes, the extent of which needs to be maximised,
while being informed by existing theories on sustain-
ability assessments. However, an initial screening
focussing exclusively on sustainability assessments lit-
erature has revealed a number of intrinsically linked
bodies of knowledge that cannot be dissociated from
such assessments, occurring both upfront and down-
stream of the process of undertaking the task of gaug-
ing the SD impacts of an initiative. These include the
concept of SD in itself, the use of indicators and policy
evaluation techniques.
With a view towards devising methodologies that
could enable the assessment of the SD impacts of
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, some fun-
damental assumptions must be made. A primary
assumption would be that there is a common under-
standing of the two concepts, however, there seem to
be as many meanings of the term ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ as there are authors trying to describe it
(Hopwood et al. 2005), while the international cli-
mate community is yet to agree on a common defini-
tion of the term ‘Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Action’, if ever the Conference of Parties (COP) to the
UNFCCC gets mandated to do so. Faced with two
hazy theoretical notions, some clarity of meaning is
thus essential, especially so as to be able to justify
those fundamental assumptions required to devise an
appropriate methodology to measure SD impacts of
NAMAs. On a more downstream level, undertaking
sustainability assessments will only make sense if they
are supported through appropriate indicators and
evaluated using an appropriate methodology.
For reasons of breadth of coverage and space lim-
itations, the present paper will only focus on some
conceptual understandings of NAMAs per se, fol-
lowed by a review of the debates around framing SD
and a critical review of SD assessment tools and SD
indicators and frameworks as could be applied to
NAMAs, with insights on desired characteristics that
could be required to assess the co-benefits of NAMAs.
It is to be noted that the purpose of this paper is not
to come up with a silver bullet methodology for
assessing co-benefits of NAMAs that could be applied
universally, but rather to critically analyse the applica-
bility and relevance of different theoretical stances that
may have practical application. Peer-reviewed articles
have been sourced from Web of Knowledge and
Google Scholar, complemented with publications
from recognised institutions and grey literature from
the internet.
2. Conceptualisation
2.1 The NAMA mechanism
International climate negotiations have often stalled,
with sovereign nations disagreeing on whether sup-
port should be delivered first or actions should be
shown first by developing country Parties before sup-
port is provided by developed Parties. The concept of
NAMAs has thus been coined as a means to incen-
tivise developing country parties to assume a share of
the essential reduction of emissions needed to avoid
dangerous climate change, while enabling countries
to develop sustainably and in light of their national cir-
cumstances (Lütken et al. 2011, Okubo et al. 2011;
van Tilburg et al. 2012). NAMA pledges could be
expected to take precedence over the model of Kyoto
Protocol’s commitments, though the concept has yet
to be operationalised by Parties. 
The notion of NAMAs formally stems from the
adoption of the Bali Action Plan at the 13th
Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC as a framework
that clarifies the engagement of developing countries
in mitigation actions. Some conceptual similarities can
also be traced to the Sustainable Development
Policies and Measures (SD-PAM) proposal, wherein
SD-PAMs were to be ‘policies and measures that are
aimed at meeting the domestic objectives of the host
country, but that also bring significant benefits to the
climate through reduced GHG emissions’ (Bradley et
al. 2005). The concept of NAMAs deviates from the
nature of carbon markets, whereby mitigation meas-
ures are implemented and development benefits are
expected to trickle down, towards a new paradigm
emphasising on development measures that bring
ancillary emissions reduction benefits. 
To-date, no official definition of NAMAs has been
agreed at COP level, though some authors have tried
to describe NAMAs. A compilation of meanings of the
term ‘NAMA’ within published literature at the time of
writing is in Table 1.
As can be observed from Table 1, scholars and
practitioners have pre-supposed a wide array of
meanings for NAMAs depending on their area of
focus and ranging from finance, the nature of inter-
vention, mitigation objective and reporting channel.
Such diversity stems from the fact that an agreement
has not yet been reached at COP level regarding a
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common definition for the term. With NAMAs being
developed bottom up, such a universal definition
might never be formalised, though some common
elements can be reasonably expected to emerge. Tyler
et al. (2013) observe a certain convergence in the
NAMA literature towards understanding NAMAs as
UNFCCC registry submissions. Common to the four
categories identified in Table 1, NAMAs can be
viewed as a new conduit through which developing
countries will either aim to have national measures
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Table 1: NAMA typologies
Typologies Description
Financial flow-focussed definition 
(Linnér & Pahuja 2012;Hinostroza et al. 2012)
Unilateral NAMAs Mitigation initiatives that are domestically funded and unilaterally implemented
(domestic NAMAs)
Supported NAMAs Mitigation is enabled by developed country support
(international NAMAs)
Credited NAMAs Carbon credits could be generated and traded on an international emissions market, similar in
(allowance NAMAs) nature to the current CDM
Nature of intervention – focussed definition
(van Tilburg et al. 2013)
Projects Such as a localised capital investment in either infrastructure or machinery, e.g. construction of 
concentrated solar power plant, a bus rapid transit system or deployment of energy efficient 
industrial motors.
Policies/regulations Government-led initiative aiming for inclusion in law, e.g. feed-in tariff, emissions trading 
scheme, building code
Strategies Long-term comprehensive plan of measures and actions designed to achieve a common goal. It
contains many types of activities with various degrees of impact: e.g 20% renewable energy 
target backed by a market and regulatory strategy to break barriers in RE development. Master 
plan to improve transit management.
Mitigation objective-focussed definition
(Sharma & Desgain 2013; adapted from submissions obtained from the Copenhagen Accord)
Goal-specifying NAMAs
Economy-wide goals Absolute reduction target, e.g. reducing emissions by 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 (Antigua 
& Barbuda)
BAU deviation target, e.g. reducing national emissions by 30% from BAU emissions in 2020 
(South Korea)
Intensity target e.g. reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 20-25% by 2020 compared to 2005 
level (India)
Sectoral goals e.g. Increase forest cover from 7% in 2005 to 30% in 2050 (Togo)
Non-goal-specifying NAMAs
Focus areas Generic sub-sectoral, sectoral or cross-sectoral mitigation options with no specific goals or
measures attached to them e.g. energy efficiency, promotion of renewable energy
Measures Specific policies, regulations, or technology initiatives e.g. standards in building sector, promotion 
of low-energy light bulbs
Specific actions Project or technological action in a specified location e.g. 450 MW hydropower project in 
Ethiopia
Others e.g. preparation of national communications (Afghanistan), preparation of comprehensive SD 
programme that prioritises renewable energy and energy efficiency (Mauritius)
Reporting channel-focussed definition
(Tyler et al. 2013)
Copenhagen Accord Country submissions to Copenhagen Accord
Registry submissions Actions registered on the UNFCCC web-based registry
Mitigation Action All other types of mitigation actions in a developing country, without regards to formal 
communications to the international community
with emissions reduction benefits recognised or
attempt to market and negotiate international devel-
opment projects. In so doing they would compete for
climate finance with quantification wherever possible
of the benefits of such NAMAs.
Though it can be argued that the open-ended
interpretation of what can be described as nationally
appropriate within a developing country can enable
encapsulation of nearly any initiative that has mitiga-
tion co-benefits, such definitional uncertainty could
also hinder mitigation ambitions (Tyler et al. 2013),
especially when a structured and strategic approach
towards NAMAs is envisaged as would be the case if
integrated with a low-carbon/emission development
Strategy. The need for such strategic planning has
been advocated within the Cancun Agreements, with
scholars such as Lütken et al. (2011) and Hinostroza
et al. (2012) understanding such a requirement as the
need for NAMAs to be mainstreamed into multidi-
mensional long-term development planning. Being
embedded in national policy, NAMAs are expected to
enjoy the appropriate level of political support (van
Tilburg et al. 2012). It can thus be argued that the
faster the UNFCCC COP provides better clarity of
what should constitute a NAMA, the easier it will be to
progress on up-scaling mitigation ambitions by non-
Annex 1 Parties. Moreover, it can also be argued that
quantification, wherever possible, of SD outcomes of
NAMAs can promote the efficient operationalization
of the mechanism.
2.2 Proposed NAMA framework
In line with the argument that national appropriate-
ness of a mitigation initiative would require abiding
with a country’s existing or planned developmental
policy and strategic orientations, it can be argued that
NAMAs, in one way or the other, would require sup-
port from government, private sector and possibly
also civil organisations in order to be operationalized
at a national scale. Private sector activities being gen-
erally market-driven, the success of a NAMA will,
amongst other conditions, be dependent on the ability
of government to create the necessary conditions that
would ease implementation of a NAMA. Whatever
mitigation measure, whether solely public, exclusively
private sector-driven or involving both, effective gov-
ernmental frameworks are a key element of the suc-
cessful implementation of a NAMA. However, public
bodies generally operate within governance structures
that are bound by more rigid regulatory frameworks
and procedural requirements than private entities – a
situation that is fair in view of the enhanced require-
ments for transparency and accountability involved in
the management of public funds. This relative rigidity
can impede the smooth implementation of NAMAs,
including assessment of their sustainable development
and other impacts. With a view to attend to the
decreased flexibility in manoeuvring, NAMAs should
thus be framed in such a way that public sector over-
sight and operational be eased. To this end, it has
been deemed important to reflect such considerations
within a NAMA framework, as pictured in Figure 1.
In view of the common public management prac-
tice of delineating responsibilities for implementation
of public initiatives as being stratified according to sec-
toral themes, a sector wise categorisation is viewed as
bearing good promise in terms of defining NAMAs.
Coordination of sector NAMAs will thus be easier with
regard to expected MRV requirements of sustainable
development impacts. 
Having classified NAMAs on a sectoral basis, fur-
ther classification in terms of reporting intent has been
deemed important – whether the NAMA is only meant
for international recognition of a national measure
(domestic NAMA), or for international funding
(International and Credited NAMAs), since each type
of NAMA can be reasonably expected to have a differ-
ent level of stringency of MRV requirements. MRV of
domestic NAMAs could make use of existing reporting
structures such as from statistics offices, line ministries
or other stakeholder institutions with the assessment
of impacts being expanded to cover the scope of the
NAMA in question. Being embedded within an exist-
ing sector or ministry will make reporting easier.
International and Credited NAMAs, on the other
hand, will need more stringent MRV requirements. A
sectoral or ministerial ‘one-stop-shop’ – operating as a
national focal point – would coordinate, implement
and MRV the sustainable development and other
impacts of NAMAs.
Following the sectoral and reporting classification,
a further categorisation of the nature of the interven-
tion (policy, target and/or project) of the proposed
NAMA would enhance conceptual clarity and assist
development of MRV frameworks at a country level. 
With climate talks evolving more and more
towards conceptualising NAMAs as a major new cor-
nerstone within international climate policy driven by
their sustainable development benefits, undertaking
an assessment of the SD impacts of NAMAs becomes
essential. However, understandings of the term ‘sus-
tainable development’ are even more divergent than
that of NAMAs. Some scholars refer to the vagueness
in definition by describing SD as an oxymoron
(Redclift 2005) or ‘an open door towards fostering
delusions’ (Robinson 2004). With this in mind the fol-
lowing section will thus attempt to review the funda-
mental principles and the different ways SD is concep-
tualised, before positioning NAMAs within such a con-
text. 
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2.3 Sustainable development – the debate
Critiques of sustainable development as an ‘ideal’
have raised a number of issues that seem to saddle
the concept. In his review of the sustainability litera-
ture, Lele (1991) opines that the weakness of the sus-
tainable development notion lies in its strength, i.e.
although the wide interpretation of the concept of SD
implies political acceptance, its lack of intellectual clar-
ity and rigour prevents it from becoming a meaningful
paradigm of development. There is concern that its
looseness could be used by decision makers (politi-
cians and business leaders) to legitimate virtually any
policy or practice without commitment to undertaking
the essential changes to their business-as-usual path
(Hopwood et al. 2005). The idea of ‘sustainable
growth’ has also been criticised as being meaningless
within a system in which economic growth is depend-
ent upon finite ecosystems (Daly 1993). 
While a universally agreed and clear definition of
sustainable development is desirable, in practice, it is
highly unlikely that such an agreement will be
reached, especially since this involves disentangling
the debate from both the need for political acceptance
and the respect for the sovereign right of states to
define their own visions of sustainable development
within their specific national circumstances. To this
end, some trade-off is required, such that a definition
of sustainable development should be broad enough
to encapsulate varying views, and concise enough to
enable cross country harmonisation of essential ele-
ments of sustainability. Within the NAMA debate, this
could entail a minimum number of SD aspects that
could be required as essential elements across nations,
while leaving specific details to be defined at a nation-
al level. The following sections will thus attempt to
analyse attempts undertaken by a number of scholars
to categorise a variety of sustainability discourses,
with the aim of identifying fundamental principles that
could guide an assessment of SD impacts of NAMAs,
comparing the relative advantages and limitations of
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Figure 1: NAMA framework
adopting different conceptual framings, and lastly,
identifying desirable characteristics of such framings
that could facilitate the assessment process.
Originating from the concerns with the sustainable
yield from renewable resources such as forests and
fisheries (Lele 1991), the concept of sustainability was
most famously first   publicised in the public debate of
research undertaken by the Club of Rome (Mitcham
1995), published in the book, ‘The Limits to Growth’
(Meadows et al. 1972), which described catastrophic
consequences of traditional global growth patterns. In
the Club of Rome’s Second Report, the tone shifted
from a discourse picturing catastrophic failure of glob-
al systems towards a more pragmatic one relating to
what could be done – from ‘development’ towards
‘development that is sustainable’ (Mesarovic & Pestel
1974). This paradigm shift was further enhanced
through publications of ‘The World Conservation
Strategy’ in 1980 by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and
the ‘Our Common Future’ report (often referred to as
the Brundtland Report after commission chairperson
Gro Brundtland) by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. 
The Brundtland Report defined sustainable devel-
opment as ‘ development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland
1987). This was a compromise made to cater for the
competing interests of, firstly, environmentalists, who
were arguing for limits to growth with a view to tackle
pollution, protect natural resources and cater for
future generations; and, secondly, economists, espe-
cially from Third World Countries, advocating for the
right to more development and growth. 
This anthropocentric, two-pillar interpretation of
sustainable development – a trade-off between eco-
logical sustainability and satisfaction of basic human
needs – has dominated the SD debate since. In short,
sustainable development challenges the assumption
that increased global trade and industry can succeed
in bringing international prosperity and human well-
being (Hopwood et al. 2005), while also recognising
the failure of traditional growth models at tacking
environmental and equity concerns. Since
Brundtland’s popularisation of the term, SD has
reached mainstream international environmental pol-
icy, especially through implementation of Agenda 21,
as a unifying concept for worldwide development
activities (Estes 2004), bringing together actors from
different disciplines and sectors with varying theoreti-
cal and ideological perspectives. 
The ideology whereby some balance is to be
sought between competing dimensions has prevailed
across the sustainability debate. It can be argued that
such a predisposition to favour a democratic discourse
should also prevail while attempting to assess the sus-
tainability of NAMAs, operating as a fundamental
principle. However, such a quest for balance amongst
sometimes converging and often diverging interests
has led to wide conceptual framing of the meaning of
‘sustainable development’ amongst scholars and
practitioners alike, which have implications on
attempts to assess the SD impacts of an initiative.
2.4 Pillar-based description
One recurring feature in the attempt for definitional
clarity visualises SD as comprising of a number of pil-
lars that represent the foundations of sustainability.
The most common one is the three pillars or triple bot-
tom-lines (Hacking & Guthrie 2008) which visualise
SD as comprising of environment (bio-physical),
social and economic dimensions. Some scholars con-
sider the ‘triple bottom-line’ assessment as one that
accounts equally for each pillar during decision mak-
ing (Pope et al. 2004). However, other authors have
expanded the scope of the pillar-base description; for
instance further dividing the social dimension of SD
into political and cultural concerns (Estes 2004).
Others have advocated a set hierarchy of elements
operating within seven spheres namely moral, ecolog-
ical, social, economic, legal, technical and political
(Pawłowski 2008) or increased the sophistication by
moving from a pillar based concept to a system-based
description with considerations extending as far as the
material and psychological spheres (Bossel 1999).
The triple bottom-line discourse in SD, which
varies from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ sustainability concepts,
has been the most discussed in literature. Weak sus-
tainability considers that nature and human-made
capital are interchangeable and the goal of such mod-
els is maintaining total capital stocks (Robinson 2004).
For instance this approach believes that a lack of nat-
ural resources can substituted for through progress in
technology (Hopwood et al. 2005). Weak sustainabil-
ity models (Figure 2) are commonly depicted as three
overlapping circles of social, environmental and eco-
nomic aspects, such that any sustainable development
would occur at the point where the three circles over-
lap (Connelly 2007).
Strong sustainability, on the other hand, refers to
an ecological sustainability model that seeks to finding
a way to live within the limits of natural sources in
view of the fact that source and sink functions provid-
ed by natural resources are finite. In contrast to weak
sustainability, the argument here is that some natural
capital stocks are ‘incommensurable and non-substi-
tutable’ (Robinson 2004), and thus must be main-
tained independently of the growth of other forms of
capital. It is commonly represented as in Figure 3.
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(Neumayer 2003) further proposes two types of
strong sustainability; preservation of nature in value
terms and preservation physical stocks of some forms
of natural capital.
As a mechanism that operates within a convention
that is focussed on climate concerns and assuming a
pillar-based description of SD, it can be argued that a
strong sustainability perspective is preferable in
assessing the SD impacts of NAMAs. However, the
multi-disciplinary nature of climate issues as well as
related development concerns have also been recog-
nised (Sathaye, Najam et al 2007) and thus calls for a
balanced stance across pillars, though limits to emis-
sions should be factored into whatever SD stance that
is adopted. 
Moreover, conceptualising SD within pillars has a
number of limitations. Those include the following
points that have been noted by Gibson (2001) and
Pope et al. (2004) regarding the triple bottom line
concept, but which can be generalised to any pillar-
based description of SD:
• it does not factor in the linkages and interdepen-
dencies of the pillars and focuses on the potentially
competing interests amongst them;
• there is a tendency to promote trade-offs at the
expense of one of the pillars, usually the environ-
ment one;
• there is a risk of omitting sustainability-related dis-
courses that do not fall into the pillars;
• run the risk of the sum of parts being less than the
whole if the interrelations are not adequately
understood or described; and
• the pillar-based notion is restrictive and does not
challenge conventional thinking and practice.
A pillar-based description of sustainability for
NAMAs will thus have similar limitations. However,
while exploring the literature, sticking only to the
above mainstream description has been found as
rather restrictive, since other relevant types of fram-
ings could also be relevant to NAMAs. With a view to
deepening the ways in which SD is modelled, the con-
cept of mind-maps will be discussed in the following
section.
2.5 Mind-maps
Human-nature relationships can be viewed with differ-
ent lenses through mind maps – pre-analytic ideas or
high generality mental constructs, which, in turn,
determine the data needs, questions asked and views
of the world to accommodate new results (Glaser
2006). Hopwood et al. (2005) have mapped the dif-
ferent views on SD across environmental concerns
ranging from low, through technologically centred, to
eco-centred viewpoints and socio-economic perspec-
tives covering the importance given to human well-
being and equality. To achieve SD, three types of nec-
essary changes can be envisaged:
• status-quo, representing the view that such
changes can be achieved within present structures;
• reform, representing the view that deep reforms
are needed without significantly disrupting existing
arrangements; and
• transformation, representing the view that the
issues to achieve SD lie with economic and socie-
tal foundations which need to be radically
changed.
With NAMAs intended to contribute significantly
within global mitigation, it can be argued that a trans-
formative change will be most adequate. This point of
view can be expected from NAMA funders who will
wish to maximise the return on ‘investment’. The
NAMA Facility, launched by the UK and German gov-
ernments to fund NAMAs have already included,
amongst other eligibility criteria, the potential for
transformational change for financing of NAMAs
(International NAMA Facility 2013).
Focussing on the inclusion of social aspects of sus-
tainability, a wider and deeper analysis has been
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Figure 2: ‘Weak’ sustainability Figure 3: ‘Strong’ sustainability
undertaken by Glaser (2006), where four types of
mind-maps have been analysed as a way to compare
the pros and cons of alternative concepts of human-
nature relationships, as summarised in Table 2. 
Though the adoption of purely eco-centric or anth-
ropocentric mind-maps provide good potential for
quantification applicability, those mind-maps exhibit
limitations in terms of factoring the social dimensions
of SD. As mentioned by Glaser (2006), scientific
endeavours of societal relevance – NAMAs in this case
– would have limited use with the use of approaches
that focus exclusively on selected disciplines or on
separate parallel spheres. With NAMAs being imple-
mented primarily for SD concerns, the social dimen-
sion will be of high importance in their implementa-
tion. Glaser further recommends the use of complex
systems mind-maps in view of their advantages of
allowing ‘integrative analyses with the participation of
system stakeholders in transformative and adaptive
trans-disciplinary work’. From the comparative analy-
sis in Table 2, a complex systems perspective for
assessing the sustainability of NAMAs could be a plau-
sible option, especially with a view to include the
social dimension of NAMAs as framed within a dem-
ocratic discourse. However the complexity of such an
approach could also be a deterrent. 
With the conceptual understanding of sustainable
development being so value-laden, time-constrained
(covering inter and intra-generational concerns), mul-
tidisciplinary and cross-sectoral, tools to be used to
assess transitions towards sustainability need to cater
for a combination of goals, while considering the
complex dynamic relationships between the differing
dimensions of sustainable development – hence
requiring country-specific democratic debates on the
issue. This also implies the recognition that multiple
and possibly irreconcilable viewpoints are likely to
exist and thus no single approach could be seen as the
correct one (Robinson 2004; Glaser 2006; Connelly
2007) and that the actual meaning of the term can
only emerge in the course of interdisciplinary and
intercultural discussions (Mitcham 1995; Pope et al.
2004). Considering the range of developing countries
that are expected to submit NAMAs, and with each
one working within its own particular context and
vision of sustainability, it will be more reasonable to
adopt democratic principles whereby the door is left
open for each NAMA participating country to adopt
its own particular mind-map, while explicitly recognis-
ing the associated limitations within the choice made
for each NAMA. 
This perspective could provide for elements that
could lead to a compromise with developing countries
as regards to their reported reluctance for an interna-
tional standard for sustainable development which
would impinge on their sovereignty (Olsen 2013). The
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Table 2: Human-nature mind-maps
Source: Adapted from Glaser (2006: 135)
Description Pros and cons
Eco-centric mind-maps
Social needs are considered as While eco-centric mind-maps recognise humanity as being embedded in nature and
secondary to requirements of provide the foundation for the quantification of eco-physical limits to human-nature
nature relationships, they reduce the social dynamics and linkages to a simplistic linear 
model.
Anthropocentric mind-maps
Defines nature in terms of goods Though anthropocentric mind-maps have enabled a comprehensive view of nature’s
and services it delivers to services to humanity as well as increased inclusion of some social dimensions, they 
humanity either ignore or oversimplify the bio-geo-physical limits to human use of nature and 
contribute to ecosystems degradation. Denial of the existence of nature also hinders 
interdisciplinary cooperation.
Inter-disciplinary mind-maps
Attempts to address ecological, Interdisciplinary mind-maps (which include triple bottom line assessments) have
economic and social dimensions enabled analysis of social variables such as institutional and legal processes in
of ecosystem management in a ecosystems management but have ignored fundamental social drivers such as
balanced way values, needs, knowledge, power structures and culture. 
Complex systems mind-maps
Attempts to analyse human-nature Complex systems mind-maps could theoretically provide a better framework that 
dynamics by concentrating on includes social dimensions while allowing for trans-disciplinary knowledge generation,
intersystem linkages and combining but lacks refinement to cater for complexity, uncertainly, non-linear feedback, cross-
these with internal subsystem scale interactions. Moreover, such systems could view humans as being driven in lieu
dynamics at various temporal, of being capable of reflection and adaptation.
institutional and spatial scales
argument is also in line with Bond and Morrison-
Saunders’s (2011) statement that political realities
need to be factored into the process of designing sus-
tainability assessments so as to ensure that sustainable
outcomes are achieved, that incorporate different
viewpoints. To this end, a framework for undertaking
their sustainability assessment would be crucial. In this
respect, the different existing sustainability assessment
frameworks will be discussed in the next sections.
2.6 Existing SD assessment approaches
The study of sustainable development, sustainability,
sustainability science and its corollaries is one that
requires the convergence of different spheres of aca-
demia. Despite a significant amount of research in the
last 25 years, scholars have not been able to settle on
‘one-size fits all’ tools that could be utilised to gauge
progress towards sustainable development. It is to be
noted that making universality claims has not been
the aim of those studies conducted. This is probably
due to the inherent inter- and trans- disciplinary
nature of sustainable development research, demand-
ing informed discussions amongst various actors. The
intrinsic link between one’s personal interpretation of
sustainability and the choice of a particular tool to
undertake the assessment has been highlighted by
Ness et al. (2007) and Gasparatos (2010). Such differ-
ences in understanding can unavoidably lead to dis-
appointment amongst participating stakeholders
(Bond & Morrison-Saunders 2011). 
Originating from environmental assessment tools
dating back to the 1970s, sustainability assessments
were included in one of the first laws governing envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) in the USA as a
decision support tool. Bond & Morrison-Saunders
(2011) and Pope et al. (2004) trace a demarcation
between two tools that set a direction towards a sus-
tainable outcome target. These comprise:
a) EIA-led integrated assessments, whereby evalua-
tion done ex-post aims to minimise negative
impacts across the three pillars by comparing
impacts as opposed to a baseline (representing
weak sustainability and trade-offs between pillars);
and 
b) ‘objectives-led’ assessment, whereby evaluation is
estimated ex-ante, aims to maximise positive
impacts across the three pillars by comparing
expected performance against aspirational envi-
ronmental objectives instead of a baseline (sustain-
ability is envisaged as a series of societal goals and
measures contributing to those goals across the
three pillars).
Sustainability assessments of NAMAs would call
for a mix of both approaches. Prior to an international
recognition of an initiative as a NAMA, it can be
argued that an initial ex-ante approach, similar to
‘objectives-led’ assessments will be required. Sub-
sequently, an ex-post evaluation, similar to ‘EIA-led’
assessments would be essential to ascertain the actual
benefits that would have been claimed, thus explicitly
justifying a NAMA as following a ‘sustainability path’
defined by a country. This perspective implies that the
establishment of a licensing system could be required
for a domestic NAMA, such as a ‘NAMA impact
assessment’ at a national level inspired from similar
institutional arrangements for processing of EIA
licences. For international NAMAs, such an arrange-
ment could be complemented with a verification sys-
tem undertaken by the donor country or institution.
Credited NAMAs could require a third-party verifica-
tion system, similar to designated operational entities
that currently prevail within the operating framework
for the CDM.
However, a number of other factors need to be
considered when choosing a methodology for under-
taking sustainability assessments. In their analysis,
Gasparatos & Scolobig (2012) further distinguish
between bio-physical, monetary, and indicator-based
tools, with each category of tools representing differ-
ent valuation perspectives of the assessment, the
adoption of a reductionist/non-reductionist perspec-
tive during the assessment and the acceptability of
trade-offs between the different sustainability issues. 
In line with Bond & Morrison-Saunders (2011)
and Gasparatos (2010), Gasparatos & Scolobig
(2012) suggest that distorted sustainability evaluations
could be obtained through the choice of a tool that
neglects the valuation perspective of the affected
stakeholders. Different tools will thus be more appro-
priate to cater for different value orientations that
humans could exhibit towards the environment, com-
prising concern for other humans (‘social-altruistic’),
concern for non-human species (‘biospheric’), and
self-interest (‘egoistic’).
The need for such a categorisation is justified from
the reported opposition towards the use of neoclassi-
cal monetary valuation from eco-centric stakeholders
and expected preference for the use of monetary tools
for stakeholders having egoistic and social-altruistic
value orientations (Gasparatos & Scolobig 2012).
Gasparatos and Scolobig further propose that lack of
a sound theoretical basis has often undermined tool
selection, with choices being usually dependent on
the time, data, budgetary constraints, skills of the ana-
lysts, and the range of accessible tools. Moreover, the
mere choice a particular evaluation tool can have sig-
nificant influence on its outcome. Gasparatos (2010)
has classified major SD assessment tools as adopting
either a reductionist or non-reductionist stance, as
described in Table 3.
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Table 3: Types and approaches of sustainability
assessments
Source: Adapted from Gasparatos (2010)





Despite the advantage of simplicity that is
obtained through summarising diverse aspects of a
project to a small set of numbers (Gasparatos 2010),
adopting a merely reductionist approach of splitting a
complex problem into smaller units to ease decision-
making implicitly ignores the complex interactions
within sub-components that contributes towards the
effectiveness of a system (Bond & Morrison-Saunders
2011). Reductionist approaches will thus impose a
certain broad value system on stakeholders without
their prior consultation. The characteristics of
approaches outlined in Table 3 are summarised
below:
a) Monetary/economic tools will put more focus on
the satisfaction of human preferences (whereby
happiness is equated with maximising consump-
tion).
b) Biophysical models will mostly gauge appropria-
tion of natural capital (neglecting human prefer-
ences).
c) Composite indicator choice and assigning weights
within indexes will also represent value choices.
A holistic approach – whereby stakeholders are
systematically involved in defining visions and means
to achieve visions of sustainability – is thus more
desirable, though little research has been reported  on
value-capturing tools. As shown in Table 5, within the
family of indicators, MCA is the one that exhibit non-
reductionist properties. However, composite indica-
tors lose their concept of value upon normalisation
and aggregation of indicators. In view of the broad
consensus-building nature of SD, assuming either an
eco-centric or anthropocentric perspective could most
likely lead to deadlock, with debates about the right
philosophical stance to adopt. To this end, the ‘com-
posite indicators’ tools bear the most promise in terms
of consensus-building potential, with the added
advantage of having the best prospect of being under-
stood by a wider audience.
Though resembling composite indicators, the
advantage of MCA lies in the absence of aggregation
of indicators, which avoids entanglement in trade-off
debates between different sustainability issues
(Gasparatos 2010). On the other end, overly holistic
principles could lead decision-makers to getting entan-
gled in conceptual understandings of complex interac-
tions of sub-systems. Here again, a right balance
between the apparent simplicity of a reductionist
approach and some combination of a more holistic
approach seems to be more reasonable. The
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management in the
UK, in the process of defining a long-term strategy for
the management of radioactive wastes, has adopted
such a mix in approaches by combining expert scaling
within a MCDA process with stakeholder weighting
(Morton et al. 2009; Bond & Morrison-Saunders
2011).
The same issues can be expected when applying it
to NAMAs. Gasparatos & Scolobig (2012) recom-
mend the use of a combination of assessment tools
(such as biophysical, indicator and monetary tools)
that covers the value orientations of affected stake-
holders, while acknowledging the issues and chal-
lenges involved in attempting to combine conflicting
value judgements, especially altruistic ones. A demo-
cratic discourse leading to the choice of an appropri-
ate tool at a country level could theoretically allay dif-
ficulties in tool selection. However, applying such a
wide interpretation of choice within NAMAs can be
tricky and increase the difficulties of enabling cross
country comparisons or achieving standardised mini-
mum properties for sustainability assessments. In that
respect, MCA could be a plausible option to assess
sustainability of NAMAs, as a tool that can combine
such value judgements.
2.7 Desired characteristics
Alongside the need to capture different value judge-
ments across countries, a number of authors describe
desirable characteristics of SD assessment tools.
Sustainability assessments should:
a) be comprehensive (i.e. cover the different themes
of SD so as to allow for the full range of impacts of
an initiative), integrated (assessment techniques
used and themes covered that are aligned, con-
nected, compared or combined) and strategic
(having a wide and forward-looking perspective)
(Hacking & Guthrie 2008);
b) operate within a structured framework and be
applied by all sectors of society, function within the
prevailing policy and legal paradigm, operate with-
in existing and new initiatives at all levels of deci-
sion making and sectors (Pope et al. 2004);
(c) be consistent with the needs of stakeholders, their
expectations and practical applications; possess
relevant desired features of sustainability assess-
ments (be integrated and predictive, cover inter
and intra-generational distribution effects, ac-
knowledge uncertainties and be participatory), be
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aligned with a chosen acceptability criterion (such
as minimising unsustainable outcomes, maximis-
ing sustainable ones or leaving society to define
and assess against defined notion of sustainability)
(Gasparatos & Scolobig 2012);
d) recognise the need for continual reflection on the
original objective of the assessment as well as the
probable policy controversies, while applying an
appropriate framing to tackle such controversies
(Bond & Morrison-Saunders 2011). 
While it would be difficult to frame an assessment
methodology for assessing SD impacts of NAMAs that
would be an exact fit for all the desired characteristics
outlined above, one could conceive a tool that max-
imises comprehensiveness, integratedness, and strate-
gic orientation, while operating within existing institu-
tional, legal and policy frameworks and favouring a
democratic discourse. 
The Bellagio principles (IISD 1996), which have a
stepwise, cradle-to-grave approach in the form of
guidelines towards undertaking sustainability assess-
ments, as well as their proposed review undertaken by
Pintér et al. (2012), could be relevant in determining
the right methodology towards assessing sustainability
of NAMAs. 
Since assessing sustainability perspectives can only
make sense if they are actually gauged, the following
section will discuss the different aspects to consider in
assessing sustainability through indicators.
2.8 Sustainability indicators
The adage that ‘what cannot be measured cannot be
managed’ has been floating in management circles for
some time. The underlying logic behind it is convinc-
ing – that only through undertaking monitoring that
progresses or digresses towards achieving set goals
can be gauged and appropriate actions be taken. On
top of aiding decision-making and management
(Stiglitz et al. 2009), measuring sustainable develop-
ment impacts can also help in promoting advocacy,
enhancing participation and consensus-building, as
well as boosting research and analysis (Parris & Kates
2003). In this context, the use of indicators is tuned
towards accounting for an activity to be recognised as
a NAMA that fits into broader sustainable develop-
ment objectives. 
Previous research on sustainability indicators has
evolved from an initial focus on conceptual debates
about the actual meaning of sustainable development
and the possibility to produce indicators, followed by
a concern for the creation of optimum models and
methods to frame optimal indicators, towards a niche
research area that views sustainability indicators as
policy tools and part of governance discourses
(Mineur 2007). It is within the last category that
research into assessing NAMA impacts can be posi-
tioned. However, whether geared towards a policy-,
target- or project-based NAMA, not all aspects of sus-
tainability can be quantified. There are some aspects,
especially those with an attached value component,
that can only be judged qualitatively, and thus will
imply some subjective judgement. Furthermore, there
is broad consensus that MRV mechanisms within
NAMAs need to be simple while allowing for an ele-
ment of freedom to pinpoint the sustainable develop-
ment benefits. On the basis of analysis pilot projects,
Jung et al. (2010) identified three types of MRVs –
those with direct effects (where MRV could be based
on existing methods such as modelling, measure-
ments, and proxies on the basis of data and emission
factors), those with indirect effects (where MRV could
focus on activities and outcomes), and those which
can only be rated by its broader SD benefits (e.g.
reduction of other pollutants, job creation, other social
and economic effects).
However, factoring in qualitative assessments is
not the only limitation in sustainability assessments.
Poorly chosen indicators can also create serious mal-
functions in socio-economic and ecological indicators
(Meadows 1998). The common pitfalls in choosing
indicators include:
• over-aggregation of information, leading to results
leading to incorrect interpretations (e.g. GDP),
• using only measurable/quantifiable data instead of
other important data (e.g. forest cover instead of
size, diversity and health of trees),
• wrongly framed conceptual models (e.g. price of
oil as a proxy for oil reserves),
• deliberate falsification of data (e.g. using only
selected time-scales so that results show only posi-
tive outcomes),
• diversion of attention from personal experience
(e.g. the stock market rising despite the population
getting poorer),
• overconfidence from decision-makers (e.g. believ-
ing that the right choice is made despite indicators
being faulty),
• incompleteness (e.g. indicators are not the whole
system and may miss some tangible and intangible
specificities of a system).
To respond to the above pitfalls, Meadows (1998)
has posited the most desirable characteristics of good
sustainability indicators as those that would be clear in
value (no uncertainty on which direction is good or
bad), clear in content (easily understandable with val-
ues that makes sense), compelling (suggestive of effec-
tive action), policy-relevant (for all stakeholders), fea-
sible (reasonable cost), sufficient (not too little nor too
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much detail), timely (not too much delay), appropri-
ate in scale (not over- or under-aggregated), demo-
cratic (people to participate in framing and use of
indicators), supplementary (should include what peo-
ple cannot monitor by themselves), participatory
(include what people can measure by themselves),
hierarchical (can go to details or highlights easily),
physical (use physical units as far as possible), leading
(so as to get time to react to it), and tentative (can be
discussed and, if necessary, changed).
With a view to easing the selection process, Ness et
al. (2007) classify the different tools developed to sup-
port the formulation of indicators for sustainability
based on temporal (ex-post or ex-ante assessment),
coverage (product or policy focus), and integrative
(combination of economic, social and environmental
systems) dimensions of sustainability. They argue for
three distinct umbrellas, comprising: 
a) indicators, which are mostly quantitative measures
representing the level of development within a spe-
cific area (often at country level),
b) product-related assessment tools, that mainly
cover the flows related to the production and con-
sumption of goods and services, and 
c) integrated assessments, using systems analysis
approaches to analyse multi-disciplinary, complex
issues, with a view to supporting decisions related
to a policy or project within a given region (often
having an ex-ante focus and often carried out in
the form of scenarios). 
Of particular relevance in the above study are
those tools that can integrate nature-society systems.
Of these, integrated assessment tools (comprising
tools such as conceptual modelling, system dynamics,
multi-criteria analysis, risk analysis, uncertainty analy-
sis, vulnerability analysis, cost-benefit analysis and EU
sustainability assessment), which can be used for poli-
cies and projects, bear the most promise in terms of
applicability to NAMAs.
However, directly applying any of the tools would
not suffice to assess the sustainability of NAMAs, since
those tools are not integrated within any conceptuali-
sation of sustainable development. Such a gap has
been addressed by a number of scholars and interna-
tional institutions through the use of indicator frame-
works. A number of such frameworks, defined as
‘conceptual structure based on sustainability princi-
ples and used to facilitate indicator selection, develop-
ment, and interpretation’ (Wu & Wu 2012: 72) have
been identified (see Table 4. 
Applying the indicator frameworks in Table 4 to
the proposed NAMA framework in Figure 1, and tak-
ing into consideration the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of each one, it can be argued that, though
capital-based, integrated accounting and aggregated
indicators could provide useful guidance on sustain-
ability, their limited coverage of SD dimensions could
inhibit agreeing on a methodology or sets of method-
ologies to assess the impacts of NAMAs. The PSR or
DPSIR framework, though a popular tool, might not
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Table 4: Indicator frameworks 
Source:adapted from UN (2007) and Wu & Wu (2012)
Short description Remarks
1. Pressure-state-response (PSR)-based
PSR framework, which has been expanded to DPSIR (driving force Ambiguous classification of indicators into 
– pressure – state – impacts – response), is more generally used to more than one dimension.
develop environmentally oriented indicators. Does not capture causalities and inter-linkages.
Those indicators identify the causal relationships between the DPSIR Does not adequately capture link 
spheres and are related to driving forces that impact SD and corres- between indicators and policy issues
ponding pressures exerted, causing changes in states, impacts and 
response measures required.
2. Theme-based
Indicators are organised across typically four dimensions representing Ability to link indicators to policy processes
SD as determined by their policy relevance (social, environment, and targets.
economic and institutional), further split into 15 themes, which in turn Provide clear and direct message to decision-
are divided into 38 sub-themes, corresponding to 58 indicators. makers.
The theme-based methodology was reviewed in 2007 and ceased to Ease communication and sensitisation with
categorise SD within the 4 pillars with a view to accommodate for the public.
multi-dimensional character of SD. A new categorisation was recom- Can enable monitoring of progress in
mended comprising 14 themes (poverty, governance, health, education, attaining the objectives and goals stipulated
demographics, natural hazards, atmosphere, land, oceans, seas and in national sustainable development strategies.
coasts, freshwater, biodiversity, economic development, global economic Flexible enough to adjust to new priorities
partnership, and consumption and production patterns), 44 sub-themes, and policy targets over time.
50 core indicators, and a total of 96 indicators.
be appropriate in view of its limited ability to link indi-
cators to policy issues. The theme-based methodology
from the United Nations Commission for Sustainable
Development and Bossel’s proposed orientor frame-
work could be promising avenues in assessing the sus-
tainability impacts of NAMAs.
Having explored the major theoretical and con-
ceptual ideas from sustainable development literature
that could be applied to NAMAs, we move in the fol-
lowing sections to review the studies that have explic-
itly related NAMAs and their SD linkages.
3. NAMAs/SD linkages
3.1 Existing research on NAMAs and SD
The need to increase research on the linkages
between sustainable development and climate change
mitigation has been most notably highlighted by
authors of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Sathaye et
al. 2007). The following challenges in assessing the
impact of specific policies on GHG emissions, which
would be relevant to policy NAMAs, have thus been
highlighted: 
• differentiating the effects of a wide array of meas-
ures encompassing policy packages;
• policies are only one of many incentives that deci-
sion-makers react to (command and control, gov-
ernment controlled emissions-producing sectors);
• indirect effects of policies are difficult to evaluate
(e.g. rebound effect of energy efficiency meas-
ures);
• difficulties in baseline evaluation.
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Attempts to calculate national wealth as a function of the sum of and Pro: can be a powerful tool for decision
interaction among different kinds of capital (including financial capital, making
produced capital goods, natural, human, social and institutional capital). Cons: difficulties in representing all forms of
Capital-based frameworks requires that all forms of capital be expressed capital in monetary terms; data availability
in common terms, usually in monetary terms and assumes substitution issues; not all capitals can be substituted;
amongst different forms of capital. does not consider intra-generational equity 
concerns within and across countries.
4. Integrated accounting
Accounting framework that draws all indicators from a single database Pros: provides full accounts of environmental
that allows for sectoral aggregation while using consistent classifications and economic capitals and flows; can be used
and definitions. The most popular form is the System of Integrated for policy analysis also; can complement
Environmental and Economic Accounting, which is linked to the capital-based frameworks and theme-based
standard system of national accounts, and comprises of four types of frameworks (from the use of a consistent
accounts: database)
physical data on material and energy flows, Con: does not factor in the social and
data on environmental management and environment-related institutional aspects of sustainable 
transactions, development
accounts of environmental assets, and
accounts of transactions and adjustments related to the impact of the 
economy on the environment. 
5. Bossel’s Orientor-based
Consist of a systems-theoretical framework for developing indicators of Claims to capture sustainability across all
sustainable development that is intended to provide a holistic and spatial scales
comprehensive conceptual structure to guide indicator development. Avoids the problems of incompleteness and
Orientors represented as categories of key concerns, values or interests double-counting common in ad-hoc methods
that ‘orient most of our decisions’, comprising of ‘Existence’, of indicator selection
‘Effectiveness’, ‘Freedom of action’, ‘Security’, ‘Adaptability’, Orientor-based indicators are expected to
‘Coexistence’ and ‘Psychological needs’ (relevant only for sentient beings). capture the essential aspects of the vitality,
Satisfaction of those orientors is required for a system to achieve performance, and sustainability of
sustainability. They usually cannot be measured directly, but their states human–environmental systems.
of fulfllment can be inferred from appropriate indicators. 
6. Aggregated indicators
Comprise a combination of indicators to capture elements of sustainable Pro: easy to communicate
development. These are primarily used for raising public awareness Con: pictures a limited view of sustainable
e.g. Ecological Footprint, Environmental Performance Index, Adjusted development
Net Savings, Genuine Progress Indicator
A review of practical applications towards method-
ological development into the SD arena which relates
to climate change mitigation initiatives reveals an
overwhelming number of sustainable assessment tools
and methodologies (Bond & Morrison-Saunders
2011; Olsen 2007; Musango & Brent 2011; Özdemir
et al. 2011; Gasparatos & Scolobig 2012; Huang &
Yang 2012; Musango et al. 2012).
As a recently coined mechanism with no formal
definition, peer-reviewed literature on NAMAs per se
is fragmented, though less so regarding possible link-
ages with SD. The review on such explicit NAMA/SD
linkages has thus been expanded to different types of
mitigation activities that most closely relate to main
conceptual framings of NAMAs at the time of writing.
Those are summarised in Table 5, followed by a brief
description of the main methodologies employed, as
well as their advantages and limitations.
Winkler et al. (2007) have proposed to adapt the
use of a system of indicators of sustainable develop-
ment to SD-PAMs based on MARKAL – an energy-
modelling framework. The implications for annual
energy saving, costs (savings, avoided investment in
power stations), pollutants (carbon dioxide, oxides of
nitrogen, sulphur dioxide, total suspended solids),
water savings and jobs (additional jobs created) of
implementing a policy scenario, through a series of
policy measures, and derived from South Africa’s
energy-efficiency target are explored and projected as
compared to a reference case. 
Winkler et al. 2008 explore the means to opera-
tionalise SD policies and measures (SD-PAMs) – a
precursor to NAMAs within a multilateral climate
regime – using four methods to quantify the benefits
of SD-PAMs: case studies, national energy modelling,
analysis of sectoral data. and using global emissions
allocation models. The comparative advantages and
loopholes of each methodology are summarised in
Table 6.
Román (2012) has utilised intervention theory to
guide empirical studies onto the application of SD-
PAMs mechanism to selected mitigation case studies
in Brazil and China and an adaptation project in
Mozambique, with the goal of identifying favourable
conditions whereby development policies can drive
climate change actions. Román furthermore stresses
particular challenges related to MRV of SD-PAMs with
regard to establishing baseline criteria for GHG emis-
sions, time-scales for mitigation, additionality defini-
tion and criteria for assessing sustainability.
Olsen (2013) has also analysed the respective sus-
tainable objectives of policy frameworks of existing
and emerging mechanisms for mitigation actions
comprising of the CDM, low-carbon development
strategies, NAMAs, REDD+ conservation, new mar-
ket mechanisms, and the framework for various
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Table 5: Peer-reviewed publications related to NAMA-SD linkages
No Typology Author(s)
1 SD-PAM related Winkler et al. 2007; Winkler et al. 2008; Román 2012 
2 Policy-framework based Olsen (2013)
3 Co-benefits approach Dubash, Raghunandan et al. (2013)
4 Mitigation action Garibaldi et al. (2013)
Table 6: Comparison of methodologies to assess SD impacts of SD-PAMs
Source: Adapted from Winkler et al. (2008)
Methodology proposed Strengths Weaknesses
1 Case studies Detailed example of SD-pams Results not very comparable across 
Operationalization within a specific context countries – need general guidelines
and national circumstances
2 National energy modellingProvides a link to energy policy and planning No comparable method for land use, land
Capable of providing an overview of emissions from fuel combustion use change
and forestry available
3 Analysis of sectoral data Allows comparable studies of energy and Setting up comparable indices limits the
GHG intensity across countries extent of accounting for national
Combines detailed analysis of the national circumstances
level for sectors with international projections
4 Inclusion of policies in Provides a comprehensive overview of Limited data availability to represent
global emission implications of SD-pams national policies and measures in enough
allocation models detail.
approaches, as well as their relative strengths and
weaknesses. With a view to promoting NAMA contri-
bution to SD, Olsen (2013) recommends a new inte-
grated approach to assess the SD co-benefits and
transformational changes towards low-carbon devel-
opment that would consider SD objectives from the
strategic planning and design stages, while incorporat-
ing stakeholder involvement and safeguards against
negative impacts.
Dubash, Raghunandan et al. (2013) explore a co-
benefits approach towards prioritising climate change
policy options in India. Using multi-criteria decision
analysis (MCDA), policy options related to modal shift
in urban transport, promotion of biofuels, and
improved efficiency of domestic appliances, have
been gauged across four co-benefits outcomes identi-
fied from India’s national strategic plan (comprising
economic growth, inclusion, local environment, and
GHG mitigation). The likely impacts of policy options
are then qualitatively described on a scale of 1 (strong
negative impact) to 5 (strongly positive impact) and
represented as spider diagrams (see Figure 4). 
Dubash et al. (2013) have also extended the
MCDA to cover likely implementation issues across
sub-dimensions of (a) political economy, (b) transac-
tion and institutional costs, (c) cost per unit energy
saved or provided, and (d) ease of financing. A similar
qualitative scoring (1 to 5) was undertaken and repre-
sented on spider diagrams. This type of analysis
allows an examination of the multiple strengths and
weaknesses of a policy objective across many desired
outcomes through debate, discussion and peer
review. Although such a methodology does not assess
the absolute effects of the policy measures, it enables
a relative comparison of impacts across desired out-
comes. 
Garibaldi et al. (2013) make a cross-country com-
parative analysis of mitigation actions undertaken in
Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Peru and South Africa. They
argue for flexibility in design of mitigation actions,
hence also their MRV requirements, in view of the
highly different policy environments and time hori-
zons of interventions, while also stressing for a broad-
ening of such an assessment to include Asian and
more African states. 
As mentioned in Table 5 and described above, the
conceptual understanding of what constitutes a
NAMA, as well as approaches and methodologies
employed to gauge the sustainable development
impacts of NAMAs, vary considerably. These can be
described as early attempts towards methodological
clarity on NAMA SD impact assessment. With NAMAs
being currently developed bottom-up, such variances
are also expected to occur. However, such wealth of
concepts restricts cross-country comparisons, espe-
cially for international NAMAs. Such comparisons
would be particularly useful to the country-driven
approach advocated by the Green Climate Fund
(established at the 16th Conference of Parties to the
UNFCCC and which could become one of the major
institutions in future climate financing (GCF 2013))
and other donor communities, in easing the setting-up
of fair and transparent mechanisms for financing
NAMAs in the developing world. To this end, the
needs for more harmonised and integrated assess-
ment approaches, embedded within documented
conceptualisations of sustainability for each NAMA,
are heightened. Such a structured approach can,
moreover, bring more credibility to the overall NAMA
process.
3.2 NAMA-SD future avenues
Attempting to delineate what is meant by SD invari-
ably leads to fundamental questions about what is to
be sustained, what is to be developed, the extent to
which sustainability is to be reached, the complex
interlinkages amongst spheres of sustainability, as well
as the time horizon within which sustainability is being
viewed. In the case of NAMAs, the driving motive that
would crystallise such a mitigation measure will pri-
marily be the development objectives to be sustained
and developed, of a particular nationally elected
administration within a particular country, operating
at a certain point in time, at a particular level of devel-
opment and within a socio-economic and cultural
context – referred to as the national circumstances.
With national circumstances expected to vary as much
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Figure 4: Likely SD impacts of policy measures 
in India
Source: adapted from from Dubash et al. (2013)
as there are countries proposing NAMAs, the likeli-
hood of having commonalities in describing SD could
be  low. Moreover, the range of diversity in contexts is
not the only issue in this case.
In a study of twelve efforts towards characterising
and measuring sustainable development, Parris &
Kates (2003) reveal that: 
• with a view towards being inclusive, a broad list of
items to be sustained and developed can be iden-
tified. That could be explained by both the vague-
ness of the concept and specifics of individual
characterisation and measurement efforts;
• few efforts are explicit about the time frame of sus-
tainable development, with a clear bias towards
the present or near term, or, at most, picturing a
single generation (15 – 25 years);
• most initiatives are deductive, with the choice of
indicators being guided on the basis of first princi-
ples or negotiated consensus of definitions of sus-
tainability.
Robinson (2004) further suggests that for sustain-
able development to be meaningful,
• it should be considered as an integrative concept
across fields, sectors and scales;
• since fundamental divisions will prevent the cre-
ation of a single coherent conceptual approach,
stakeholders should shift from those attempts to
conceptualise it towards more concrete actions;
• one should move beyond technical fixes towards
addressing deep issues of opportunity, distribution,
material needs, consumption and empowerment;
• scientific analysis, which embeds value judge-
ments and social commitments, can only inform,
rather than resolve issues about sustainability;
• ‘it should be part of an incremental process of col-
lective decision making that is based on, but not
determined by, expert knowledge; that is open to
multiple perspective but not paralyzed by them;
that allows for, and reinforces, social learning and
changes in views over time; and that is provisional
but concrete’.
However, as mentioned in Sathaye et al. (2007),
despite criticisms, some commonly held principles of
SD are emerging. These include the welfare of future
generations, the maintenance of essential biophysical
life support systems, ecosystem wellbeing, more uni-
versal participation in development processes and
decision making, and the achievement of an accept-
able standard of human well-being. 
The Millennium Development Goals, whereby
nations pledged towards eight time-bound goals and
targets to be achieved by the year 2015 using a base-
line of 1990 is an example that it is possible to have at
least some universal concepts of sustainability, with
significant progress reported across the different
MDGs as at 2013 (United Nations Dept of Public
Information 2013) though with uneven achievements
across countries (United Nations 2013). The outcome
of the Rio+20 conference process, whereby member
states agreed to pursue a ‘green economy ‘ agenda as
well as develop a set of SD goals by 2015 (United
Nations General Assembly 2012) could thus provide
the basis of assessing cross-country NAMA sustain-
ability (Linnér & Pahuja 2012 in Linner, Mickwitz et
al. 2012). 
4. Conclusions and remarks
From a starting point of literature related to sustain-
able development assessments, the present paper has
attempted to unpack the theoretical requirements that
could better inform an integrated approach to gaug-
ing the sustainable development benefits of NAMAs.
A number of conclusions can be drawn based on this
review. 
Assessment of the SD impacts of NAMAs will be
facilitated by adopting a sectoral focus, whereby over-
sight and operational control, especially regarding
MRV requirements, is maximised under a sectoral or
ministerial ‘one-stop-shop’. The paper has proposed a
NAMA framework for this purpose that further cate-
gorises NAMAs by the nature of the intended inter-
vention (i.e. across policy-, target or project themes)
and further classified as either domestic, international
or credited NAMAs. 
A review of the explicit linkages between NAMAs
and SD has shown that a wide variety of approaches
and methodologies has been adopted by scholars,
which is an indication of early attempts to provide
clarity when assessing SD impacts of NAMAs.
However, such an array of concepts limits cross-coun-
try comparisons. On the other hand, imposing univer-
sal sustainable development assessment methodolo-
gies will incur the critique voiced by developing par-
ties regarding the possible impingement to sovereign-
ty. To attend to this concern in light of the array of
approaches revealed by the SD literature review, it
would make sense to leave each developing country
Party to define its own vision of sustainable develop-
ment. However, a minimum set of common features
should prevail, especially for NAMAs that require
international funding, while leaving room for flexibility
to accommodate particular national circumstances.
These minimum features would provide the founda-
tions for cross-country comparison of SD impacts for
NAMAs. 
When working at individual country level, framing
sustainable development will require merging views
from stakeholders with sometimes radically different
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values, contribution from varying disciplines and sec-
tors and consideration of different time-frames and
agendas. The literature review points to the use of
holistic approaches in defining visions and means to
achieve sustainability which provide for a systematic
involvement of stakeholders. Countries could thus
favour a democratic discourse to attend to those
expected multiple and conflicting viewpoints, while
being explicitly informed of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different approaches that could be
chosen. The use of Multi-Criteria Analysis has been
shown to be a plausible option which could attend to
such concerns, especially through promoting consen-
sus building amongst stakeholders.
As one of the most common representations of
sustainability, pillar-based descriptions (especially
triple-bottom line (TBL) assessments) are potential
options for countries to use to define their visions of
sustainable development. When applied to assessing
NAMAs, the adoption of TBL approaches should be
geared towards favouring a balanced, strong sustain-
ability perspective. For methodological clarity and
transparency, the limitations of such pillar-based
descriptions should also be explicitly recognised.
The need for NAMAs to generate transformational
change could be integrated within the respective con-
ceptualisations of sustainability adopted by individual
countries. However, as is the case for sustainability,
this will require further clarity on what transformation-
al change actually means and how sustainable devel-
opment, as an overriding paradigm, could be more
conducive to the transformation of sectors within
which NAMAs operate.
Further exploration of the SD literature as applied
to NAMAs has revealed that such sustainability assess-
ments will require a combination of ex-ante and ex-
post assessments. Gauging the potential SD impacts
of NAMAs in a first phase will assist prioritisation,
while assessing their actual SD impacts through ex-
post assessments will allow decision making to rectify
deviations from a chosen sustainability path. To sup-
port the process, it would be essential to set up appro-
priate corresponding administrative and institutional
arrangements, such as ‘NAMA Impact Assessments’,
which could borrow from existing Environmental
Impact Assessment licence processing setups. In the
case of externally funded NAMAs those setups could
also be expanded to cater for an extended verification
system from a donor country or institution. 
Furthermore, the review has revealed a wide array
of characteristics that sustainability assessments
should possess. Those include considerations for such
assessments to be comprehensive, integrated and
strategic, while operating within existing institutional,
legal and policy frameworks. However, from a prag-
matic point of view, an exact fit for all those properties
might not be realistic. Hence, attempting to maximise
those desired properties would be advisable. To
attend to those concerns, the adoption of the Bellagio
Principles as a guidance towards indicator framing is
a plausible option. 
An analysis of existing sustainable development
indicator frameworks has also shown that further
inspiration could be taken from the United Nations
Commission for Sustainable Development’s theme
based methodology and Bossel’s orientor framework.
However, such frameworks do not preclude the right
for any country to develop its own framework, which
would then need to be analysed for methodological
sense by a potential new Methodological Panel for
NAMAs similar to CDM or by an independent third
party.
Furthermore, the above remarks calls for a
‘process’ line of thought that shifts sustainability
assessments away from a rigid and pragmatic debate
towards a more deliberative sustainability discourse.
This perspective has been highlighted by members of
the Green Climate Fund, who have recommended
developing countries to develop co-benefits as a
process-based approach rather than an outcome
requirement (Green Climate Fund 2013). However, as
highlighted by Mineur (2007), there is also the risk of
efficiency driven processes being favoured in lieu of a
more democratic rhetoric, with participation being
envisaged at most in its softer form through wide
stakeholders being informed ex-post or through invi-
tations to attend meetings due to extended trust
expressed by politicians to expert knowledge and dif-
ficulties viewed onto the involvement of the public. 
In line with the arguments raised in the present
paper and with a view to further clarify NAMA-SD
linkages, a number of research avenues could be pur-
sued, such as comparing similar assessment
approaches across different technologies operating
within the same sector, across sectors, and across dif-
ferent developing countries as well as exploring theo-
retical considerations while applying different policy
evaluation approaches. Further research is also
required towards conceptualising transformational
change as a new development paradigm that could
combine enhanced sustainable development with a
significant decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.
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Abstract
NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) in developing countries are a political
choice, given the complexity of issues involved at national as well as international level. There
are political implications of which mitigation actions are reported as NAMAs, and which of the
emerging categories of NAMAs (domestic, supported, credited, hybrid, mutually appropriate,
sectoral etc) they are assigned to. These actions need to conform to countries’ positions in cli-
mate negotiations, particularly on climate finance, technology transfer, capacity building and
measurement, reporting and verification. They also need to ensure socio-political acceptability
and economic viability in a national context of sustainable development. This paper offers a
structured approach to making these decisions. Building on the review of climate negotiations,
and national policies in developing countries along with stakeholder consultations, it develops
an approach arranging a range of criteria clubbed under key desirable outcome clusters.
Recognising that each criterion within an outcome cluster may have different significance for
a country, and scoring against a criterion may involve multiple options, towards which coun-
tries may have different positions, the approach allows individual countries to reflect their
weighting for each criterion within an outcome cluster and attitudes towards various options
for a criterion. Accordingly, each outcome cluster gets positive and negative scores depending
upon the specific project details. These scores are intended to assist the decision-makers in
deliberating on and comparing various NAMA proposals, their eligibilities, acceptability and
categories. Moreover, the negative scores also provide an indication how a proposal which is
rejected can be revised and modified to achieve an appropriate scale and design.
Keywords: NAMAs, decision tool, multi-criteria, deliberation, co-benefits
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1. Introduction
Mitigation in developing countries has always been a
controversial issue in climate policy discourses broad-
ly couched in the language of development versus
environment and ethical distribution of responsibilities
along the emission continuum (Mintzer & Leonard
1994; Grubb 1995; Tóth 1999; Bauer et al. 2008;
Shrivastva & Goel 2010; Winkler 2010). The dis-
course has visibly gone through a transition with the
general acceptance of the idea that the objectives of
economic growth and development planning need to
be situated within the framework of a transition to a
low-carbon economy and the decision at COP-13
(COP = Conference of Parties) stating that develop-
ing countries will take ‘nationally appropriate mitiga-
tion actions (NAMAs)’ in the context of sustainable
development and in line with support from developed
countries (UNFCCC 2008). Recently, these two ideas
have become inseparable, and NAMAs are increas-
ingly being seen, and promoted, as a conceptual vehi-
cle for this transition in developing countries
(Shrivastava, 2013; UNEP, 2011a). In parallel, discus-
sions on NAMAs have also gone through a consider-
able transition in both academic and policy circles.
While it is widely recognised that varied national cir-
cumstances, including capabilities, would necessitate
NAMAs being specifically identified, prioritised and
designed for each country (Hänsel et al. 2013), there
has emerged a variety of ideas about how NAMAs
could be implemented (Linnér & Pahuja 2012). These
discussions, along with developments at recent COPs,
have virtually transformed the phrase ‘nationally
appropriate mitigation actions’ from a politically con-
densed articulation of conditions under which devel-
oping countries may be willing to take mitigation
actions to a mechanism by which mitigation actions in
developing countries may be promoted. 
The conceptual and institutional apparatus that
the evolving discourse has produced so far includes a
NAMA-registry and a range of categories of NAMAs
broadly depending upon the financing mechanism of
particular NAMAs. A prototype of a NAMA registry
has already been set up.1 The registry is expected to
function not only as a NAMA database but also as a
match-making platform for those who seek support
and those who intend to provide it. The registry pro-
vides options for submitting NAMAs seeking interna-
tional support and NAMAs seeking recognition.
Subsequently, it will also have information on support
for the preparation and implementation of NAMAs
and information on supported NAMAs and associated
support after matching has taken place.2 Many coun-
tries have already submitted information while the
debates are still underway.3 Most of these NAMAs are
at the concept and proposal stage, with few ready for
implementation. Alongside, research community and
other stakeholders have started identifying NAMAs in
various sectors and countries (Agarwal 2012a; Tewari
2012; 2013; Tyler et al. 2013; Hänsel et al. 2013). In
addition to the obvious categories of domestically
supported and internationally supported NAMAs,
other categories that have emerged include credited
NAMAs, hybrid NAMAs, mutually appropriate mitiga-
tion actions (MAMAs), sectoral NAMAs, poverty-alle-
viating mitigation actions (PAMAs) etc (Sharma 2013;
UNEP 2011a; UNFCCC 2013). Of course, these cat-
egories do have significant overlaps, and arguably are
symptomatic of the ambiguities and uncertainties that
surround NAMAs, both in terms of definition as well
as the evolving institutional arrangements within and
outside the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change) framework. 
From a developing country perspective, NAMAs
are a political choice. What mitigation actions are
reported as NAMAs, and which of the emerging cate-
gories of NAMAs they are assigned to, have political
implications. These actions need to conform to coun-
tries’ positions in climate negotiations, particularly on
climate finance, technology transfer, capacity building
and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV).
They also need to ensure socio-political acceptability
and economic viability in national context of sustain-
able development (Shrivastava 2010; 2012). The
complexity and incompleteness of mechanisms under
COP, particularly the NAMA registry (Tewari 2012)
and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (euractive.com
2013), along with the growing activity on the ground
in many developing countries through bilateral initia-
tives – e.g. the Nordic Partnership Initiative on Up-
scaled Mitigation Actions (Laurikka & Leskela 2012)
and the NAMA Facility by the governments of
Germany and UK – broadly driven by the donor
agencies’ agendas (Hänsel et al. 2013), makes the
choice of NAMAs very difficult at national level.
Speculation is rife that the governance of NAMAs
would largely follow the institutional structure of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where the
role of the counterpart of the CDM Executive Board
would be limited to maintaining the registry, and may
also, perhaps, involve selection of NAMAs submitted
by developing countries for support from the relevant
international funding mechanism, including the GCF.
To some extent, the evolving NAMA registry is per-
forming the first task. However, it is still uncertain
whether NAMAs would emerge as an international
mechanism with clearly laid out negotiated guidelines
or would largely remain a category where developing
countries may report part or all of their mitigation
actions as NAMAs. What is certain, however, is that
the mitigation actions reported by developing coun-
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tries as NAMAs would be subjected to some kind of
MRV process. As of now, depending upon the type of
NAMAs – i.e. domestically supported NAMAs (d-
NAMAs) and internationally supported NAMAs (s-
NAMAs) – MRV guidelines may be different wherein
the d-NAMAs will be domestically MRVed according
to international guidelines and s-NAMAs will be inter-
nationally MRVed (UNFCCC 2010). While these
guidelines and rules are being negotiated, the issue of
MRV is further complicated by the possibility that a
mitigation action may have some components which
are domestically supported while others receive inter-
national support. What MRV procedures would be
applicable under these circumstances? Further, with
respect to international support for NAMAs, whether
there would be a dedicated centralised body deciding
upon the allocation of financial support, or if it would
be the responsibility of GCF, or left to the match-mak-
ing role of the NAMA registry, is still to be resolved.
With this ambiguity comes the uncertainty of the type
and source of finance and associated political issues.
With regard to technological support, the relationship
between NAMAs and the Technology Executive
Committee and Climate Technology Centre and
Network is yet to emerge. Given institutional uncer-
tainty at international level, alongside the increasing
flow of bilateral support,  it is important that develop-
ing countries are prepared with an institutional
arrangement at the national level to streamline their
negotiating interests with the mitigation actions, flow
of support and various reporting requirements. 
A government buy-in of any action labeled as a
NAMA has been taken as a given requirement. Many
reports and studies have suggested that the need for a
designated national body for NAMAs is on the hori-
zon. Such a body would require a framework for deci-
sion-making and streamlining the various concerns
related to NAMAs. This paper offers a structured
approach to making these decisions. The proposed
approach could be used to design a NAMA or assess
national appropriateness of mitigation actions. In the
case of already developed proposals, the approach
can not only help in assessing the degree to which a
proposal is in the national interest, it can also be an
instrument to find ways to improve the proposal.
However, the most important use of the approach is
at the stage of designing a NAMA. It is recommended
that the approach is applied in an iterative fashion at
that stage. There have been developed some insight-
ful approaches which directly or indirectly relate to
mitigation actions and policies (e.g. UNEP 2011b;
Dubash et al. 2013). These approaches lay out impor-
tant steps that should be followed in making choices,
and also offer a set of criteria against which a pro-
posed mitigation option should be scored. These
approaches broadly follow multi-criteria methods and
provide, very justifiably, scope for deliberation.
However, these approaches also give considerable
space for subjective scoring, which leaves room for
transparency lapses in decision making. Further, the
negotiation dynamics of NAMAs has been given little
attention. The approach presented in this paper
attempts to address these issues as well. It is important
to mention here, however, that the presented
approach has evolved almost simultaneously with,
and hence is not a critique of, existing work. Instead,
the overlaps are primarily due to similar concerns
relating to mitigation and development imperative in
policy-making, and divergences result from different
entry points, and methodologies, to a similar problem.
In that, this paper contributes to the existing body of
literature to better understand, structure and think
through the national and international agendas of
development and mitigation.
2. Methodological steps
The entry point of this research is an exploration of
the idea and meaning of ‘national appropriateness’ of
mitigation actions. Given the diversity of ideas, we
assumed that a NAMA may actually take many forms,
from being a standalone project, to a large pro-
gramme, to a policy and regulatory intervention
(Linnér & Pahuja 2012; Sharma 2013), and may be
owned or operated by private as well as public sector
actors, with necessary government approval.
Accordingly, it is also assumed that a national desig-
nated authority or an agency with approving authority
will be a necessary institutional arrangement for
implementing NAMAs (Linnér & Pahuja 2012). The
authority may be decentralised depending upon the
governance structure in a country. Nonetheless, this
authority will make a choice, the appropriateness of
which is to be established with reference to national
context and goals.4 Exploration of the normative
aspects of the decision-making process with a given
context and goal, therefore, forms the core conceptual
exercise towards developing the approach and selec-
tion of criteria. 
In this exercise, three parallel steps were followed:
(a) a literature review; (b) stakeholder engagement
through consultation workshops and a questionnaire
survey; and (c) interpretation of existing NAMA pro-
posals to unravel the underlying normative assump-
tions. A stakeholder consultation was organised in
August 2011 in New Delhi to seek inputs and validate
this methodological approach.5 These three steps pro-
vided a range of criteria that are appealed to in
adjudging appropriateness of an action in the context
of national development priorities and climate change
negotiations. Interim findings and discussions from
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these three steps are published in the project research
letter ‘Mitigation talks’ (Agarwal 2012a, b; Pahuja
2010; Tewari 2012; Shrivastava 2010, 2012). A
roundtable was organised in New Delhi  in November
2012 to discuss the draft synthesis of these findings.6
The participants in the roundtable included policy
makers, funding agencies and researchers. Based on
the comments received in the roundtable, findings of
the survey results (Pahuja & Agarwal 2013) along
with the discussions during the various side events on
NAMAs held during the COP 18 (Tewari 2013) and
bilateral discussions with some of the members of the
NAMA committee of India, the approach was revised
into its present form, which at present is under review
by international experts engaged with NAMA policy
and implementation.
3. Normative guidelines for developing the
approach
From the three methodological steps, the following six
normative guidelines emerged as necessary in order
to develop any approach and criteria to assess nation-
al appropriateness of a mitigation action:
3.1 Flexibility to country context
Mitigation in developing countries is a complex
choice. Like any other environmental problem, it has
a strong political undercurrent, and has multiple ways
of constructing and solving the problem of rising GHG
emissions (Bardwell 1991). Mitigation actions can
range from purely policy to technological and behav-
ioral or as combinations. A mitigation action entails
more than a technical solution and requires a combi-
nation of social, economic, political, and institutional
buy-in (Solomon & Hughey 2007). Therefore, a key
question for developing countries relates to the com-
plex choice of most ‘appropriate’ mitigation actions
from the available options. But there are gaps in eval-
uation of climate policy instruments to select the most
appropriate instruments (Konidari & Mavrakis 2007).
Moreover, an instrument that works well in one coun-
try may not work well in another country with differ-
ent social norms and institutions (IPCC 2007), which
further makes choosing the most ‘appropriate’ action
a complex process. Hence, a flexible, yet comprehen-
sive evaluation framework is required. 
3.2 A multi-criteria approach is unavoidable
Since any action is likely to have different implications
depending upon the prevailing circumstances, it is
extremely important that the process of making a
choice is considerate of those circumstances. A com-
prehensive understanding of circumstances necessari-
ly involves a number of factors. In a national policy
context, these factors include concerns relating to dif-
ferent, often competing, national priorities; resource
endowments; institutional, economic and physical
infrastructure; terms of trade in global economy;
social, cultural and political values; and so on. This
implies that a choice in national context is necessarily
a ‘balancing exercise’ between multiple concerns.
Hence, for any action to be ‘nationally appropriate’ it
needs to be justified against multiple criteria, separate-
ly as well as collectively.7
Different stakeholders expect a variety of out-
comes from NAMAs, such as transformation of an
economy (Linnér & Pahuja 2012; Escalante & Roeser
2013), co-benefits of development and economic
growth (Pahuja & Agarwal 2013), sustainable devel-
opment (Linnér & Pahuja 2012a) amongst others.
Many also discuss the consideration of local capacities
and institutional feasibilities while designing NAMAs.
In general, while environmental problems are com-
plex, involving a high level of uncertainty and being
political in nature (Bardwell 1991), selection of appro-
priate mitigation options is a further complex problem
(Ramanathan 1998). Many argue that there are differ-
ent ways of constructing the problem and different
paths to solving it. This necessitates the need to
analyse different mitigation options to identify the
most appropriate mitigation action. Such a choice
involves a combination of technical social, economic,
political, and institutional buy-in (Solomon & Hughey,
2007). While the choice of NAMAs is largely political,
determined by the concerns in international negotia-
tions, the implementation of actions is at domestic or
local levels, which necessitates making the choice
more inclusive and participatory.
We chose an approach which deals with decision-
making problems under the presence of a number of
decision criteria, both multi-objective decision-making
(MODM) and multi-attribute decision making
(MADM), as multi-criteria decision-making methods
and tools (MCDM) are considered appropriate for
capturing complexity of the problem and multiple per-
spectives of the environmental sustainability goal
(Greening & Bernow 2004; Solomon & Hughey
2007; Wang et al. 2009; Konidari & Mavrakis 2007)
and provide participatory analysis and qualitative
assessment, along with a complete environmental and
socio-economic impact assessment approach
(Browne & Ryan 2010). MCDM helps with trans-
parency by making key considerations explicit in pol-
icy-making process. 
Literature on multi-criteria approaches suggests
that a choice problem is generally a ranking problem
among various choice options. Each option is
assessed against a fixed set of criteria, particularly
defined for a context, and the top-ranking option is
deemed the most appropriate choice. It also suggests
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that most of the multi-criteria models are a variation
of the analytical hierarchy process (AHP). However,
one of the major drawbacks of the AHP, which is
extremely relevant in the context of NAMA design, is
that it is not very suitable to situations which involve
interdependencies among different criteria. In such sit-
uations, use of an analytical network process (ANP) is
recommended. ANP is a generalisation of AHP, where
hierarchies are replaced by networks that enable
assessment of outcome of various dependencies and
feedback relations between factors (Gasiea et.al.
2010; Saaty 2001).
Many studies have used different versions of the
multi-criteria approach. The choice of indicators in
each shows varying degree of overlap (see Table 1).
For this study, in addition to a review of literature,
stakeholder consultations and an online survey were
used to identify independent criteria as well as define
the independent criteria where there is possibility of
interdependence.
3.3 Criteria must be measurable
In applying any criterion, the scale of measurement is
crucial. In the context of NAMAs it is all the more
important due to the concerns of MRV. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the conceptual debate on the
efficiency of application of AHP or ANP revolves
around the use of a suitable scale to give scores to var-
ious options against different criteria. While different
authors advocate use of different scales – linear, loga-
rithmic, square root, verbal, geometric etc – there is
unanimity that no single scale can entirely capture the
complexity of choice parameters. Therefore, some
also suggest using combination of scales (Ji & Jiang
2003). While the focus is on measurability, the criteria
chosen also allow for some kind of qualitative matrix
along with quantitative matrix given the complexity of
criteria.
3.4 Discursive application of criteria
While the use of a multi-criteria approach is broadly
recommended in either AHP or ANP format, some
critical challenges remain in ascertaining accuracy and
reliability in the outcome. The two most important
challenges relate to the problems of ‘rank reversal’
and ‘incommensurability of values’. The problem of
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Table 1: Summary of studies analysing climate policy instruments using a multi-criteria approach
Study Objective/ Need for evaluation Used sets of criteria
Hoerner & Muller Carbon taxes Effectiveness, environmental incentive, administrability,
(1996) fairness (actual and perceived) and revenue loss
Wu Zongxin & Wet Mitigation assessment for China’s Mitigation potential, local environmental impacts, energy and
Zhihong, (1997) energy sector resources efficiency, economic costs, consistency with 
national developmental goals, availability of resources, 
infrastructure requirements and capacity for localisation of 
manufacturing
Ramnathan (1999) Selection of appropriate Cost-effectiveness, extent of reduction, local pollution benefit,
mitigation options other national benefit, adverse side effect, political and social 
feasibility, replicability, ease of implementation
Pearce & Howarth Climate policy instruments Causal, efficiency, equity, macro-economic and jurisdictional
(2000)
Perrels (2000) Finnish climate policy Social cost, used potential, compliance risks, distribution 
effects and public/administrative cost
Government of New New Zealand’s climate change Economic efficiency, equity, feasibility, environmental 
Zealand (2001) mitigation policies integrity and competitiveness
IPCC (2001) Climate change mitigation policy Environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional
options considerations, administrative and political feasibility
Kete & Petkova National case studies (Central and Environmental outcomes, economic/social outcomes,
(2001) Eastern Europe), climate miti- technical outcomes, institution building potential, project
gation policies and measures sustainability, dissemination/replication potential
Philibert & Pershing Fixed, binding, dynamic, non- Environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, contribution
(2001) binding, sectoral targets, policies to economic growth and sustainable development, and
and measures for climate change equity
mitigation policy
Smith & Sorrell EU-ETS, national climate policy Environmental effectiveness, static economic efficiency,
(2001) instruments (France, Germany, dynamic economic efficiency, administrative simplicity,
Netherlands, UK, Greece) and equity, transparency and participation, political acceptability
policy interactions
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Table 1 (continued)
Study Objective/ Need for evaluation Used sets of criteria
Johannsen (2002) Danish agreements scheme on Static concerns, dynamic concerns, institutional demands on
energy-efficiency in industry the regulator and regulatee, political dimensions, risk.
Torvanger & Ringius Burden-sharing rules in Responsibility, need, capacity, universal applicability and
(2002) international climate policy simplicity, easiness of making it operational, allowance for 
future refinements, allowance for flexibility and allowance of 
country-specific circumstances
Geoegopoulou et al. Defining national priority for a Cost of measure, contribution to fulfilment of the national
(2003) NAP for GHG mitigation in emission reduction target, synergies with other actions
energy sector for Greece and related to the improvement of life quality, applicability,
formulate a relevant time schedule contribution to employment
for actions implementation
Aldy et al. (2003) Global climate policy architectures Environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, equity, flexibility, in the presence of new 
information and incentives for participation and compliance
Governmental depart- Netherlands GHG mitigation Cost-effectiveness, equity, flexibility, transparency, efficiency,
ments of Netherlands policies; domestic climate policy innovation, implementation according to schedule, certainty
(1990), (2002), (2005) instruments of the intended emission reductions, administrative costs, 
differentiated responsibilities
German BMU (2005) Renewable Energy Sources Act Ecological effectiveness, investment security, socially 
acceptable, cost-efficiency, administrative effort, openness
Ericsson Karin (2006) Danish agreements scheme on Competitiveness, cost-efficiency, side-effects (free riding),
energy-efficiency in industry effectiveness, flexibility
Konidari & Mavrakis Performance of EU emission Direct contribution to GHG emission reduction, Indirect 
(2007) trading scheme in 8 countries environmental effects, cost-efficiency, dynamic cost-efficiency,
competitiveness, equity, flexibility, stringency for non-
compliance, implementation network capacity, administrative
feasibility, financial feasibility
Solomon & Hughey Evaluation of mitigation options Environmental emissions, particulate emissions, noise, 
(2007) from aviation sector economic impact on GDP, competitiveness, economic 
distortion, cost-effectiveness, jobs and tourism, social-equity, 
distributional aspect, cultural, affordability and accessibility, 
institutional – political willingness, institutional feasibility, legal 
and statutory requirements, technological innovation
Wang et al. (2009) Multi-criteria aid in decision- Efficiency, energy-efficiency, primary energy ratio, safety, 
making reliability, maturity, investment cost, operation and 
maintenance, fuel cost, electric cost, net present value worth, 
payback period, service life, equivalent annual cost, emission 
of different gases, land use, noise, social acceptability, job 
creation, social benefits
Mundaca & Neij Evaluation of tradable white Energy-saving and environmental effectiveness, economic 
(2009) certificate schemes efficiency, cost-effectiveness, transaction costs, political 
feasibility, administrative burden, technical change
Grafakos et al. (2010) Assessing policy interactions. Climate: reduction in GHG emissions, increase in 
environmental awareness; energy: security of supply, 
reduction in energy intensity; financial: compliance costs, 
administration costs, transaction costs, governmental 
revenues; macro- economic: market competition, 
employment, competitiveness, business opportunities and 
trade; technological: innovation cycle, diffusion of existing
technologies
Halsnaes & Garg Assessing the role of energy in Economic: cost-effectiveness, growth, employment,
(2011) development and climate policies investments, energy sector; environmental: climate change 
air pollution, water, soil, waste, exhaustible resources, 
biodiversity; social: local participation, equity, poverty 
alleviation, education, health
‘rank reversal’ refers to the situation when a change in
the order (not weighting) of a criterion results in
change in the outcome (Saaty 2001). Clearly, this
should not be the case while assessing ‘national
appropriateness’ of an action. The problem of ‘incom-
mensurability of values’ refers to the fact that not all
relevant aspects can be measured against a single
scale and therefore scores against various criteria can-
not be aggregated into a single score (Martinez-Alier et
al. 1998). Moreover, different people are likely to
assign different scores to an option depending upon
their perceptions and ‘reasons to value’ (O’Neill
2001). While the ANP approach does reduce the
problem of ‘rank reversal’ to a considerable extent, the
problem of incommensurability of values remains. As
a solution, it has been suggested that while a multi-cri-
teria approach should be deployed to have a fuller
understanding of the choice problem, final decision
should be made taking into account various qualita-
tive factors as well as quantitative information on dif-
ferent criteria considered relevant (Martinez-Alier et al.
1998). Survey findings (Agarwal 2012a; Pahuja &
Agarwal 2013) reveal that different stakeholders
attribute different weighting to a particular criterion.
For example, while consistency with national develop-
mental goals and environmental performance are
considered equally important by all stakeholders, ‘co-
benefits’ and ‘quantification of actual mitigation’ are
rated relatively higher by government and multilateral
agencies, whereas private sector and not-for profit
organizations give higher importance to ‘ease of
implementation’ and ‘economic efficiency’ considera-
tions. The responses of developed country respon-
dents also differed from developing country respon-
dents on many criteria. 
The survey asked respondents to reflect on their
perceptions on importance of different considerations
while designing NAMA proposals to determine the
weightings for each criterion. ‘Consistency with
national development goals’ was considered the most
important criterion in designing NAMAs, by both
developed and developing country respondents. This
reinforces the understanding that national circum-
stances are pertinent while designing NAMAs propos-
als and it is important to allow for flexibility in their
design. ‘Environmental performance of actions’ and
‘ability to measure and quantify emissions reductions
achieved’ were considered the next most important
criteria, with developing country respondents consid-
ering the latter more important. This relates to lack of
clarity with respect to what, how, when, and to what
extent the action would be MRVed; and the fear is that
MRV would be even more cumbersome for NAMAs as
compared to the CDM. It is therefore important to
have clear and simple guidelines on MRV for both
domestically and internationally supported NAMAs.
The developed country respondents, on the other
hand, considered ‘environmental performance’ as
more important, clearly indicating their emphasis on a
result-based approach. At the same time,‘ambition of
level of actions’ was considered the least important
consideration while designing NAMAs by both devel-
oped and developing country respondents. This res-
onates with the idea that developed country Parties
must take the lead and come up with higher levels  of
ambition. The results from each stakeholder group
vary and corroborate the Arrow’s impossibility theo-
rem (http://gatton.uky.edu/Faculty/hoytw/751/arti-
cles/arrow.pdf). No decision-making tool can be
designed that satisfies every decision maker or user.
Therefore, given that the primary beneficiary of the
proposed approach will be various stakeholders
including developing country governments, private
sector, funders, involved in designing/ approving
NAMAs, the approach allows for flexibility in assigning
the weights.
3.5 Political sensitivity of negotiations
Further, amidst a range of speculations, the NAMA
registry under the UNFCCC has begun to take shape,
many bilaterally supported mitigation concepts in
developing countries outside the UNFCCC process
are in the pipeline and many feasibility studies are in
process. It is important to note that the bulk of NAMA
activity is driven by bilateral support from developed
countries largely in the form of ODA (Hänsel et al.
2013; Kuramochi et al. 2012), which from developing
countries’ point of view should not be accounted as
climate finance. Moreover, the reasoning for most of
these activities is that the experience from pilot actions
is a better guide to design the governance structure of
NAMAs. Arguably, this is creating a laboratory outside
UNFCCC for a future climate regime in which devel-
oping countries are on the receiving end. It is therefore
in the interest of developing countries that an objec-
tive approach exists, explicitly reflecting their negotiat-
ing interests, in judging under what conditions, any
proposed mitigation action should be labelled as a
NAMA.
3.6 Utility and ease of application 
The strength of an approach lies in its utility for the
maximum number of stakeholders and in ease of
application. In the case of NAMAs, different stake-
holders need evaluation frameworks at different
stages and for different goals. While different aspects
are taken care of by the use of a multi-criteria method,
use of the approach at different stages, particularly ex-
ante as well as ex-post evaluation needs to be inbuilt.
In particular, the approach to evaluate NAMAs should
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also serve as a background for developing a MRV
framework. The ease of application can be best cap-
tured if the approach can be translated into a ready-
to-use tool. 
4. The proposed approach
The primary beneficiary of the proposed approach
will be developing country governments. In addition
to helping policy-makers select more ‘appropriate’
mitigation actions from a broad spectrum of choices,
the proposed criteria can also help governments in
classifying NAMAs.The emerging discourse on
NAMAs indicates that NAMAs could be categorised in
two different ways. One is according to the type of
action (policy, programme or project) and the other is
according to the source of support (domestic, interna-
tional, mixed etc). These two types could be arranged
in a matrix. It is likely that each combination in this
matrix will have different political sensitivities attached
to it, particularly with regard to MRV implications. The
proposed criteria offer a structured approach to estab-
lish boundaries between domestic and supported
NAMAs, to ensure synchronisation with national pri-
orities to the maximum detail possible, and may also
help in determining what mitigation actions over a
period of time are possible in a country and why.
Moreover, the proposed criteria could be applied in
making ex-ante choices of mitigation actions and in
ex-post evaluation of the performance of mitigation
actions. It is, however, important to note that it is not
an alternative to the normal policy process, but,
rather, a tool to inform the policy process. A structured
approach that clearly spells out national priorities and
concerns will also serve as a guide for prospective
NAMA developers (government agencies, private
players, technical consultants). The criteria, if applied
in the prescribed manner (see section 4), will be useful
in determining the appropriate scope and scale at
which an action becomes ‘nationally appropriate’.
The proposed approach arranges multiple social, eco-
nomic and environmental concerns in a structured
order. It will help funding agencies to assess a propos-
al with reference to their funding priorities. It may also
be useful in streamlining various lines of funds dedi-
cated to specific developmental objectives. 
While developing the proposed approach, we
began with a listing of key concerns, based on the
review of climate negotiations, and national policies in
developing countries, along with stakeholder consul-
tations. We found that each NAMA is expected to
have a set of desirable outcomes. These possible out-
comes are clubbed into eight normative objectives –
the outcome clusters. Each outcome is further trans-
lated into ‘criteria’. Recognizing that each criterion
within an outcome cluster may have different signifi-
cance for a country, the approach allows flexibility to
users to assign weighting to each criterion within an
outcome cluster, which essentially reflect national cir-
cumstances and priorities. Each criterion may have
multiple options (see Annexure 1) for which different
countries’ attitude may be different. The approach
allows the users to reflect their attitudes, reflecting the
sensitivity to negotiating positions as well as political
and socio-cultural acceptability conditions.
Users can assign weightage for each criterion with-
in an outcome cluster along with attitudes towards
various options: (acceptable (+1), indifference (0)
and not-acceptable (-1)). A proposed NAMA is
mapped against these options in terms of qualitative
and/or quantitative scores, expressed numerically as
per the scoring guide (see Annexure 1). These scores
are aggregated for outcome clusters. Since it is
advised not to reduce impacts of an action to a single
score, but at the same time it is also recognised that
some degree of aggregation is necessary for making
the criteria accessible and useful, it is proposed that
each outcome cluster is given two scores: one signify-
ing the qualitative strength of positive impacts and
other recognising negative impacts. This is achieved
by aggregating the option scores as per the sign of atti-
tude (positive or negative). Accordingly, each out-
come cluster gets positive and negative scores, in a
‘deliberation matrix’. The ‘deliberation matrix’ of var-
ious NAMA proposals can be used to ascertain their
eligibilities, acceptability and categories. Moreover,
the negative scores also provide an indication of mod-
ification of NAMA design. It is important to note here
that the user may add or delete more criteria and cor-
responding options within each outcome clusters.
Figure 1 presents the general scheme of the approach.
4.1 Outcome clusters and criteria
(i) Political acceptability of international support
Mitigation in developing countries in the context of cli-
mate change has always been a politically contentious
issue. Any discussion or opinion about NAMAs, there-
fore, can be insulated from reference to its internation-
al context. The two most important aspects are the
international support (technology and finance) and
MRV requirements. While it is a well-known position
of developing countries that mitigation actions are
dependent upon the international financial, techno-
logical and capacity building support, the need to
scrutinise the package of support itself has also been
pointed out, citing sovereignty and accountability
concerns. For example, the source of support, or the
channel through which support flows to developing
countries and the conditions with which support is
provided, needs to be carefully examined. A better
way of doing this is to reflect upon it at the design
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stage of the action, mentioning the acceptable pack-
age of support. With reference to MRV requirements,
transparency and an upfront statement of national cir-
cumstances and priorities that a proposed action
caters to are imperative in any design criteria for
NAMAs. Implicit in this is the requirement of measur-
ability. Many studies (Ramnathan 1999; Sorrell 2001;
Johannsen 2001; Solomon & Hughey 2007;
Mundaca & Neij 2009) have considered political
acceptability as a criterion to exert choice. However,
choice of NAMAs would also have the elements of
international political acceptability. Therefore, criteria
such as finance, technology, capacity building and
MRV are considered in the decision-making tool.
However, the weightings, options and attitudes could
be determined by each user. 
(ii) Transformation of the economy
Although expressed through various concepts such as
energy and resource efficiency (Zongxin & Zhihong
1997), sustainable development (Linnér and Pahuja
2012a), low-carbon economy and green growth
(Shrivastava 2013) and so on, the underlying
assumption has been that a NAMA should help the
economy transform itself over a period of time into a
more environment-friendly economic system bringing
about transformational change (Escalante & Roeser
2013). This transformation may be brought about
through technological changes, increases in private
sector participation, changes in life-style, associated
changes in manufacturing capability and shift in ener-
gy mix. It is also noted that such a transformation of
the economy should not be at the cost of compromis-
ing national developmental priorities and overall envi-
ronmental well-being. In other words, the transforma-
tion should be measured in terms of contribution to
national developmental priorities, such as energy
security, poverty alleviation, and enhanced manufac-
turing capabilities. These concerns may be further
broken down into considerations of not only the
immediate effects of the action but also the long-term
effects (Escalante & Roeser, 2013). Hence, considera-
tion of the ‘time dimension’ and ‘second order effects’
is integral to assessing contribution of an action
towards transformation imperatives. Many studies
have used similar criteria for exerting choice on cli-
mate policies, such as infrastructure requirements and
capacity for localisation of manufacturing (Zongxin &
Zhihong 1997), improvement of quality of time
(Geoegopoulou 2003), technological innovation cycle
and diffusion of existing technologies (Grafakos et al.
2010). However, each user may have a different per-
ception of transformation, so the weightings, options
and attitudes in the decision making tool could be
determined by each user.
(iii) Social and cultural acceptability
The social dimension of the sustainable development
agenda, along with acceptability among the local and
political community, emerges from the discourse as
one of the core priorities. Almost all studies evaluating
climate policy instruments (see Table 1) use social
acceptability as a criterion. In particular, reduction in
economic and social inequalities, job creation and
sensitivity to the cultural practices of local community
are considered critical considerations. 
(iv) Environmental consequences
The trade-off between mitigation benefits and other
environmental benefits finds an increasing resonance
in climate policy discourse. Mostly, other environmen-
tal benefits are articulated as co-benefits of climate
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Figure 1: General scheme of the approach
action, highlighting added advantages and hence jus-
tifying certain mitigation actions. However, it is also
articulated in a reverse order, pointing out that mitiga-
tion actions should not be undertaken at the cost of
other environmental considerations, like  air quality,
biodiversity, water quality, soil etc. Most of the earlier
studies evaluating climate policy instrument (see Table
1) use environmental co-benefits as a criterion.
However, articulation of each differs. The survey
asked the respondents about their perception on what
best describes ‘environmental performance of actions’
in the context of NAMAs. Direct contribution to GHG
reduction (84%) was considered the best indicator of
environmental performance, followed by ‘environ-
mental co-benefits’ (70%). Surprisingly, ‘Indirect con-
tributions to GHG reduction’ was considered less
important, contrary to the increased emphasis on sys-
temic transformational change (see for details Linnér
& Pahuja (2012)) that NAMAs could bring about.
(v) Cost-effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness of an action emerges as one of the
primary criteria in all the studies evaluating climate
policy instruments (see Table 1). These considerations
include cost implications not only for the project
implementer but also for the regulatory agencies, gov-
ernment and the beneficiaries of the action. 
(vi) Institutional feasibility
All actions take place within an institutional context.
Therefore, in order for an action to be implemented it
is a pre-requisite that it is a feasible action not only
according to economic rationality but also in terms of
institutional requirements.8 Mostly, these concerns are
expressed in terms of fulfillment of regulatory require-
ments, favorable legal and policy environment, envi-
ronmental standards, safety measures and so on.
(vii) Domestic resource use
Efficient and optimum utilisation of, and greater
reliance on, domestic resources are well established
guiding principles of development planning. The dis-
courses on low-carbon transition, energy security and
sustainable development underscore this principle.
(viii) Reduction in undesirable impacts
Any action might have positive as well as negative
impacts across multiple dimensions. As a general rule
the positive impacts must be maximised and negative
impacts should be minimised. While these concerns
are expressed in positive as well as negative require-
ments, a generalisation of views expressed could be
made so as to imply that as long as certain negative
impacts are avoided an action could be considered
appropriate. However, it might not be possible to
eliminate all the negative impacts of a project. The
choice, therefore, would be between two different
combinations of negative impacts. Moreover, in differ-
ent country contexts the list of negative impacts may
be different. The negative impacts, over which very
strong opinions emerged from discourse include (a)
social and economic inequality should not increase;
(b) no action described as NAMA should allow the
economy to get locked into high-emission economic
activities that cannot be closed down within economic
rationality before a certain period of time; (c) a NAMA
should not imply diversion of resources from other
development activities; (d) conditionality of support
should not infringe upon sovereignty; (e) balance of
payment condition of a country should not be wors-
ened; (f) the action should not lead to loss of liveli-
hood of poor; (g) import dependence of an action
should be as minimal as possible. 
An illustrative list of possible criteria under each
outcome cluster and a range of options that could be
available to score against each criterion is given in
Annexure 1 along with an illustrative guide of scoring
against each option.
4.2 Scoring scheme
Since it is advised not to reduce impacts of an action
to a single score, but at the same time it is also recog-
nised that some degree of aggregation is necessary for
making the criteria accessible and useful, we propose
that each cluster is given two scores: one signifying the
strength of positive impacts and other recognising
negative impacts. The positive (or negative) score for
an ‘Outcome cluster’ is calculated according to the fol-
lowing equation:
       L+ = Ʃi[WCi* Ʃij(CiPj*SCiPj)
+]
Where,
L+ = positive score of Outcome cluster L
WCi = Weight assigned to i
th criterion of Outcome
cluster L
CiPj = ‘attitude’ given to j
th option of ith criterion of
Outcome cluster L
SCiPj = Score given to the proposed NAMA against
jth option of ith criterion of Outcome cluster L
Σij(CiPj*SCiPj)
+ = sum of the positive values
Similarly, the negative score for the cluster is to be cal-
culated.
To illustrate, Table 2 shows how the scores for the
Outcome cluster ‘Political acceptability of internation-
al support’ may be calculated in a hypothetical case.
In this illustration, we assume that each criterion is
equally important, and in order to ease the compari-
son between positive and negative scores we have
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taken the weightings to add up to 10. Based on our
assessment of climate change negotiations and posi-
tions generally taken by developing countries on var-
ious options listed in the table (grant as type of
finance, concessional as one of the modes of technol-
ogy transfer, etc) we have assigned ‘attitudes’ of an
average developing country. For example, grant
would be acceptable (+1) climate finance, whereas a
commercial loan is most likely to be unacceptable (-1)
to developing countries as climate finance. For all
practical purposes, we assume that the weightage and
attitudes are given ex-ante by the user, and how they
arrive at them is beyond the scope of this paper.
Accordingly, they may add more criteria and options.
Now, suppose there is a candidate NAMA project in a
super-critical power project involving a multinational
company in collaboration with the public sector enter-
prise in India, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
(BHEL). This project receives 60% as grant from the
GCF and 40% comes in the form of foreign direct
investment (FDI), to the effect that the multinational
company owns the plant. The involvement of BHEL
in the project is to build the boilers through a technol-
ogy transfer agreement with Alstom on full commer-
cial basis. The MRV requirements include a consider-
able part of how BHEL has implemented and benefit-
ed from the technology transfer agreement. These
aspects are reflected in the project scores for options
as per the scoring guide. It is very likely that the full
commercial basis of the technology transfer agree-
ment, FDI in power sector, and scope of MRV of
BHEL functioning will be unacceptable for a range of
policy and political reasons. The positive criteria
scores are calculated by multiplying the sum of the
project scores of the acceptable options by the weight-
ing assigned to criteria. For example, 0.6 is the sum of
the scores of acceptable options of type of finance,
which, upon multiplication with weighting (i.e. 2),
gives a positive criterion score of 1.2. Similarly, the
negative criteria score is -0.8. Further, by summing up
the positive and negative scores of each criterion we
arrive as the positive and negative scores of the out-
come cluster ‘political acceptability of international
support’, i.e. 12.4 and -5.6 respectively.
4.3 Application of the criteria
It is important to keep in mind that the proposed cri-
teria are not aimed at making final decision; rather the
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Table 2: Illustration of calculation of Outcome cluster scores for ‘Political acceptability of 
international support’
Criteria [C] Weighting of Options Project Guide for Criteria pos- Criteria neg- ClusterCluster
criteriaa Attitudeb Options scorec project itive score ative score score score
[WCi s.t. [CiPj] [SCiPj] score [CiPj*SCiPj] [CiPj*SCiPj] (+) (-)
ΣWCi=10]
Type of 2 1 Grant 0.6 % of total 1.2 -0.8 12.4 -5.6
finance 0 Equity 0 investment
1 Concessional loan 0
-1 Commercial loan 0.4
0 ODA 0
0 Philanthropic 0
Nature of 2 1 Concessional 0 Yes (1) /No (0) 2 -2
technology -1 Commercial 1
transfer 1 IPR license 1
1 Joint R&D 0
1 Knowledge 0
Capacity 2 1 Institution level 1 Yes (1) / 6 0
building 1 Systemic level 1 No (0)
1 Individual level 1
Source of 2 1 GCF/UNFCCC 0.6 % of total 1.2 -0.8
finance (under/ -1 Multilateral financial inst- investment
outside FCCC) institutions/outside UNFCCC 0
-1 Bilateral funding/ODA 0
-1 Private investors/FDI 0.4
0 Individual/philanthropic 0
MRV imp- 2 -1 International MRV of all 1 Yes (1) / 2 -2
lications aspects of project No (0)
1 International MRV of only 0
supported component of 
project
1 Only domestic MRV 0
1 Part domestic, part inter-
national MRV 0
1 MRV of support 1
Note:
a. Weighting within a cluster/decided by government/user
b. Acceptable (+1), Indifference (0), unacceptable (-1) decided by government/user 
c. To be filled in by project developer, verified by DNA.
purpose is to facilitate decision making in a more
transparent and MRVable manner. The scoring
scheme will give an 8 x 2 matrix as below. These
scores are to be used for deliberation for making the





Political acceptability of 
international support
Transformation of economy





Reduction in undesirable impacts
As mentioned earlier, the proposed criteria could
be used to design a NAMA or assess national appro-
priateness of mitigation actions. In the case of already
developed proposals, the application of criteria can-
not only help in assessing the degree to which a pro-
posal is in the national interest, but also be an instru-
ment to find ways to improve the proposal. However,
the most important use of the criteria is at the stage of
designing a NAMA. It is recommended that the
approach is applied in an iterative fashion while
designing a NAMA.The purpose of iterations is, first,
to eliminate the negative scores or reduce them to an
acceptable level; and, secondly, to find an adequate
financial, institutional and technological scale as well
as scope under which an action is most appropriate.
This implies that, for the iterative process, if a pro-
posed action does not attain acceptable scores against
each cluster, corrective measures must be included as
part of the proposed action and scores should be
reworked. This would necessarily affect the scale and
scope of the action. Moreover, if a fully internationally
supported action does not meet the conditions of
political acceptability, that action must not be under-
taken. A schematic representation of how to apply the
approach is given in Figure 2. Since iterations can go
on for innumerable rounds and there is no clear
rationale for the number of iterations an evaluation
exercise should go through, we propose that a time-
frame of assessing impacts of proposed action over a
period of 15-20 years after iplementation should be
considered.9 Further, governments may choose to fix
a minimum net score for each cluster for a project to
be considered nationally appropriate, thereby incor-
porating a threshold for action into government poli-
cy.
To illustrate, let us take the example of fully domes-
tically supported large hydropower projects in India. A
likely deliberation matrix for the project is given in
Table 3. For the sake of simplicity we have given
descriptive scores with explanation.
Given the huge hydro potential and experience
within India, it is expected that the project will have
high positive scores for outcome clusters ‘transforma-
tion of economy’, ‘institutional feasibility’, ‘domestic
resource use’, ‘political acceptability of international
support’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’. One may also rea-
sonably expect mixed positive and negative scores for
‘environmental consequences’ and ‘reduction in
undesirable impacts’. However, experience has shown
that large hydro projects in India have faced serious
protests and hence, in their current form, will have
high negative scores on ‘social and local acceptabili-
ty’. Any large hydropower project becoming NAMA as
per the proposed scheme will have to reduce the high
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Figure 2: How to apply the NAMA design and approval approach
negative scores on ‘environmental consequences’
(e.g. biodiversity loss), ‘reduction in undesirable
impacts’ (e.g. political unrest), and ‘social and local
acceptability (e.g. proper relocation and resettlement
of displaced communities). Obviously, this would
have cost and scale implications, but at the same time
would also improve positive scores on ‘transformation
of economy’ (more equitable). These are the subjec-
tive choices a decision-maker will have to make while
deliberating and revising a proposal for a large
hydropower project.
Although in the case of large hydro projects in
India the conclusion that a proper relocation and
resettlement arrangement of displaced communities is
the only way forward is already well understood, from
the perspective of whether to label such a project as
NAMA the proposed approach is useful. As is clear
from the ‘deliberation matrix’, it helps in assessing the
areas where negative scores are too high and need
improvement. Further, at the second stage when
increased costs are to be met with additional financial
resources, whether it can be mobilised through
domestic sources or through international funding, it
helps make a decision depending upon the various
criteria under the political acceptability of internation-
al support outcome-cluster. Hence, the iterative appli-
cation of the proposed approach systematically helps
in first harmonising a mitigation option with national
developmental concerns and circumstances and then
acceptability of international support.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a systematic step by
step approach to operationalise NAMAs from concep-
tion through implementation, from the perspective of
bridging the national political context of decision-
making, development imperatives, and their positions
in global climate change negotiations. Although we
have listed illustrative set of criteria, by allowing flexi-
bility to users to prepare their list of criteria and
include options as they emerge, along with making
their weightings and attitudes explicit, we hope that a
clearer communication among various stakeholders
will help decision-making become more transparent
and more attuned to various objectives that stake-
holders pursue. For example, it may be the case that
a project has different deliberation matrix scores for
the governments and funding agencies but they both
might find it acceptable and appropriate. In such a sit-
uation, the reasons will be clearer and the areas where
improvement is needed are well documented in the
project score sheet. However, it is important to make
it clear that the proposed approach aims only at assist-
ing the decision-making based on user’s priorities and
by no means prescribe any norms. 
Notes
1. A publicly available full version of the registry was due
to be uploaded in October 2013 on the UNFCCC plat-
form. Updates on prototype registry could be accessed
at: https://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/nama/items
/7476.php.
2. More information can be found in UNFCCC (undated),
available at http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/applica-
tion/pdf/info_note_on_the_registry.pdf.
3. Details can be accessed at https://unfccc.int/coopera-
tion_support/nama/items/6945.php.
4. A very rich discussion on these lines is found in the
debates on the literature on social choice. For a compre-
hensive summary and discussion see Sen (1982; 2002). 
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Table 3: Likely deliberation matrix for a large hydro power project in India
Cluster Positive score Negative score
Political acceptability of High, since it is fully domestically funded Low, assuming only domestic MRV and
international support no judgment on ambition under ICA.
Transformation of economy High, increased share of renewable energy Low
and reduced dependence of imported ex-
haustive fossile fuels sources (energy security)
Social and local acceptability Medium, job creation, cultural acceptance of High, displacement of marginalised 
hydro-power, safe sections and possible empoverishment
Environmental consequences Medium, comparatively low GHG emissions, Medium /low, biodiversity implications
improved ground water table, 
Cost-effectiveness High, proven cheap power Low/medium 
Institutional feasibility High, already in place Low, already in place
Domestic resource use High, domestic resources and technology Low
Reduction in undesirable Medium. Reduced emissions and import High, livelihood losses and increased
impacts dependence income disparity due to displacement, 
political unrest
5. Minutes of the stakeholder consultation can be accessed
at www.teriin.org/projects/nfa/pdf/NFA_NAMA_Stake-
holder_Proceedings.pdf.
6. Minutes of the roundtable discussion can be accessed at
www.teriin.org/projects/nfa/pdf/NFA_NAMA_Roundtabl
e_Proceedings.pdf.
7. It is worth noting here that economist F.A. Hayek, in his
critique of planning for a whole economy, pointed out
that such an exercise would require undertaking an
impossible task of gathering and synthesising enormous
amounts of information.
8. There is a rich debate on the meaning and interpretation
of the term ‘rationality’ and its application to economic
decision making. Here we use it in the standard neo-
classical sense of the term and not in the sense the critics
such as Simon (1985), Sen (2002), Fine (2003) and
some institutional economists refer to it. However, their
concerns are embedded, we believe, in the multiple cri-
teria and method to apply the criteria.
9. This time frame is loosely based on the work of Freeman
and Perez on the pattern of changes in techno-economic
paradigms (Perez 2004).
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Annexure 1: Outcome clusters, criteria, options and guide for proposal scoring (an illustrative list)
Criteria Options*
Political acceptability of international support
Type of finance Grant, equity, concessional loan, commercial loan, oda, philanthropic, private sector…
Nature of technology transfer Concessional, commercial, IPR license, joint R&D, knowledge…
Capacity building Institution level, systemic level, Individual level
Source of finance Green climate fund/UNFCCC, multilateral financial, institutions/outside UNFCCC, bilateral funding/ODA,
(under/outside FCCC) private investors/FDI, Individual/philanthropic
MRV implications International MRV of all aspects of project, International MRV of only supported component of project, 
Only domestic MRV, part domestic, part international MRV, MRV of support
Transformation of economy
Technological Technology transfer agreement in case of imported technology, diffusion of domestically best available
technology, enhancement in R&D infrastructure and/or domestic manufacturing capability, strengthening 
of national/sectoral innovation systems, market creation for new technologies
Private sector participation Increased corporate social responsibility, leverages private finance, encourages private sector R&D, 
Voluntary initiative of private sector, public private partnership
Energy security Increased exploitation of renewable energy, improvement in energy efficiency, reduced reliance on 
imported fuel, reduced demand for energy through behavioral change, reduced energy prices / improved 
access to energy
Impact on manufacturing Addition to domestic manufacturing strength, domestic content of total input/raw material, improvement 
capability in competitiveness in international market, increased demand for domestic products (manufacture)
Lifestylechanges Incentives for change in consumption patterns, Incentives for adoption of best practices, increased 
willingness to pay for environment friendly products, enhanced awareness
Social and cultural acceptability
Reducing income disparity Benefits for population below USD1 (PPP) per day, Proportion of employed people living below USD1 
(PPP) per day,
Job creation Nature (skilled, unskilled etc), type (permanent, temporary, seasonal etc.), reduces unemployment rate, 
no. of jobs per unit of investment
Impact on marginalised Lower gender inequality, Increased resilience, improved social justice
sections of society
Safeguards against risks Health hazards adequately addressed, safety concerns adequately addressed, risk performance against 
(industry) benchmarks
Cultural acceptance Involves a lifestyle change, Involves acceptance of a new paradigm/system/process, promotes change in
attitudes
Environmental impacts
GHG reduction potential Increase in green cover (impact on sinks), Decrease in primary energy use (impact on sources), scale of
impact (local, state, national)
Impact on air quality No impact, increase in emissions of other GHGs i.e. GHGs not covered under KP (SPM/RSPM etc), 
Emissions of toxic air pollutants (acid rain, dioxins etc.),
Impact on biodiversity No impact, ecosystem/biome spread (e.g. fragmentation, connectivity), abundance and distribution of 
species (diversity index), change in status (e.g. from threatened to protected etc)
Impact on water resources No impact, water quality, availibility of water, local access to water, groundwater table
Waste management Quantity of waste generated, type of waste generated, availibility of suitable waste disposal facilities, No 
impact
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Criteria Options*
Impact on soil Top soil (pollution/productivity), ground cover (erosion), salinization (from anthropogenic sources such as
irrigation, fertiliser use etc)
Cost-effectiveness 
Cost of action Investment per unit emission reduction, total cost per unit emission reduction, total cost per unit co-
benefits accrued (whether the costs are lower than a pre-determined benchmark)
Cost of compliance Costs incurred for meeting all the regulatory requirements within the project boundary per unit emission 
reduction achieved (whether the costs are lower than a pre-determined benchmark)
Cost to government  Costs incurred by the government in ensuring/enforcing compliance in terms of per unit of emission 
reduction or output (whether the costs are lower than a pre-determined benchmark)
Cost to beneficiaries Reduce prices of goods and services, development of community assets or other tangible assets, ease of 
access of credit, introducing tax burden on beneficiaries
Cost recovery period /econ- A positive economic NPV, a positive discounted net cash flow, cost of capital <IRR, duration of payback
omic viability of the project  period
Resource (input) efficiency  Extraction of natural resources per unit of output, non-compliance with one or more than one laws and
regulations applicable to the action 
Institutional feasibility
Compliance with existing Compliance with all laws and regulations applicable to the action
laws and regulations
Changes in institutional Existing institutional structures are adequate for undertaking the action, action requires modifications 
arrangement within the existing institutional structure, Action requires establishment of new institutional arrangement
Domestic resource component
Human resources Action enhances the awareness levels of the local population, enhances the knowledge and expertise 
(skills) of the local population/leads to building green societies through green (job) training, enhances 
(provides) job opportunities for the local population, brings about a behavioural change in the local 
population (as a response mechanism to climate change), promotes good health and well-being of the 
local population, enhances economic prosperity and stability amongst the local population, enhances 
economic prosperity and stability amongst marginalised sections of the local population
Natural resource Action enhances the natural resource base of the region, enhances the natural resource base of the 
region, promotes the use of locally available natural resources as raw materials/inputs for the mitigation 
actions, outsources/imports raw materials, etc. from other regions to protect/maintain the natural resource 
base of the region, outsources/imports raw materials, etc, from other regions to address the paucity of 
natural resources in the region, outsources/imports raw materials, etc. from other regions to achieve the 
desired efficiency levels of the employed technologies/processes (in the absence of required materials 
locally)
Financial capital Actions strengthens the local financial market and institutions, promotes the use of local financial 
resources/inputs, promotes investment by external sources/parties
Technological capital Action enhances the technological capital of the region by promoting/incentivising deployment and 
utilisation of new climate friendly technologies, enhances the technological capital of the region by 
promoting/incentivising innovation/development of new technologies, enhances the local technological 
capability of the region by promoting diffusion (commercialization) of certain technologies (through 
demonstration of the environmental effectiveness of the technologies/cost reduction), enhances the 
technological capital of the region by reducing/meeting the ‘learning costs’ of adoption of new 
technologies, i.e. the additional cost involved in adapting to the new technology, enhances the ‘spill-
overs’, that is, transfer of the knowledge or the economic benefits of innovation/technology adoption 
amongst the potential users in the region
Reduction in undesirable impacts
High emission lock-in Duration of lock in compared to a pre-determined period: Scoring guide High (-1), Low (+1)
Import intensity Share of imports to total input value: Scoring guide: increases (-1), declines (+1)
Impact on domestic Whether it puts domestic manufacturers out of business?: Scoring guide, yes (-1), no (+1)
manufacturers
Diversion of resources Does the action needs government support that necessitates limiting support to MDG programs: Scoring 
guide, yes (-1), no (+1)
Livelihood losses Does implementing the action leads loss of livelihood 
Conditionality of support Does the international support impose conditionalities other than MRV (e.g. IMF’s structural adjustment 
program): Scoring guide, yes (-1), no (+1)
Hazardous waste Does the action produces hazardous waste? : Scoring guide, yes (-1), no (+1)
Balance of payments Does the action have potential to negatively affect balance of payments: Scoring guide, yes (-1), no (+1)
Note:
* The list of options is likely to keep evolving with policy, market and technology innovations. We propose these options to be scored as
yes (1) and no (0) except for the outcome cluster “reduction in undesirable impacts”. Particular users may define scoring differently,
provided it maintains comparative consistency and sensitivity of scores)
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Abstract
The transport sector globally is overly dependent on liquid fossil fuels. Electric vehicles (EVs) are
touted as a way of diversifying the fuel mix and helping to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. There
could also be other co-benefits of EVs, such as improved energy security, decarbonising of the elec-
tricity sector, CO2 mitigation and reduction in local air pollution. The Indian government has
recently launched a national electricity mobility mission to promote EVs. There is, however, much
uncertainty in terms of the penetration of EVs in the transport sector, particularly those related to
infrastructure and policies. While the literature on EVs has focused more on the role of electric cars,
it could be electric two-wheelers which could make early headway, as is the case in China where
nearly 120 million such vehicles had been sold by the end of 2012. Three scenarios (Business as
Usual (BAU), Electric Vehicles, and Electric Vehicles Plus 2°), for EVs from 2010 to 2050, are
analysed using the bottom-up energy system ANSWER MARKAL model. The paper makes use of
global CO2 prices for aligning the model with global stabilisation targets. Electric two-wheelers and
electric four-wheelers achieve cost competitiveness in the BAU scenario by 2035, but tax incentives
in the EV scenario help in advancing this to 2020 for electric two-wheelers and to 2025 for electric
four-wheelers. The diffusion of EVs would, however, depend on availability for charging infrastruc-
tures and a strengthened grid for handling increased electricity demand. EVs are not a mitigation
option unless electricity is cleaned up, and EVs, together with smart grids and renewables, can pro-
vide a solution for this.
Keywords: electric vehicles, energy security, CO2 mitigation, co-benefits
TRANSPORT
1. Introduction
The transport sector, amongst the largest energy-con-
suming sectors, is globally overly dependent on liquid
fossil fuels. Of all the fuel used in the transport sector
in 2010, 93%  was oil-based, of which road trans-
portation accounted for 77% (IEA 2011: 109). The
sector’s share in total oil consumption has increased
over the  years, up from 45% in 1973 to 61% in 2010
(IEA 2012). The sector is also a major source of GHG
emissions and accounts for 23% of total global ener-
gy-related CO2 emissions (IEA 2010). The transport
sector is also associated with several environmental
and health hazards. As a result, emission mitigation
and reducing energy consumption have been at the
centre of various national and global energy and envi-
ronmental policy debates in recent years, with trans-
port one of the key sectors involved. In the BLUE sce-
nario prepared by the International Energy Agency
(IEA) (2010), transport  accounts for 37% of total
emission reduction in the long term up to 2050, com-
pared with the baseline scenario. 
Several options have been considered to reduce
emissions and energy consumption of the road trans-
port sector. These include various supply-side meas-
ures such as fuelswitching (e.g. increased use of biofu-
els and compressed natural gas), improved fuel stan-
dards, advanced internal combustion (IC) engine
technology; and demand-side measures such as
modal shifts (e.g. the extension of rail and urban
transport networks). One of the key ways in which
future emissions can be avoided is through the devel-
opment and use of low-carbon technologies (IPCC
2007). In the context of decarbonising transport, elec-
tric vehicles (EVs) are one such option. EVs include
battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel-cell vehicles (FCVs). EVs
are important to decarbonise transport sector in the
long-run (IEA 2013; Offer et al. 2010: 24). According
to IEA projections, in order to meet the global 2°C sta-
bilisation target by 2050, three-fourths of all vehicles
sold in 2050 would need to be EVs of some type (IEA
2013). EVs are touted as a way of bringing in more
renewable energy within the electricity sector if the
batteries can be used as storage and therefore help to
reduce dependence on fossil fuels. There could also
be other co-benefits of increase in share of renewable
electricity and EVs, such as decarbonising of the elec-
tricity sector, CO2 mitigation, and reduction in local air
pollution.
1.1 Electric vehicles
The history of EVs in transportation goes back to the
late 1880s, when the first electric car was introduced
in the German market. Such vehicles gained popular-
ity, and more vehicles were introduced in other
European and US markets. However, after the intro-
duction of petrol-based vehicles in the early 20th cen-
tury, interest in EVs started declining, and after the
economic crash of 1929 many companies manufac-
turing EVs went bankrupt (Hoyer 2008: 65). EVs
again came into prominence for a short period briefly
after World War II, but it was in the early 1990s, when
concerns around vehicular emissions and global cli-
mate change started growing, that EVs started getting
attention from manufacturers and policy makers. This
renewed interest in EVs has been referred to as ‘third
age’ of EVs (IEA 2013). It has witnessed large
improvements in battery capacity and technology,
and a sharp decline in costs of EVs and related com-
ponents. Improvements in technology have also
opened up the possibility of deploying EVs as both a
generation and storage device, thereby using it for
bidirectional power transfer (Guille & Gross 2009:
4379). 
Today the global EV stock has passed 180 000,
representing 0.02% of total passenger cars (Guille &
Gross 2009), with the USA and Japan the two biggest
markets. Different countries have adopted different
strategies and policies to promote EVs. While some,
like the US, have focused on demand and supply side
incentives, others, like Japan and Germany, have
focused more on building the charging infrastructure
for EVs (NEMMP 2012). India has also launched a
national electricity mobility mission plan (NEMMP) to
incentivise production and use of EVs, including
exploring their role in public transportation. While
other countries have focused more on electric four-
wheelers (E4Ws), it is electric two-wheelers (E2Ws)
which have witnessed rapid increase in sales in China.
For example while the global cumulative sales of elec-
tric and hybrids (including plug-in hybrids) were only
5.8 million by end of 2012, E2Ws have achieved a
near-commercial status in China with nearly 120 mil-
lion such vehicles being sold by end of 2012.
However, this success of E2Ws in China has not been
replicated elsewhere. 
While several policies are being used to promote
EVs, little is known about the effectiveness of policies
and the development trends of EVs (Choi & Oh 2010:
2263). There is also much uncertainty about the
future role of EVs in the transportation sector, partic-
ularly matters related to infrastructure and policies. In
this paper we look at the scenarios for EVs in India
and attempt to resolve some of these issues. We first
offer a literature review of different modelling exercis-
es and policy documents within India, and on the
basis of it create alterative storylines for electric vehi-
cles. These alternative storylines are then used to
analyse a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, an elec-
tric vehicle (EV) scenario, and and electric vehicle sce-
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nario in a low-carbon society (EV_LCS). The LCS is
pegged to a global stabilisation target of 2°C. Using
the scenario analysis, the three alternative storylines
for EV in the case of India are explored. The scenarios
span from 2010 to 2050 and are analysed using the
bottom-up energy system ANSWER MARKAL model. 
1.2 the Indian transport sector
The Indian transport sector is dominated by two-
wheelers, which account for 75% of total vehicles sold
in the country (NEMMP 2012). Production of vehicles
has increased by more than 80% in the last five years
(2007-12) (see Figure 1). Despite this rise in produc-
tion, the current level of vehicle penetration in India is
amongst the lowest in the world at 11 cars and 32
two-wheelers per thousand persons. This leaves a
large scope for upward movement, which is further
evidenced by demand projections. For example, in
the short term, India’s demand for passenger vehicles
is expected to go up from a little over two million units
in 2010–11 to around ten million units by 2020.
During this period the global demand is expected to
rise from 73 million units to 108 million units
(NEMMP 2012).
In terms of fuel, Indian transport is mostly depend-
ent on liquid fossil fuels, most of which is imported.
India today imports close to 80% of its crude oil
demand (Figure 2). Transport accounts for about one-
third of total crude oil consumption in the country, of
which road transportation accounts for 80% (NEMMP
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Figure 1: Production of vehicles in India
Source: NEMMP (2010)
Figure 2: Crude oil in India: Consumption and imports 
Source: MoSPI (2012)
2012). Consumption as well as imports of crude oil
have increased exponentially in recent years. While
consumption has increased fourfold during 1991-
2011, imports have gone up by eight times in the
same period. 
This high share of imports has implications for the
Indian economy and also for energy security. Over-
dependence on liquid fossil fuels also leads to
increased emissions of GHG gases and other pollu-
tants such as SO2 and NOx, which not only cause
local air pollution but also contribute to global climate
change. Rising energy consumption in the transport
sector has also led to a rise in emissions. Between
1994 and 2007, total GHG emissions from India went
up by more than 40%, while those from the transport
sector increased by more than 77% (MoF 2012a).
In the case of alternative fuels, India currently has
a national policy for biofuels which runs up to 2017.
The policy mandates blending biofuels, currently 10%
by 2017 and 20% in the longer term. India has also
recently launched a national electric mobility mission
plan (NEMMP) with a total proposed investment of
INR 224 billion (equivalent to USD 3.6 billion) till
2020. The current market for EVs is very small in
India. Though there are different types of E2Ws
(scooters and motorcycles), E4Ws (electric cars), and
electric buses, the overall share of EVs is negligible. In
the 1990s, some Indian firms (Vikram, Mahindra &
Mahindra, Bajaj Auto) had introduced electric two-
and three-wheelers in the market, but they had to dis-
continue them few years later for various reasons.
Another Indian firm, Reva (now acquired by
Mahindra & Mahindra), launched an electric car in
the early 2000s which continues to sell few units even
today. Mahindra & Mahindra launched another elec-
tric car, Mahindra e2O, in India in 2013. In 2010,
Toyota introduced the Prius Hybrid model and has
followed it up by introducing the Camry Hybrid in
2013. In the same year, Tata Motors introduced a
CNG-electric hybrid bus, the first such bus in India
(Tata Motors 2010). Recently a few other Indian firms,
such as Maruti Suzuki and Tata Motors, have
announced plans to introduce electric cars in the
short-to-medium term (Banerjee 2013; Tata Motors
2012). 
2. Literature review
Studies examining various aspects of EVs have grown
in recent years. EVs have been studied in a global
context (IEA 2013; IEA 2010; UNEP 2009), a regional
context (Pasaoglu at al. 2012), a national one (Choi &
Oh 2010; Diamond 2009; Guille & Gross 2009; Huo
et al. 2011; Offer et al. 2010; Ou et al. 2010; Skerlos
& Winebrake 2010; Weinert et al. 2008), and a sub-
national one (Perujo & Ciuoffo 2010; Wu et al. 2012).
Some studies have looked at separate aspects of EVs
(e.g. technical, economic, and energy and environ-
mental) (He et al. 2012; Huo et al. 2012; Pasaoglu et
al. 2012); while a few others have tried to study mul-
tiple aspects of EVs (Choi & Oh 2010; He 2012; Offer
et al. 2010). Studies which model EVs in the short-to-
medium term are limited but growing (Offer et al.
2010; Ou et al. 2010). 
Within EVs, electric 4Ws have generally drawn
more attention; though there have been recent studies
which have specifically looked at electric 2Ws
(Weinert et al. 2008). There have also been studies
which have tried to analyse growth drivers and barri-
ers to EVs (Ou et al. 2010; Weinert et al. 2008). While
a majority of such studies have considered barriers
from a macro-economic perspective, there have been
few which have specifically considered the behaviour-
al aspects, giving insights into barriers to large-scale
adoption of EVs and other alternative fuel vehicles
(Eppstein et al. 2011; Offer et al. 2011). 
The literature has enumerated several co-benefits
of EVs, such as greater energy security (Offer et al.
2010: 24; Skerlos & Winebrake 2010: 706), reduced
GHG emissions (Skerlos & Winebrake 2010: 706),
and improved urban air quality (Fontaine 2008: 23;
Offer et al. 2010:  25). However, quite a few studies
have also pointed out that the ability of EVs to reduce
GHG emissions could be limited when electricity is
derived from coal (Huo et al. 2011: 37; Weinert et al.
2008: 2544). This suggests that the source of electric-
ity becomes important when one considers the GHG
mitigating potential of EVs. Achieving the full GHG
reduction potential of EVs would then demand decar-
bonising the electricity sector, which could give a push
to renewable energy in the electricity sector. Common
barriers to EVs include the relatively high purchase
cost compared to conventional vehicles, lack of charg-
ing infrastructure, the high cost of batteries, slow
charging of batteries, and the limited range of EVs
(Densing et al. 2012: 137; Fontaine 2008: 23; Iyer &
Badami 2007: 4326; Offer et al. 2010: 25; NEMMP
2012; Weinert et al. 2008: 2553) 
There are few India-centric studies on EVs. EVs in
India have been mostly studied within the global con-
text (IEA 2013; IEA 2010; Kyle & Kim 2011; Magne
et al. 2010) and therefore have limited coverage in
terms of parameters such as electricity prices and
additional investments in electricity production. The
document released along with NEMMP contains a
detailed description of the current status of EVs in the
country and the planned scenario for EVs, but only up
to 2020. While the existing literature on the Indian
scenario offers several important insights, these suffer
a few limitations. Most of the studies have a short-
term horizon. A few global studies have considered
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the long-term horizon but they lack details of develop-
ments in the domestic electricity sector which could
impact on EVs and their co-benefits. As has been
pointed out in some literature, there are linkages
between the transport and electricity sectors. Many
changes are proposed in the Indian electricity sector
which could have far-reaching implications. For exam-
ple, several initiatives such as the Jawaharlal Nehru
National Solar Mission (JNNSM) have been launched
to promote the share of renewables in the generation
mix. Similarly, carbon capture and storage technolo-
gies have been proposed for coal power plants to
sequester carbon. A roadmap for transition to smart
grids has also been drawn. These changes, as and
when they occur, hold the potential to both decar-
bonise the electricity sector and make load manage-
ment in the Indian electricity system more efficient.
There is a need to consider the implications of these
changes in the Indian electricity sector on EVs in the
long term. EVs could in turn have vital implications
for energy security, local air quality, GHG mitigation,
and increasing renewables share in the electricity sec-
tor. India is still at a relatively early stage of develop-
ment and, as mentioned, the per capita penetration of
vehicles is still low. There is thus a need to consider
these development and mitigation aspects of EVs in
the long term. The next section describes the method-
ology used to model future role of EVs in India. 
3. Methodology
3.1 Modelling framework
The assessment of future paths for analysing the role
of electric vehicles in India is carried out using an
energy system model, ANSWER MARKAL. The
assessment includes transport as well as the power
sector, embedded within the model to study long-term
transitions up to 2050. An integrated bottom-up mod-
elling framework is used, with an energy system
model and end-use sector models. The ANSWER
MARKAL model framework has a detailed representa-
tion of transport as well as power sector technologies.
It is supported by an end-use demand model, which
provides demand projections for alternative scenarios.
Technology choices within the transport sector
depend a lot on the investments into infrastructures
(rail, road, metros, etc) and therefore the model tran-
sitions within the transport sector are handled sepa-
rately in the transport model. In the ANSWER
MARKAL model, only the competition between alter-
native technologies for a given mode is handled (e.g.
between electric and petrol cars). 
The modelling framework uses the strength of bot-
tom-up models which have a highly disaggregated
representation of the economy with a very detailed
characterisation of technologies and reflecting the
optimistic engineering paradigm (Grubb et al. 1993).
Bottom-up models primarily focus on the energy sec-
tor of economy and have been extensively used for
analysis at national and regional level (Chiodi et al.
2013; Hainoun 2010; Kesicki 2012; McDowall et al.
2012; Winkler et al. 2009). Bottom-up models are
used to assess the energy supply and demand-side
technology-based policies that are not driven by price
(Sarica & Tyner, 2013; Börjesson & Ahlgren, 2012).
They have detailed representation of technological
options in energy supply and the end-use sector in
terms of costs, fuel inputs, and emission characteris-
tics. 
Assessing the role of EVs in the long term involves
analysing different energy markets and the interaction
between them (such as the electricity, oil and gas mar-
kets). It also requires a detailed representation of the
technologies involved. A bottom-up modelling frame-
work like MARKAL is well suited to this and has been
used previously to study long-term transitions in India
(Shukla & Dhar 2011; Shukla et al. 2008). 
3.2 Scenarios
Three scenarios are considered for the study and are
described below
3.2.1 Business as Usual scenario (BAU) 
This scenario assumes future economic development
along the conventional path and therefore the future
socio-economic development mirrors the resource
intensive development path which has been followed
by the current developed countries. The annual GDP
growth rate of 8% for the time period 2011–2032 is
consistent with economic growth projections for India
(Government of India [GoI] 2006) from 2007–2032
period. Population growth and urbanization are
assumed to follow the UN median demographic fore-
cast (UNPD, 2013). The demand for road transporta-
tion has been forecasted using a logistic regression
function to project the growth of transport sector pas-
senger and freight demand. The modewise break-up
for the BAU and EV scenarios are given in Table 1.
The penetration of EVs for intercity road trans-
portation is challenging on account of the limited dis-
tance they can travel on a single charge, and therefore
constraints were introduced to limit the EV at the
maximum to urban transportation. The demand for
urban transportation was taken from Dhar et al. 2013.
This BAU scenario assumes a mild mitigation
action and therefore a stabilisation target of 650 parts
per million by volume CO2 equivalent is considered.
The carbon price is assumed to rise from USD3/t CO2
in 2010 to USD 20/t CO2 in 2050 (Clarke et al. 2007). 
The BAU scenario considers that cities will develop
better infrastructures for public transport as an integral
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part of urban planning. In line with government intent
(MoUD 2006) all Indian cities of two million people or
more are assumed to have metros or bus rapid transit
systems in the future. This is the reason for the rising
share of buses in urban transport. 
Electric and hybrid vehicles currently face low
taxes and excise duty, but receive support in terms of
other enabling conditions (Table 2). The BAU sce-
nario assumes future policies will follow the current
trends.
Electric vehicle scenarios for India: Implications for development and mitigation 44
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION FORUM 2014 
Table 1: Transport demand from road transport (in BPKms*)
Mode 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2-wheeler 260 353 479 545 521
3-wheeler 114 146 185 197 174
4-wheeler† 544 (28.0%) 1230 (40.0%) 2782 (40.0%) 5154 (45.0%) 7817 53.0%)
Bus† 5596 (4.2%) 8796 (5.5%) 9334 (7.1%) 9149 (9.7%) 8859 (11.6%)
Goods LCV 92 169 230 298 375
* Btkms for goods transport.
† Figure in brackets show the share of urban transport.
Table 2: Enabling environment for EVs in BAU and EV scenarios
Source: Facilitations for propagating electric vehicles (n.d.); MoF (2012b); MoF (2012c); 
State government taxes in India (n.d.); Tiwari & Jain (2013)
BAU scenario EV scenario
Excise duty / import duty
Currently EV and hybrid cars carry 12% duty, the same as Considers full duty exemption till 2025 on cars and 
petrol or diesel cars with engine capacities under 1500 cc  batteries, which can help lower capital costs by around 30%
and shorter than 4m. Bigger and longer cars have 24-27% from BAU. The post-2025 tax rate increases and tax parity
duty. Batteries and other parts for EV have no preferential  is achieved by 2040.
treatment in imports.
Sales tax (VAT)
Varies across states, resulting in different prices for cars, Considers half the VAT as in BAU to factor for positive local 
but incentives are provided in a few states. No  environmental benefits till 2025; thereafter an increasing tax 
concessionsfor VAT considered. rate with tax parity by 2040.
Charging infrastructures
No specific investment in charging infrastructures, so An intelligent electric grid which can allow usage of EVs
EVs make use of spare grid capacity. Therefore a max- both as storage and source of electricity. This would also
imum share constraint put on two-wheelers: 10% by entail strengthening the primary transmission (132/220/400/
2050; 7% by 2050 for cars. 765 KV) and secondary transmission (66/132 KV) and 
distribution networks. As a result, 10% increased investment 
on transmission and distribution is considered but 
constraints on EVs are removed.
Dedicated lanes for cycles
A few cities have dedicated cycle lanes or good infra- Dedicated cycle lanes created in million-plus cities and 
structures for cycles. Funding from the centre under the E2Ws with a maximum speed of 25 km/hour allowed on
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission them. Two-wheelers could move faster than average traffic,
should create cycle lanes and a better infrastructure for increasing the appeal of E2Ws. A minimum share of 40%
cycles in the cities, but these limited to non-motorised of motorised two-wheelers are considered electric by 2050.
cycles. Motorised two-wheelers, unlike cyclists, will A shift of at least 25% of non-EV bicycles to EV also
receive no priority. considered.
Public transport
BRT systems expected in all million-plus cities. With improvement in infrastructure for electricity charging, 
city bus companies should use it; so a minimum 10% share 
for buses for intra-city is considered.
Goods transport
Goods transport within cities mainly done by LCVs, Improvement in infrastructure for electricity charging and
tempos, etc, mainly running on diesel. In future, LCVs tax incentives mean that transport companies are expected
are expected to diversify into CNG as fuel.  to move to Evs, so a minimum 10% share for EV LCVs for 
intra-city is considered.
Electric Vehicle scenario
Electric vehicles can deliver multiple co-benefits
(improved environment, energy security, renewable
integration, etc), and the scenario assumes that gov-
ernments recognise these aspects of EVs and push
their penetration. Therefore the scenario considers
that there will be domestic policy support (see Table 2)
for EVs which improve their competitiveness. Govern-
ments also provide greater incentives for research and
development in battery technologies, EV drive trains
and smart grid technologies to enable usage of EVs as
a storage for renewable technologies. The EV sce-
nario also considers that battery costs, which account
for close to half of EV cars’ costs, come down to less
than half of today’s levels in the next 10-15 years
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2012). Advance-
ments in battery technologies, improvements in bat-
tery capacities, declining component costs, and
economies of scale in production will drive the price
reduction of batteries. Improved batteries with higher
energy density will also help reduce the weight of bat-
teries which will further lead to reduction in the cost of
EVs. 
Electric Vehicles Plus 2°C (EV_LCS) scenario
EVs can increase or decrease the emissions from
transport, depending on the CO2 content of electricity
– which can get sufficiently altered if there are strin-
gent climate regimes (Shukla & Dhar 2011). This sce-
nario combines the policy support together with a
high carbon tax corresponding to the globally agreed
vision of a 2°C temperature rise, which in turn corre-
sponds to a stabilisation target of 450 ppmv CO2-eq.
The carbon price trajectory corresponding to stabilisa-
tion at 450 ppmv CO2-eq concentration target, is USD
46 per ton of CO2 in 2020 and rises to USD 200 per
ton of CO2 in 2050 and based on outputs from




In the BAU scenario the overall demand for energy
increases nearly sixfold between 2010 and 2050. The
overall dependence on fossil fuels continues, though
there is diversification towards natural gas. Electricity
starts emerging as a significant option after 2020. This
is driven by three trends: investments in rail-based
transportation for inter-city passenger and freight
movements, implementation of metro projects in all
major cities, and diffusion of EVs (buses, cars, three-
and two-wheelers). The share of EVs in overall elec-
tricity demand is 53.8% in 2020 and this increases to
67.3% in 2050. See Figure 3.
EV and EV_LCS scenarios
The overall demand for energy in the EV scenario is
lower due to the greater role of EVs which are typical-
ly more energy-efficient at the end-use level. In the
EV_LCS scenario, the high carbon price means the
hybrids and more efficient vehicles become cost-com-
petitive, which further reduces demand for energy.
The fuel mix in the EV_LCS scenario also gets further




Electric two-wheelers using lead acid batteries at the
current cost structures achieve cost competitiveness
with conventional two-wheelers by around 2035.
Small two-wheelers and electric bicycles are cost-com-
petitive as early as 2020, but their limited carrying
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Figure 3: Fuel mix for transport in BAU scenario
capacity, speed limits and issues with regard to relia-
bility restrict their wider diffusion.
Electric cars using lithium ion batteries but with a
limited driving range (below 100 km) achieve cost
competitiveness with conventional gasoline- and
diesel-based vehicles by 2035. However, this technol-
ogy may not be easily scalable for a wider set of users
who require a longer driving range and features com-
parable to conventional cars. 
EV and EV_LCS scenarios
The policy actions (see Table 2) for EV help in
advancing the EV story, and by 2020 a substantial
share of electricity is seen in the fuel mix (Figure 4a).
Due to the policy incentives, EV two-wheelers
become competitive by 2020. The policy of allowing
them on cycle tracks gives a further fillip, but there is
also a shift from non-motorised to motorised bicycles
and smaller EV two-wheelers. Electric cars also
become competitive due to tax incentives by 2025
(10 years earlier than BAU), but the more expensive
electric cars with a driving range beyond 300 km do






The overall CO2 emissions from transport increase
nearly five times between 2010 and 2050 and elec-
tricity is also a major contributor towards these and
therefore greater diffusion of EVs does not deliver any
significant benefits for mitigation. See Figure 5.
Figure 5: CO
2
emissions in the BAU scenario
EV and EV_LCS scenarios
The EVs help to lower energy demand (Figure 4a),
but the CO2 emissions in most cases remain either
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Figure 4: Fuel mix for transport in (top graph) EV and (bottom graph) EV_LCS scenarios
equal or slightly higher than in BAU. This is on
account of the high CO2-intensity of electricity (Table
3). However, when the policy actions for EV are com-
bined with a high carbon tax, as happens in EV_LCS
scenario, a major overall reduction in CO2 emissions
happens. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: CO
2
emissions: BAU, EV & EV_LCS
scenarios
The role of electric vehicles in mitigating CO2
emissions is closely related to the CO2 content of elec-
tricity. In the low-carbon scenario, due to increased
share of renewable, nuclear, and carbon capture and
storage, the emission intensity of grid electricity
becomes nearly one eighth of the corresponding BAU
figure in 2050 (see Table 3).
Table 3: Emissions intensity of the grid (t CO
2
/MWh) 
Scenario 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
EV LCS 0.99 0.73 0.34 0.19 0.08
BAU 0.99 0.94 0.86 0.74 0.69 
5. Discussions and conclusions
There is already some production experience of EVs
in India. These include E2Ws (scooters and motor-
bikes), E4Ws (cars), and electric heavy vehicles
(buses). However, the penetration of these vehicles is
still limited. There are limited incentives for EVs, but
they require all the elements of the enabling frame-
work, including infrastructures for charging and smart
grids to leverage renewables. The EVs currently avail-
able have attractive costs but limited driving range,
lower carrying capacity and very low volumes, which
are not helpful in building customer confidence. 
India exhibits a pattern  of EV sales more similar to
China’s than to other markets (like Japan and the
USA), where E2Ws have had a larger market penetra-
tion than E4Ws. This, then, indicates a possibility that
the same growth pattern of EVs could continue in the
short-to-medium term. However, significant penetra-
tion of E2Ws may not be realised till cities develop the
necessary infrastructure. 
In the BAU scenario, current policy trends were fol-
lowed and both E2Ws and E4Ws achieve cost com-
petiveness by 2035. Inadequate investments into grids
and charging for EVs would act as a barrier, however.
Battery costs emerged as a significant barrier as more
than 30% of the cost of the vehicle is the cost of the
battery. In the analysis we considered a battery life of
three years, but if manufacturers are able to provide a
longer warranty for battery the competitiveness of EVs
would improve. Policy support in the form of excise
and sales tax waivers for two-wheelers helps in mak-
ing them cost-competitive by 2020, whereas EV cars
achieve cost competiveness by 2025. A wider diffu-
sion for these would require the strengthening of
transmission networks and the creation of smart grids
to make use of EVs as a storage for electricity. 
The role of EVs in mitigation of CO2 emissions is
closely related to the CO2 content of the electricity. In
the BAU scenario, EVs can even lead to higher CO2
emissions – though if climate constraints exist, a clean-
er electricity can convert EVs into  a mitigation option.
EVs can, however, deliver other co-benefits such as
improved urban air quality, reduced local pollution
and direct health impacts, and could therefore offer
win-win solutions in a carbon-constrained world.
Indian cities have a high use of bicycles and many
cities are creating bicycle lanes under the Jawaharlal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission. Most E2Ws
have speeds below 25 km per hour, and if they were
allowed on bicycle lanes it could provide an addition-
al incentive to switch from gasoline-powered to elec-
tricity-powered two-wheelers.
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Abstract 
Studying development in a climate change context, it is important to analyse the implica-
tions of development on GDP growth, expenditure and resulting emissions. We use the
IRADe LCSD (low-carbon strategy for development activity) analysis model to analyse this
issue. Results show that our Visionary Development scenario, including poverty alleviation
and reaching the level of ‘high human development’ countries by 2050 for indicators like
life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, mean years of schooling, universal access to
water and sanitation, durable housing and clean cooking fuel, are possible with a step up in
government expenditure, proper reallocation of resources, and good governance. It can be
done with the similar high GDP growth rate achieved in the Dynamics as Usual scenario,
and with an increase in CO2 emissions similar to the level of CO2 emissions in that scenario.
Keywords: development, carbon emissions, India, climate modeling 
HOW COMPATIBLE ARE DEVELOPMENT AND 
MITIGATION NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE?
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1. Introduction 
India has many development priorities. It has to lift
354 million people out of poverty (Planning Com-
mission, 2010). A large part of the population is
denied the basic necessities of life such as food and
nutrition, potable drinking water, access to sanitation,
health and education facilities, good housing and so
on. The Indian government is already taking steps to
improve the conditions through its inclusive develop-
ment strategy. However, there is a lack of clear vision
of the present status of India on well-being indicators
and where India should be in the next 35 years (by
2050), what should be long-term targets for well-
being indicators and what kind of interventions are
needed to reach those targets. Most of the official doc-
uments (five year plans, Millennium Development
Goals’ report, economic surveys) do not go beyond
the framework of next five to seven years. 
Since the climate negotiations are centered around
medium-term (2030) and long-term (2050) effects, it
is important for India to assess the required GDP
growth, development expenditure and resulting emis-
sions from development over this time-frame before
making commitments. 
We have built a scenario, Dynamics as Usual
(DAU), which is a business as usual scenario, includ-
ing the impacts of government policies. It was found
that DAU will have a high GDP growth rate, private
consumption expenditure will increase by 2050 and
will achieve a substantial improvement in poverty
alleviation and many well-being indicators. However,
DAU itself will not be sufficient to achieve targets in all
well-being indicators in a reasonable time. Hence, we
suggest a Visionary Development scenario (VD)
which identifies important well-being indicators for
India, sets targets for various indicators and lays out a
pathway to achieve each target by 2050 at the latest.
The two scenarios are then compared for GDP, private
consumption, CO2 emissions and energy intensity,
CO2 intensity etc.
It should be noted here that DAU itself will see
many technological improvements, increased renew-
able and so on. The same assumptions are kept con-
stant for VD, to make the comparison possible and to
analyse the impacts of development. 
We use the Integrated Research and Action for
Development (IRADe) LCSD (low-carbon strategy for
development) model which is a dynamic activity
analysis model. 
2. Literature survey 
Models that assess the economic impact of climate
change in the literature can be classified as bottom-
up, top-down, or integrated. A few modeling studies
have explored India’s options in low-carbon develop-
ment. Weyant and Parikh (2004) analysed how vari-
ous global models have projected India’s emissions.
In recent years, Shukla et al (2009) have studied a
low-carbon pathway for India. It uses a combination
of the ANSWER-MARKAL model and the AIM End
use model to obtain the low-carbon pathway for
India. The model uses a soft linkage between top-
down and bottom-up approaches and demand pro-
jections are done outside the model. 
IRADe, the Energy and Resource Institute (TERI),
and the National Council of Applied Economic
Research (NCAER) created models for the Ministry of
Environment and Forests in 2009 to study the CO2
emissions profile of India (MoEF, 2009). The IRADe
model optimises consumer welfare, states explicit
technological choices, provides energy-economy-
investment-consumption feedback, dynamically opti-
mal investment, resource constraints, endogenous
income distribution and separate consumer demand
systems for each consumer class. The TERI model is a
MARKAL model with pre-determined energy
demand, explicit technological choices and a least-
cost energy solution. The model from NCAER is a
year-by-year simulation model with endogenously
determined prices, energy-economy-investment-con-
sumption feed- back, demand determined by demand
system, myopic market economy, no resource con-
straints and non explicit technological choices. 
The McKinsey report (2009) provides a global
greenhouse gas abatement cost curve for 21 world
regions up to 2030. It assumes GDP and population
growth rates are set exogenously. The report finds that
the GHG emissions can be reduced by 70% by 2030
compared to 1990 levels. 
There are few studies which consider development
goals in climate change framework. Vuuren & Kriegler
(2011) have built global socio-economic scenarios
which consider many possibilities of development lev-
els in the world by 2050 andthe  resulting impact of
emissions as well as the necessity of mitigation and
adaptation efforts. 
IIASA (Austria) has made a global energy assess-
ment (GEA, 2011) and provides low-carbon path-
ways for different regions of the world, including
South Asia, which can be applied to India. These sce-
narios ensure energy security, electricity access and
clean cooking fuel to all and make an assessment of
costs. 
Parikh et al (2013) assess the impacts of develop-
ment initiatives like poverty alleviation, inequality and
rural urban disparity reduction on CO2 emissions in
India in a macroeconomic framework using the
IRADe activity analysis model. 
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3. Methodology
3.1 IRADe activity analysis model 
Among energy models, the bottom-up models bring
technological knowledge and specificity, but often
techno-economic evaluations are incomplete and
overly optimistic, in that policy and institutional obsta-
cles are not fully accounted for. Top-down models
bring macro-consistency but simplify the sectoral
details by judgments and assumptions. Among them
are econometric models which use reduced form
equations, but the structural relationships behind
these remain unclear and implicitly constant. Another
approach of top-down modelling is the computable
general equilibrium (CGE) approach where a
sequence of single period equilibria is worked out. In
econometric and CGE models, often a high elasticity
of substitution is assumed which makes it easy and
relatively costless to adjust to CO2 constraints. The
problem is thus assumed away. An activity analysis
approach permits macro-consistency, dynamic behav-
iour, new and specific technological options and thus
limited substitution. It can constitute a truly integrated
top-down-bottom-up approach. 
The IRADe LCSD model is a dynamic multi-sec-
toral inter-temporal linear programming activity
analysis model based on an input-output framework.
The input-output matrix used in the model is based
on the Social Accounting Matrix for India 2003–04.
(Saluja, Yadav, 2006). The model runs at constant
prices of 2003–04.
The model maximises the present discounted
value of private consumption over the planning peri-
od (45 years (2005-50).
Objective function:






are the total population and
total per capita consumption at time t. T is the plan-
ning horizon (2005 to 2050). The discount rate is
denoted by r. The term PC bar is the discounted sum
of per capita consumption beyond the period of opti-
misation after which the consumption is assumed to
grow at a fixed rate called the post-terminal growth
rate. 
The model scenarios cover the period from 2005
to 2050 and have nine time periods, five years apart.
Thus, it is solved simultaneously for 2005, 2010, and
2015 up to 2050. Scenario results are reported for
2050 as well as decadal values of 2020, 2030 and
2040. Investments to different sectors of the economy
are determined endogenously in the model, which
eliminates the need for arbitrary determination of allo-
cation that is required in a sequential model solved
period by period. To smoothe the growth path of the
model, monotonicity constraints are added for per
capita total consumption, sectoral output and sectoral
investments. (Constraint equations used in the model
are given in Annexure 1.) 
The various consistencies in the model ensure that
all the feedback is taken into account and that there
are no  supply sources or demand sinks in the system
unaccounted for. Thus, the model is suited for multi-
sectoral, inter-temporal dynamic optimisation. This
permits exploration of alternative technologies and
CO2 reduction strategies from a long-term dynamic
perspective and permits substitution of various kinds. 
The model is solved using the general algebraic
modelling system (GAMS) programming tool devel-
oped by Brooke et al (1988). For consistency in
endogenous income distribution, optimal solutions
are iterated, changing distribution parameters among
iterations until they converge.
The major instruments of control in the model are:
the upper bound on the marginal savings rate, the
exogenous government consumption growth rate, the
exogenous discount rate and the upper bound on the
consumption growth rate. The assumptions about
these parameters are given below. The assumptions
noted below remain the same across all scenarios. 
Table 1: Assumptions about important control
parameters in the IRADe–LCDS model
Assumptions Rate
(%per annum)
Upper bound on savings rate 35(of GDP)
Upper bound on growth rate of 
household consumption 9
Discount rate 4
Post terminal growth rate 2
Growth rate of government consumption 7  
Total factor productivity growth rate for 
agriculture 1
Total factor productivity growth rate for
industry and services 1.5
Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) represents
the percentage increase in output that can be pro-
duced for the same amount of capital stock and
labour force. Various studies have estimated India’s
TFPG as ranging from 1.4% per year to 2.5% per
year (Fuglie 2010; Das et al 2010; Goldar & Mitra
2008; Bosworth et al 2006; Rodrik & Subramanian
2005; Jorgenson 2005). This study assumes a TFPG
rate of 1.5% per year in DAU. 
4. Assumptions behind DAU
Some assumptions behind the DAU scenario regard-
ing the role of government and technology options in
the power sector are specified in detail below. 
4.1. Role of government
The government consumption growth rate is pre-
scribed exogenously and is assumed to be a uniform
7% per annum for all commodities over time. This will
keep roughly constant the share of government
expenditure in GDP. All the government expenditure
including that on welfare schemes incurred on and
before 2003–04 is accounted for in DAU. Similarly,
government initiatives on the climate change front
taken on or before 2003–04 are accounted for, and
the trend is assumed to continue until 2050 in DAU. 
However, the government has started many wel-
fare schemes like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), and the
right to education, etc since 2005. For action on cli-
mate change, the National Action Plan on Climate
Change (NAPCC) has been developed. The policies
and schemes started after 2005 are not accounted for
in the DAU scenario. If these measures were account-
ed for, the DAU scenario would show a lower growth
rate and lower emissions, as NAPCC measures
involve additional costs, such as the subsidy provided
to solar power through a higher feed-in tariff com-
pared to the cost of power from conventional sources.
4.2 Electricity generation options
The DAU scenario considers various options in elec-
tricity generation. 
Coal 
Coal is the main fuel for power plants in India. Two
types of plants are considered, sub-critical and super-
critical. The latter is more expensive but uses less coal.
The government has already taken steps to replace
sub-critical coal with super-critical coal technology.
The target is to replace 70% of coal-based electricity
generation plants with supercritical coal-based tech-
nology power plants by 2050 (Planning Commission
2011), hence DAU incorporates this target. An
increased cost of coal has already been taken into
account by imposing a constraint on total coal avail-
ability and through higher price of imported coal.
Nuclear energy 
India’s installed nuclear capacity as on March 31,
2013 was 4 780 MW, consisting mainly of domestic
pressurised heavy water reactors, which require natu-
ral uranium as the fuel. By the end of the twelfth five-
year plan (in 2017), a capacity of 5 300 MW will be
added. Thus, existing plants plus plants under con-
struction will give an installed capacity of 11 000 MW.
DAU freezes the nuclear capacity at this level. The
same upper bound is imposed on the other scenario.
Nuclear power poses many issues of waste disposal,
costs of decommissioning and the consequences of
large accidents, even though the probability of such
accidents may be very small. 
Hydropower
The ultimate potential for generating power from
hydro plants is 150 000 MW at 35% load factor
(Planning Commission 2006). According to the expert
group on low-carbon strategy, only when the costs of
resettlement, deforestation and emissions from land
clearing are accounted for should a hydro project be
considered viable (Planning Commission 2011). 
Natural gas
India’s natural gas potential is limited and an import
ceiling of 50% of total domestic requirement is
imposed. The infrastructure to import and use gas is
limited but dependence on external resources is a risk
that must be kept in check. 
Renewables 
Renewable technologies like wind, solar thermal, and
solar photovoltaic with and without storage are avail-
able as options. Investments are already being made
in renewables and hydro; solar PV with and without
storage and wind are expected to come up by 2050 in
both DAU and VD scenarios. The costs of these tech-
nologies is assumed to fall over the years and targets
of the NAPCC are incorporated in DAU and VD. 
4.3 Autonomous energy efficiency
improvement
The change in the energy/GDP ratio that is not related
to the change in the relative price of energy is called
autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI). It
is an empirical representation of non-price-driven
changes in technology that are increasingly energy-
efficient. Table 2 shows the AEEI values used in the
DAU scenario. However, the AEEI valuesfor coal use
in electricity generation and gas input in gas]based
power plants have been restricted to 1.0% per
annum. Electricity used in electricity generation has
an AEEI of 0.5%. 
Table 2: AEEI parameters in DAU
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5. Visionary Development scenario 
The construction of the VD scenario is detailed below.
The analysis is done in three steps. In the first, well-
being indicators for India are determined and devel-
opment thresholds for 2050 fixed. Secondly, the
causal factors behind the indicators are identified and
statistically tested. Finally, the interventions necessary
to achieve those development thresholds are pre-
scribed and incorporated to form the scenario. The
results are compared with the situation of develop-
ment thresholds in the DAU scenariol, and implica-
tions for carbon emissions are noted. 
5.1 Well-being indicators and development
thresholds
There are a number of indices and measures, which
are currently being used to measure human develop-
ment across countries. Most popular are the Human
Development Index (HDI), multidimensional poverty
index and Millennium Development Goals given by
the UNDP. The World Bank provides a comprehen-
sive time series of cross-country data on a number of
indicators. The UN’s department of social and eco-
nomic affairs (population division) provides data on a
number of health- and education-related indicators. In
India, the Planning Commission, National Sample
Survey and Economic Survey provide national as well
as state level data on the progress of well-being indi-
cators.
To realise the VD goals, well-being indicators need
to be quantified and measurable targets should be set
for each well-being indicator. Hence, a development
threshold is defined for each well-being indicator to be
achieved by 2050. The methodology adopted to
define development thresholds is given below. 
For a similar discussion on well-being indicators in
a macroeconomic framework see MOSPI (2013a).
5.2 Methodology adopted to determine the
development thresholds
The UNDP classifies countries into four categories, as
shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Country classification on the basis of the
Human Development Index
Source: UNDP (2013a)
Level of human Range of HDI Average value of 
development values (in 2012) HDI (in 2012)
Very high 0.0805 to 0.955 0.905
High 0.712 to 0.796 0.758
Medium 0.536 to 0.710 0.640
Low 0.304 to 0.534 0.466
India has a HDI value of 0.554 in 2012 and ranks
136th among 186 countries. It lies in the lower range
of medium human development countries. The VD
scenario aims to raise India to the ‘very high’ category
by 2050 and increase its HDI value to 0.905, which is
the current average HDI of the very high human
development countries as per the latest Human
Development Report (UNDP, 2013a). The current
value for India given in the Report is taken as the
baseline for well-being indicators in health and educa-
tion. The current average value of very high human
development countries (including Germany, Sweden,
United States, Japan, Israel and Australia in a total of
47 countries) for these categories is taken as the
development threshold to be achieved by 2050. 
In the case of basic services (water, sanitation) we
have followed the definition of indicators given by the
World Bank (2013). The data given by the Planning
Commission (2010) is taken as the baseline. The tar-
get is to achieve 100% access to these basic services
as early as possible (not to wait for 2050).For housing,
we have used latest Census (2011) data as a baseline
and the target is to convert all non-durable houses
(kuchha) to durable houses and take care of the addi-
tional housing requirement. For clean cooking fuel
and electricity, too, we have taken Census 2011 data
as the baseline, and the target is to cover the popula-
tion, which currently lacks access to these services.
Halving the population living below the poverty line
between 2000 and 2015 was a Millennium Develop-
ment Goal. Extending this, the target is set to com-
pletely alleviate poverty before 2050. Table 4 provides
a brief description of each well-being indicator, the
present value of the indicator, the development
thresholds selected, and the gap between the two. 
5.3 Determining the factors governing well-
being indicators
To achieve the given development thresholds for var-
ious well-being indicators from now to 2050 requires
mapping a pathway for each indicator. To understand
the factors determining the level of well-being indica-
tors a literature survey was carried out which was fol-
lowed by extensive regression analysis using eVIEWS
to determine the causal relationship between well-
being indicators and income and non-income factors.
For example, the infant mortality rate is affected by
the level of public health expenditure in the country
and improved water and sanitation facilities. For this
exercise, the cross-country data for year 2011 of the
World Bank was used (World Bank, 2013).
5.4 Development interventions and policy
framework for the VD scenario
i) Access to improved water sources and sanitation 
Water and sanitation issues should be tackled togeth-
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er. Water and sanitation facility provision comes main-
ly under public services and is primarily considered a
government responsibility. But according to the
twelfth five-year plan, the government of India has
spent, during the eleventh plan, only 67% of the plan
allocation on water and sanitation (Planning Com-
mission 2012). In VD, government will spend all its
allocation on water and sanitation. Rural drinking
water and sanitation programmes are converged. Also
in urban areas, every water supply project will also
have a sewage treatment plant as per the twelfth five-
year plan target (Planning Commission, 2012). The
problem of drinking water is more acute in rural areas.
The ‘slipped back’ habitations will be covered under
the VD scenario. Rural drinking water schemes will be
integrated into national aquifer management. Thus,
we project that coverage of clean drinking water and
sanitation will be 100% by 2015. 
ii) Increase in government expenditure on health and
education 
The government spends only 1.3% of India’s GDP on
the health sector compared to the 8.2% of GDP by
very high human development countries (UNDP
2013b). Currently the focus is on expanding public
health care facilities as per the twelfth five-year plan
(Planning Commission 2012). But VD envisages an
equal focus on preventive health care. 
Government expenditure on education has
improved in recent years, increasing from 2.72% of
GDP in 2006–07 to 3.11% of GDP in 2011–12 (Min-
istry of Finance 2012). But given the mean of only
5.48 years of schooling and a target of attaining 11.6
years of schooling, India needs to boost its efforts to
increase the education level. Thus in the VD scenario
we increase government expenditure on health and
education as a proportion of GDP by 4 percentage
points in 2015 to reach a level of 7% of GDP and
thereafter the government expenditure on health and
education grows at the same rate as government con-
sumption. Many countries with a good record in
health and education have public expenditure on
health and education at around 7% of GDP. Also the
government target is to raise it to 6% of GDP. We have
taken a higher level for the VD scenario.
iii) Housing, electricity and clean cooking fuels
Durable houses to all 
The Census of India distinguishes between houses as
kuchha (non-durable), pucca (durable) and semi-
pucca (semi-durable). According to the 2011 Census,
there are 13 million non-durable houses in the coun-
try, which are owned by the very poor. Government
has launched two schemes for helping the poor to
build durable houses: Indira Awas Yojana (scheme for
housing in rural areas) and Rajiv Awas Yojana
(scheme for housing in urban areas) (MRD 2013;
MHUPA 2013). The eleventh five year plan provided
about 1.5 million houses under these schemes, imply-
ing a rate of 0.3 million housing units being built every
year (Planning Commission 2011). VD aims to
increase the pace of providing such houses, stepping
up from 0.3 to 0.5 million units per year by 2015 and
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Table 4: Selected well being indicators for India in the VD scenario
Description of the indicator Most recent avail- Development thresh- Gap between
able value of the  old to be achieved present and 
indicator by 2050 or before threshold values
Human development index (HDI)a 0.554 0.905 0.351
Life expectancy at birth a 65.8 80.1 14.3
Infant mortality rate a 48 5 -43
Mean years of schooling a 5.48 11.5 7.1
Households with access to improved water source (%) b 90.5 100 9.5
Households with access to improved sanitation facilities (%) b 47.2 100 52.8
Rural households with access to clean coking fuels (%) c 11.9 100 88.1
Urban households with access to clean cooking fuels (%) c 65.5 100 34.5
Rural households living in durable houses (%) c 46 100 54
Urban households living in durable houses (%) c 68 100 32
Percentage of rural households with access to electricity (%) c 55.3 100 44.7
Percentage of urban households with access to electricity (%) c 92.7 100 7.3
Poverty headcount ratio b 29.8 0 -29.8
a. UNDP (2013a)
b. Planning Commission of India (2010) 
c. Census of India (2011) 
to one million units per year till 2025. So the scenario
envisages that apart from the current rate of 0.3 mil-
lion houses per year, an additional 0.2 million houses
will be built each year till 2015 and an additional 0.7
million each year from 2015 to 2025. 
Under Indira Awas Yojana, assistance of INR
45 000 is provided to the poor for building houses. At
2003–2004 prices (used in the model), the cost is INR
30 000. Taking into account houses to be built in
addition to the government target and per house cost,
total costs are calculated as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Total costs of building additional houses 
2010 2015 2020 2025
Additional houses (millions) 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.7
Total cost @ INR 45 000 
(2010 price)/unit 
(INR billions) 90 315 315 315
Total cost @ INR 30 000 
(2003–04 price)/unit 
(INR billions) 60 210 210 210
The total costs from 2010 to 2015 are thus INR 60
billion each year of building additional houses apart
from houses getting built under Indira Awas Yojana.
From 2015 onwards, the total costs each year are INR
210 billion. This is what is modelled as the additional
demand for construction by government, which they
assured in houses for the poor. It is assumed that the
income levels will go up with economic development
by 2025 and there will be no need to provide govern-
ment assistance to built durable houses beyond 2025.
Access to electricity 
India has already made some progress in increasing
access to electricity, especially in urban areas. The
Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana electrifi-
cation programme had a target to connect all villages
by electricity by 2012 and to provide free connection
to all households below the poverty line. While there
have been slippages, one expects that all but some
25 000 remote villages will be grid-connected soon.
However, the power supply is erratic and electricity
consumption is low. Access to electricity is a dynamic
concept, whereby electricity consumption will go up
with an increase in income level as well as lifestyle
changes over a period of time. Taking into account
these changes, VD aims to give an electricity access of
a minimum of 1 kWh electricity per household per
day which is adequate to use modern electric appli-
ances like tube lights, fans, refrigerators, etc. In the VD
scenario, households consuming less than 1 kWh per
day are given the balance amount of electricity by the
government which pays for it. The derivation of total
value of per capita annual electricity consumption
paid by government to poor households is shown in
Table 6.
Table 6: Derivation of subsidy for minimum
electricity consumption
Price of electricity (INR/kWh) in 2003–04: 2.13
Minimum electricity access (kWH/household 
per day): 1
Minimum annual electricity consumption 
per person (kWH): 73
Total value of per capita annual electricity 
consumption (INR): 155.49
Access to clean cooking fuel 
The majority of rural households still depend heavily
on firewood as cooking fuel. Thus VD aims to provide
a LPG connection to all households in both rural and
urban areas. A lump sum subsidy will be given to poor
households who cannot afford to buy a LPG connec-
tion. A subsidy can be gradually removed when the
total income of the poor increases and they can afford
clean cooking fuel on their own. Simultaneous inno-
vations in efficient cooking stoves, biogas plants to
reduce indoor air pollution and pressure on forests are
necessary. The Indian Network on Ethics and Climate
Change has compiled eight case studies on such pos-
sible micro-interventions at community level (INECC
2011). In the VD scenario the poorer households’
expenditure on cooking fuels is supplemented by gov-
ernment so that they have six cylinders of LPG per
year.
iv) Cash transfer to the poor 
In the VD scenario from 2015 onwards, each person
in the poorest two household classes in rural and
urban areas receives INR 3000(at 2003–04 prices) per
person per annum. This cash transfer can be taken as
the sum of all kinds of cash transfers received by the
poor, for example in the form of cash transfer for food,
guaranteed wages received for unskilled labour under
an employment guarantee scheme (like MGNARE-
GA), or some subsidies. It is assumed that the govern-
ment is able to levy additional tax on the richer classes
and is able to target it effectively. Even though effec-
tiveness of targeting is very questionable, a cash trans-
fer instrument is used to get maximum impact on
poverty reduction at minimum cost. 
5.5 Assumptions regarding technology options
in the VD scenario 
The scenario focuses on development interventions
over and above DAU. Hence, all the specifications in
DAU related to energy mix, TFPG, AEEI, energy
options and role of renewables remain intact in VD.
For example, a target in VD is to attain universal
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access to electricity, ignoring whether the electricity
derives from fossil fuels or renewables. 
6. Results 
The VD scenario has many development interven-
tions in the economy and aims to achieve the devel-
opment thresholds of well-being indicators latest by
2050 as discussed above. The following section dis-
cusses the results of VD. First, it is compared with the
DAU scenario for well-being indicators. A cost com-
parison and the impact on carbon emissions are dis-
cussed in later sections. 
6.1 Achievements in well-being indicators
Well-being indicators reach the threshold levels by
2050 and some even before then. As one can see in
the results given below, DAU itself is a development
pathway and makes substantial achievements in
many well-being indicators by 2050. However, VD
accelerates this development and achieves either bet-
ter or faster development. 
Note that in all the diagrams of well-being indica-
tors the horizontal line shows the targeted threshold
value.
6.1.2 Health indicators 
Life expectancy at birth 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years
a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same
throughout its life. It is a comprehensive health indica-
tor. According to regression analysis, life expectancy at
birth depends on the availability of clean water, sani-
tation facility, and the prevailing death rates. Table 7
shows the coefficients of regression for life expectancy
at birth for a female (see also Figure 1).
Table 7: Life expectancy at birth (female)
Constant 54.63
Weighted average of rural and urban availability 
of water (percentage of population with access) 0.12
Sanitation (percentage of population with access) 0.20
Death rate (no. of deaths per 1000 population) -0.94
Regressions are confirmed by cross-checking the
value for the base year 2010 with currently available
actual values for India. According to the Planning
Commission of India (2010), life expectancy at birth
for females was 64 in 2010. Given the prevailing rates
of availability of water, there will be universal access
to water by 2020 in DAU. However, sanitation facili-
ties will reach only 68% of the population by 2050 in
DAU. Death rates are already low and projected to go
down to 8 by 2050 in DAU. Hence, by 2050 life
expectancy of females will increase to 72 years in the
DAU scenario; in the VD scenario it will reach 80. 
Life expectancy at birth for males is generally
below that for females. The regression results suggest
that life expectancy for males depends on water, san-
itation, death rate and income (see Figure 2).
According to the Planning Commission (2010), life
expectancy at birth for males is 62 years at present.
DAU projects it to increase to 69 years by 2050. With
additional measures for health, water and sanitation,
VD projects life expectancy of males to reach 76
years.
Table 8: Life expectancy at birth (male)
Constant 57.81
LOG(GNI/CAP) -0.24
Death rate (no of deaths per 1000 population) -1.02
Weighted average of rural and urban availability 
of water (percentage of population with access) 0.09
Sanitation (percentage of population with access) 0.17
Figure 2: Life expectancy at birth (male)
Infant mortality rate 
The Infant mortality rate is defined as the number of
deaths of children before they attain the age of one,
per 1000 live births (World Bank, 2011). Currently,
infant mortality rates in India are 31 in urban and 51
in rural areas, which are very high. The regression
analysis shows that infant mortality depends on
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Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth (female)
female literacy, public health expenditure and water
and sanitation.
Table 9: Infant mortality
Constant 158.13
Public health expenditure -0.27
Sanitation -0.38
Weighted average of rural and urban 
availability of water -0.37
Female literacy rate -0.59
Figure 3: Infant mortality rate
DAU makes substantial progress in reducing the
infant mortality rate (IMR) by 2050 and achieves the
target of five by 2050. However, higher health and
education expenditure, universal access to water and
sanitation reduces IMR even faster in VD. A threshold
of five is almost reached in 2030 itself and by 2040
IMR reduces to two. 
6.1.3 Education 
Mean years of schooling 
Mean years of schooling is calculated as the average
number of years of education received by people
aged 25 and older, converted from education attain-
ment levels using official durations of each level.
Currently, the mean period of schooling is 5.48 years.
DAU projects it to reach the threshold level of 11 years
by 2050. However, an increase in expenditure on
education in VD is expected to increase literacy levels,
school enrolment ratios and reduce dropout rates,
and VD achieves 10.72 years of schooling by 2040
and exceeds the threshold level in 2050 to achieve 12
years.
Figure 4: Mean years of schooling
6.1.4 Poverty 
Population below poverty line 
The poverty line is defined in terms of the class
boundary of the second-poorest class in rural and
urban areas respectively. The poverty line in rural
areas is the upper class limit of RH2, INR 6 800 per
annum or INR 227 per month per person at 2003–04
constant prices. In urban areas, the poverty line is the
class boundary of class UH2, which is INR 10 800 per
annum or INR 360 per month per person at 2003–04
constant prices. Hence, the poverty line and the pop-
ulation below the poverty line are not strictly compa-
rable with the national data. However, they are useful
for comparing results of scenarios in a consistent man-
ner. 
Figure 5: Rural population earning less than INR 227
at 2003–04 constant prices
DAU shows the level of poverty as counted by the
model, if the trend of poverty alleviation measures
taken before 2005 continues. With this definition,
there are 242 million persons spending less than INR
227 at 2003–04 constant prices in rural areas in 2005.
By 2020, there will be 92 million earning less than
INR 227 and by 2050, there will be no one earning
less than INR 227 at 2003–04 constant prices. Hence,
DAU will shift the majority of rural population to mid-
dle class (classes RH3, RH5, RH6) by 2050. 
The VD scenario accelerates the process of pover-
ty alleviation by providing cash transfer to the persons
falling into the poorest two rural classes. The cash
transfer is given until every person enters RH3 or
spends more than INR 227 in monthly consumption
expenditure. After that, the cash transfer instrument
automatically gets eliminated. With a cash transfer of
INR 3000 per person per year, poverty is eliminated
at a faster rate; by 2020 there will be 25 million poor
in rural areas spending less than INR 227 at 2003–04
prices. By 2030 only 4 million, and by 2040 no-one
will be spending less than INR 227 in rural areas. 
In the Indian scenario, urban poverty is already
limited compared to rural areas (both in terms of the
absolute number of people below the poverty line and
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the headcount ratio of poverty). The same is reflected
in the trends shown by DAU and VD. In DAU, there
are only eight million poor earning less than INR 360
per person per month at 2003–04 constant prices in
2030. By 2040 only one million will be earning less
than INR 360 and poverty is alleviated in that sense.
In VD, poverty is eliminated faster than in DAU until
2040 and it is completely eliminated in 2040 because
of cash transfers. 
5.1.4 Access to services 
Access to water and sanitation 
According to World Development Indicators, the
World Bank’s collection of development indicators,
access to an improved water source refers to the per-
centage of the population with reasonable access to
an adequate amount of water from an improved
source, such as a household connection, public stand-
pipe, borehole, protected well or spring and rainwater
collection. Unimproved sources include vendors,
tanker trucks, and unprotected wells and springs.
Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at
least 20 litres of water per person per day from a
source within one kilometre of the dwelling.
Currently, more than 80% of households have
access to clean water. In the DAU scenario, by 2020
the entire population will have access to clean water.
VD achieves universal access to clean water by 2015.
See Figure 7.
Access to improved sanitation facilities includes
access to a latrine facility with water closet or covered
pit latrine or public latrine (World Bank 2012).
Currently, 67.3% of households do not have access to
sanitation facilities and have to opt for open defeca-
tion (Census 2011). If this trend follows in the DAU
scenario only 68% of the population will have access
to sanitation facilities by 2050. In VD, 90% will have
access by 2030, and by 2040 universal access to san-
itation is provided. See Figure 8.
Access to electricity 
At present, 67% of households have access to electric-
ity but, even though they are connected to the grid,
access is limited due to power cuts (Census 2011).
The model shows that poor households (people in
household consumption classes of RH1, RH2 and
RH3 in rural areas) consume less than 1kWh of elec-
tricity per household per day in the DAU scenario.
Thus, in the VD scenario, subsidised electricity is pro-
vided to poor households in these three classes to
increase their electricity consumption above 1 kWh
per household per day, or above 365 kWh per
annum. Assuming a household size of five persons, it
translates to electricity access of 73 kWh per person
per annum.
Figure 9 shows that in the DAU scenario the aver-
age electricity consumption of poor households from
RH1, RH2 and RH3 is merely 13 kWh per person per
annum in 2020. By 2040, on average every person in
a poor household will consume 79 kWh of electricity
per annum, and by 2050 average consumption will
increase to 174 kWh per person per annum. 
In the DAU scenario, electricity consumption by
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Figure 6: Urban population earning less than INR
360 at 2003–04 constant prices
Figure 7: Access to clean water Figure 8: Access to sanitation
poor households (UH1, UH2 and UH3 household
consumption classes) in urban areas will be 58 kWh
per person per annum in 2020. By 2030, every poor
household will consume more than 78 kWh of elec-
tricity per person per annum. In the VD scenario, the
electricity consumption of poor households will
exceed 79 kWh per person per annum and will be 101
kWh in 2020; by 2050,electricity consumption will be
322 kWh per person per annum (see Figure 10).
Access to clean cooking fuel 
According to Census 2011, only 29% of households
in India use LPG or PNG as a cooking fuel. The rest,
mainly in rural areas, depend on firewood, cow dung
cake, crop residues, etc. VD aims to provide universal
access to LPG and/or PNG. In that scenario, a mini-
mum of six LPG cylinders is provided to all those
households that are already not consuming LPG. 
VD envisages development in important well-
being indicators like health, education, access to vari-
ous services and poverty reduction. These can be
achieved mainly with income growth, targeted assis-
tance/subsidies reaching the poor and increase in gov-
ernment expenditure on health and education, along
with good governance. The values of well-being indi-
cators in the VD scenarios are summarised below. 
6.2 Assessment of the cos of the VD scenario
The VD scenario maximises the per capita consump-
tion expenditure similarly to DAU. However, due to
various development interventions, the government
consumption increases. Many investments are reallo-
cated to prefer increase in household consumption on
health, education, housing, electricity, cooking fuel
etc. Figure 11 shows that per capita consumption
expenditure remains similar in DAU and VD. While it
would seem that income transfer to the poor should
have increased average per capita consumption in
VD, this does not happen because the transfer is
financed by a tax on the richer classes. This would
affect the savings of different classes. However, we do
not take class-wise savings and the aggregate saving
in the economy is endogenously determined in the
model to optimise the present discount value of pri-
vate consumption over time (Chidiak & Tirpak 2008). 
Figure 11: Per capita consumption expenditure in
DAU and VD
GDP is also comparable in DAU and VD. GDP
grows at a slightly higher rate of 7.02% from 2010 to
2050 in the VD scenario. Figure 13 gives the GDP
comparison of DAU and VD in constant 2003–04
prices.
Figure 12: GDP in DAU and VD
6.3 Impact of VD on carbon emissions
One would expect that development in all fields will
lead to significant increases in carbon emissions in
VD. However, results show that emissions are in fact
similar in both scenarios, mainly because the technol-
ogy and energy mixes are kept the same. It gives an
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Figure 9: Per person per annum average electricity
consumption in poor rural households
Figure 10: Per person per annum average electricity
consumption in poor urban households
important message that VD is, in fact, possible, with-
out increasing carbon emissions compared to DAU. 
Cumulative emissions grow from 40 to 385
Gigatonnes by 2050 in DAU whereas in VD they
increase from 40 to 381 Gigatonnes. Slightly lower
emissions in the VD scenario result from the lower
electricity consumption of richer classes. Annual CO2
emissions in DAU increase from 4 443 million tonnes
in 2020 to 20 072 in 2050. VD has a similar level of
annual CO2 emissions. Per capita emissions will reach
13.1 tonnes by 2050 from 3.4 tonnes in 2020 in DAU
scenario. VD will have 3.3 tonnes per capita emissions
in 2020 and will reach 13.1 tonnes by 2050. See
Figures 13–16.








The paper explores the possible interventions for
reaching development thresholds by 2050 and analy-
ses its implications on GDP, consumption, emissions
vis-à-vis business as usual. These issues were exam-
ined with the help of a bottom-up-top-down macro-
model, which covered the whole economy and pro-
vided alternative technologies. This model optimised
the present discounted value of household consump-
tion over 2005 to 2050. The main findings of the
paper are summarised below. 
7.1 Dynamics as Usual 
India needs to grow to take care of its human devel-
opment needs. The DAU scenario that continues the
policies of 2003–04 shows that, with compound
annual growth rate of 6.96% of GDP and 7.69% of
private consumption over 2010 to 2050, per capita
consumption per year will exceed INR 490 000 in
2003–04 prices. With this high growth rate and with-
out any special measures to reduce emissions, India’s
emissions in 2050 will reach about 13.1Gt of CO2.
Cumulative emissions in this scenario over 2010 to
2050 will be 385 Gt of CO2.
The shares of different sectors in emissions will
change dramatically over time. The share of the ener-
gy sector (i.e. coal, gas, oil, petroleum products sup-
ply) remains more or less constant at around 5–7%
percent. The share of the power sector, however,
declines dramatically from nearly 60% in 2007 to
30% by 2050. The share of transport increases from
11% in 2007 to 40% by 2050. The share of industry
comes down from around 25% in 2007 to 16% by
2050.
Progress in the well-being indicators of human
development will be steady and many of the target
thresholds will be reached by 2050. 
Electricity generation remains dominated by coal.
However, the share of coal for subcritical power plants
goes down from 67% in 2010 to slightly more than
20% by 2050 when supercritical coal provides more
than 50% of electricity. Renewables such as wind,
solar and hydro become important only in later years
and in 2050 provide 14% of electricity generation. 
7.2 Visionary Development
India’s human development index is currently low,
below the average of medium human development
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countries. For the VD scenario, well-being indicator
thresholds were set based on the indicators of high
human development countries. Then the develop-
ment thresholds were set for water, sanitation, health,
education, housing, poverty, clean cooking fuel,
access to electricity. The government’s Bharat Nirman
target was to have 100% provision of safe drinking
water by 2012. The trend shows that even under
DAU, safe drinking water will be available to all by
2020.
A number of other government measures are
incorporated in the VD scenario:
• Expenditure on health and education is increased
by 4% of GDP in 2015 and thereafter it goes by
7% of GDP. This is to ensure better outcomes on
health and education. 
• ‘Pucca’ (durable) houses are provided to all by
2020 by Indira Awas Yojana and Rajiv Awas
Yojana.
• Government ensures electricity consumption of 1
kWh per household per day by providing a neces-
sary subsidy to poorer households (without regular
brown-outs).
• Government provides 90 kg of LPG or six cylin-
ders (for cooking) to every household per year.
• Cash transfer of INR 3 000 per person per year is
given to all persons below the poverty line from
2015 onwards. 
The cross-country regression analysis has shown
that life expectancy and infant mortality depend on
per capita GNI, access to clean water and sanitation
and death rate, public health expenditure and female
literacy rate. The model generates the GDP, water and
sanitation accesses from government policies, and as
a conservative measure  we have assumed the current
death-rate trend. Thus, we are able to generate all the
well-being indicators. Table 11 shows these indicators’
values in the two scenarios in 2050. 
It is seen that the VD scenario reaches the thresh-
old values of well-being indicators earlier for indica-
tors like headcount ratio of poverty, access to sanita-
tion, infant mortality rate by 2040. What is important
to note is that the GDP values and the per capita con-
sumption levels are virtually the same in VD as in
DAU, as are CO2 emissions. 
A major conclusion is that VD does not involve
any significant cost compared to DAU. All it needs is
effectively implemented focused policies as described
above. Of course, growth of GDP plays an important
role but is by itself insufficient. 
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Abstract
The Green Climate Fund (GCF), the new operating entity under the Financial Mechanism of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, is emerging as an innovative
multilateral climate finance institution. Among other things, it is commissioned to support
developing countries’ project-based and programmatic pursuits to address climate change,
including Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). Promising as these ambitions
may be, the GCF’s effectiveness in supporting NAMAs hinges on overcoming significant gov-
ernance challenges. Using perspectives from international environmental law and governance
literature, this paper identifies some crucial governance challenges and analyses the capacities
granted to the GCF Board in dealing with them. Developed countries expect that support will
lead to measured emissions reductions. Developing countries prefer stringent monitoring of
support while hesitating to agree on internationally defined NAMA criteria. The GCF will
struggle with this balancing act. Absence of concrete criteria for deciding on NAMA support
may prompt potential funders to seek other channels for supporting NAMAs. On the other
hand, too-rigid criteria may discourage developing countries from submitting NAMA propos-
als. For the GCF to be effective in incentivising development and diffusion of NAMAs, we
argue that the contracting Parties to the Convention will have to forge an institution that has
the capacity to balance diverging expectations on NAMAs. Our analysis indicates that the
GCF Board has the governance capacity to efficiently deal with this challenging balancing act.
Inability to exercise this capacity may result in establishing a strong but empty shell for sup-
porting NAMAs.




Multilateral environmental negotiations have long
struggled with balancing national sovereignty against
effectiveness of implementing international law
(Skjærseth et al. 2006). In such negotiations, states
strive to maximise legitimacy by achieving consensus
agreements, while resisting the dilution of the opera-
tive text to a stage where its implementation can
become ineffective (Boyle 1991; Biermann & Bauer
2004). Consequently, to safeguard universal accept-
ance, multilateral environmental negotiations are
extraordinarily sensitive to the arguments and inter-
ests of all sovereign states participating in the negotia-
tions at hand.
An area of emerging international environmental
law where balancing sovereignty, reaching universal
agreement and achieving effectiveness are particularly
complex is that of encouraging mitigation of green-
house gases in developing countries. The 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) allows developing countries to
voluntarily propose mitigation actions (UN 1992, Art.
12). It also acknowledges that the extent to which
developing countries will effectively implement their
commitments depends on financial and technological
support from developed countries (UN 1992, para.
4.7). The UNFCCC agreement on the concept of
‘Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions’ (NAMAs)
in 2007 builds on these elements in the Convention.1
Since 2007, there has been intense negotiation as to
the more precise meaning of NAMAs (UNFCCC
2008). The ‘national appropriateness’ inherent in the
concept signals the weight given to domestic circum-
stances, and a strong emphasis on the sovereign right
of developing countries to govern their initiatives
according to national priorities also when undertaking
actions of relevance to global stakeholders. Using the
example of Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience
Fund where ‘the majority of stakeholders were not
ready to grant a key leading role to an outside inter-
national institution at the expense of national control’,
Gomez-Echeverri (2013) argues that governance
structures for climate change finance are now being
challenged. At the same time, developed countries
have been reluctant to cover needs for mitigation
action support in developing countries channelled
through the main operating entity of the financial
mechanism of the UNFCCC. They have by far pre-
ferred bilateral or more constrained multilateral chan-
nels for providing climate finance2 (Olbrisch et al.
2011; Yamineva & Kulovesi 2013), guaranteeing
developed country ownership over where and how to
spend resources.
In this context, the Parties to the UNFCCC have
established the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It serves
as an operating entity of the financial mechanism (UN
1992, para. 11; UNFCCC 2011, para. 102). The
Conference of the Parties (COP) expects that the GCF
will become a key player in the climate finance land-
scape, including the possibility of it becoming a signif-
icant channel for supporting the preparation and
implementation of NAMAs (UNFCCC 2012a). 
This paper seeks to analyse the challenges for
using a multilateral support function – perceived to
have potential to impede sovereignty – to effectively
support nationally defined mitigation actions in devel-
oping countries. To this end the paper analyses the
challenges for the GFC in supporting NAMAs – at
least potentially – and its governance capacity to over-
come such challenges, by asking:
• In relation to support of NAMAs, how will the issue
of sovereignty play out in the GCF?
• What constitutes the governance challenges facing
the GCF for effective support of NAMAs? 
• What form of governance capacity is granted to
the GCF to resolve such challenges?
The paper starts by briefly outlining the emergence
and establishment of NAMAs, the GCF, and their
interrelation in UNFCCC politics (Section 2). Section
3 elaborates on the analytical perspective, as well as
on our method for collection and categorisation of
empirical material. We provide a definition of the gov-
ernance capacity that we refer to, and explore its rela-
tion to international environmental law literature. The
analysis departs from this framework to discuss the
governance capacity of the GCF, and how this capac-
ity conditions the ability of the GCF in supporting
NAMAs. For the latter discussion, we draw particular
attention to the challenge of meeting the expectations
of all sovereign member states to the UNFCCC, while
maintaining governance capacity to be effective in
supporting NAMAs. Although it is too early to evalu-
ate the performative governance capacity of the GCF
(Secco et al. nd; Arts & Goverde 2006), our analysis
highlights that further considerations of options are
essential to ensure effectiveness of the GCF as an
institution supporting NAMAs. This can only be
achieved if states forge an institution that has the
capacity to balance different expectations from
NAMAs: developed country Parties generally expect
measured emissions reductions in return for support,
while at the same time being reluctant to strictly mon-
itor the support they extend; developing country
Parties are hesitant to agree on internationally defined
NAMA criteria and have high hopes for transparent,
reliable, predictable and additional support. Inability
to manage these varied expectations will lead to cre-
ation of a strong but empty shell that will struggle to
attract both funds and NAMA proposals. 
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2. Background: Complexity in international
support on NAMAs
Paragraph 1(b) (ii) of the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC
2007) introduced NAMAs, but provided a very broad
reference point (van Asselt et al. 2010). Various
research initiatives on NAMAs have focused on its def-
initional and design aspects (Sterk 2010; Torres et al.
2012), yet no clear consensus has evolved over these
aspects, for two primary reasons. First, the national
appropriateness element of NAMAs varies from one
country to another and NAMAs as a concept is still
subject to varying interpretations (McMahon et al.
2010; Linnér & Pahuja 2012). Secondly, the research
on NAMAs is still conceptual in nature (CCAP 2012),
with very few implementation examples to draw on
(Röser & De Vit 2012). Some studies take the volun-
tary actions announced by the non-Annex I (NAI) par-
ties after COP15 as their point of analysis (Fukuda &
Tamura 2010; Sterk 2010). Others studies focus on
the supporting framework available at the domestic
level and study country specific policy design and
institutional arrangements for NAMAs implementation
(Höhne et al. 2008; Teng et al. 2009; van Asselt et al.
2010; Wang-Helmreich et al. 2011; Tyler, Boyd,
Coetzee & Winkler 2013; Tyler, Boyd, Coetzee, Torres
Gunfaus et al. 2013).
The topic of support for NAMAs has also garnered
attention, especially on what is eligible to be counted
as support (Sterk et al. 2011), and how to link the
funding to specific actions and the role of the private
sector (Buchner et al. 2012; Clapp et al. 2012) along
with relations with carbon markets (Jung et al. 2010;
Röser & De Vit 2012; Upadhyaya 2012). Studies
have also examined the relationship between specific
mechanisms and how specific projects can benefit
from being converted into NAMAs (Cocco et al. 2011;
NOAK-NEFCO 2011; Sutter & Schibli 2011). 
The Convention primarily puts the onus of raising
finance to address climate change on developed
countries (UN 1992, Art. 4). However, there are differ-
ences between countries on the following:
• what can be counted as climate finance (Clapp et
al. 2012; Watson et al. 2012); 
• its purpose (Buchner et al. 2011; Sterk et al.
2011); 
• climate finance needs in developing countries and
the adequacy of  the USD 100 billion annually
pledged by developed countries from 2020
onwards (Sterk et al. 2011; Morel & Delbosc
2012); 
• how climate finance can be raised (High-level
Advisory Group on Climate Change Finance
2010; Romani & Stern 2011; Clapp et al. 2012);
and 
• its deployment. 
There is also lack of clarity on how much climate
finance has already been made available to develop-
ing countries (OECD 2011; Buchner et al. 2012;
Kossoy & Guigon 2012). Developed countries argue
for flexibility in raising finance whereas developing
countries demand new, additional and predictable
sources of climate finance.
This means that neither support for nor implemen-
tation of NAMAs is well defined. The GCF, established
in 2010, is expected to play a key role in channelling
finance to developing countries (UNFCCC 2012b,
para. 3), not least towards NAMAs. Paragraphs 35, 36
and 40 of the governing instrument for the GCF make
clear that the Fund will support agreed full and agreed
incremental costs, both project-based and program-
matic approaches, as well as readiness and preparato-
ry activities, relating to, inter alia, NAMAs (UNFCCC
2012b). Its role is contingent on the amount of finance
made available and the agreement of the developing
countries to the terms and conditions under which this
finance will be made available. The uncertainty sur-
rounding its role is underpinned by the differences
between developed and developing countries on var-
ious aspects of climate finance. These differences
have also been visible in the GCF Board meetings
where Parties have frequently differed on the choices
presented on the GCF’s: a) objectives, results and per-
formance indicators; b) Financial instruments; c) pri-
vate sector facility; and d) enhanced direct access
(Schalatek 2013). In the fifth Meeting of the Board,
however, decisions regarding many of these issues
have been adopted (GCF 2013a). While developed
countries have pledged to mobilise USD 100 billion
annually in so called long-term climate finance from
2020 onwards (UNFCCC 2011), linkages between
the GCF, long-term finance and NAMAs, and the gov-
ernance challenges associated with such linkages,
have not been explored (Yamineva & Kulovesi 2013).
The USD100 billion annually in long-term finance
is pledged ‘in the context of meaningful mitigation
actions and transparency on implementation’ (UNFC-
CC 2011). It is unclear how much of it will flow
through the GCF, which is required to balance its allo-
cation of funds between adaptation and mitigation.
For developing countries that are now starting to con-
sider NAMAs as the cornerstone of their domestic mit-
igation action, it means high uncertainty. Developed
countries stress the need for the GCF to ‘get on with
it’, whereas developing countries emphasise ‘getting it
right’ (Schalatek 2013). The impatience with the UN
process is also visible in the fact that bilateral arrange-
ments to finance NAMAs have already been initiated.
This may lead to proliferation of funds that can result
in tension between centralised or decentralised forms
of managing finance (Gomez-Echeverri 2013).
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Climate finance is a complex issue by itself. New
operating entities such as the GCF and the Adaptation
Fund, as well as new streams of bilateral and more
closed multilateral financing mechanisms, make the
picture even more complicated. Partly in response to
this, COP16 decided to establish a Standing
Committee on Finance (SCF) to assist the COP in
dealing with the Convention’s financial mechanism
(UNFCCC 2011).3 The tasks of the SCF include
improving coherence and coordination in the delivery
of climate financing, rationalisation of the financial
mechanism, mobilisation of financial resources, and
measurement, reporting and verification of support
provided to developing country Parties.
The Parties of the UNFCCC, through decision
7/CP.18, specifically requested the SCF and the Board
of the GCF to develop arrangements between the
COP and the GCF in accordance with its governing
instrument and Article 11, paragraph 3, for agreement
by the Board and subsequent agreement by the
Conference of the Parties at its nineteenth session.
Thus, the SCF, without having jurisdiction over the
GCF, played a direct role in developing the gover-
nance capacity of the GCF (UNFCCC 2013a). The
fifth meeting of the GCF Board accepted the report by
the SCF on the draft arrangements between the COP
and the Fund (GCF 2013b). The arrangement gives
the GCF Board full responsibility for its funding deci-
sions but refrains from elaborating on the role of COP
in the event of a complaint of a party against a GCF
funding decision. 
3. Governing through international
environmental law
Since the early 1980s, international law has been
called upon to govern an increasing number of envi-
ronmental problems. Traditional national and bilateral
politics have failed to deal with the increasing severity
and complexity of such problems, whose global
dimensions have become better understood (McNeill
2000). Thus, international environmental law-making
has, since the 1980s, become gradually more multilat-
eral and sometimes even universal (UoJ & UNEP
2007; Muñoz et al. 2009). Multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) have been established in areas
such as trans-boundary pollution, desertification,
degradation of biological diversity, ozone depletion,
climate change, and sustainable development at
large, to mention only the most commonly referred to
treaty bodies and declarations (Rajamani 2003;
Seyfang 2003; Viñuales 2013). The increasing impor-
tance of international environmental law makes it ten-
able to also approach the GCF through this perspec-
tive to understand governance capacities of and chal-
lenges for the GCF in supporting NAMAs. 
3.1 Governance capacities
In this paper, we refer to ‘governance as the organiza-
tion of collective action’ (Shawki 2009: 44).
Governance entails setting up institutions, with rules,
that both constrains and enables actions (Hufty
2011). Institutions can therefore be said to have differ-
ent governance capacities to act on different kinds of
collective problems. Building on this definition, gover-
nance capacities refer to the ability of the institution
concerned, to operate as a collective actor (González
& Healey 2005). With our focus on GCF and its
capacities and challenges in supporting NAMAs, we
are particularly interested in the capacities of the GCF
to support NAMAs. The literature divides governance
capacities into indicative and performative capacities
(Arts & Goverde 2006). Performative governance
capacities refer to the performance of a governance
arrangement, in this case, performance of the GCF in
supporting NAMAs. As the GCF has still not support-
ed any NAMA, we focus on its indicative governance
capacities, by which we mean the potential of the
GCF to act as a collective actor in effectively govern-
ing NAMA support. Thus, when we refer to ‘gover-
nance capacities’ below, we have ‘indicative gover-
nance capacities’ in mind. For indicative governance
capacity, ‘the key question is whether a certain policy
arrangement is such that we can expect a “capacity to
govern”’ (La Rovere et al. 2002, p. 3). As noticed by
González and Healey (2005) and in line with our
approach to international law, governance capacity is
not just defined by formal laws and the mandate that
the institutions grants to the organisation, such as the
GCF. Governance capacity is equally dependent on
what we refer to as different levels of soft law. 
In a strictly formal approach to international law,
either there is a law or there is not (Vihma 2013).
International law normally requires a signed and rati-
fied treaty text, or a rather distinct custom (UN 1969).
However, the emergence of a growing collection of
MEAs has been paralleled by a change in the literature
on international environmental law where gover-
nance through law has gradually shifted from a binary
understanding of law to a more nuanced continuum-
approach (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma 2009). It
captures a broader range of options to govern through
law, where both soft and hard law are seen to create
legal obligations with different levels of precision and
delegation. The effectiveness of law is therefore not
contingent on its formal status but on the level of legit-
imacy that it enjoys from the states (Brunnée & Toppe
2010).
Governance through international law thus ranges
from strictly legally binding hard law to the much
more flexible soft law. As binary categories, hard and
soft law do not reflect the more nuanced practice in
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international law. However, the concepts are well suit-
ed to serve as endpoints in a continuum of options for
international governance. The level of ‘hardness’ or
‘softness’ of international law is often judged based on
three criterions (Abbott & Snidal 2000; Abbott et al.
2000; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma 2009: Vihma
2013):
• obligation (level of ‘bindingness’ of a state to a rule
or commitment);
• precision (level of unambiguous definition of an
obligation, and its modalities and procedures);
and,
• delegation (the level of authorisation of third party
to implement, interpret, apply, and amend or add
rules, as well as serving to arbitrate disputes
between states).
On the continuum, the formal character of law
matters less than the creation of effects of legal obliga-
tions (be they effects of hard or soft law). A COP deci-
sion can be more precise and more effective than rat-
ified treaty text (Abbott & Snidal 2000). In fact, the
UNFCCC is a good example of precisely this. Under
its Kyoto Protocol, for example, there was not enough
time before concluding to elaborate on all details
required for Parties to feel confident in ratifying the
protocol. During the years following on the adoption
of the Protocol in 1997, many details had to be clari-
fied before the clause for entering into force was ful-
filled. As a result, most of what regulates (for example)
compliance, as well as the use of flexible mechanisms,
is defined in decisions rather than treaty text. This
shows that when approaching the issue of governance
capacities, effectiveness is not necessarily only a func-
tion of the existence or not of hard law in the formal
sense (Brunnée & Toppe 2010).
In the case of the GCF, besides the theoretical
arguments, there is also an empirical reason for avoid-
ing the formal distinction between hard and soft law.
The GCF is, formally speaking, established through
the use of soft law, in COP’s capacity as an
autonomous decision-making body. The GCF is
defined through soft law, and its governing instrument
is annexed to soft law. Still, the GCF is set up to per-
form specific tasks. As such, it can be said to have
governance capacities designated to it by the COP.
We will address these capacities and their status in
terms of obligations, precision and delegation.
3.2 Governance challenges: Effectiveness and
sovereignty
The discussion of how sovereignty issues play out in
the GCF, with consequential challenges for the GCF in
supporting NAMAs, relates to the peculiarities of inter-
national as opposed to national law. In domestic set-
tings, it is often the case that a legislating body con-
structs law while police and courts enforce law. This is
clearly not how international law functions, nor is it a
feasible option for reforming the system of interna-
tional law (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006). There is no
sovereignty attached to the global community. The
international is indeed a realm where states with dif-
ferent interests (Vogel 1997), all of which have sover-
eign rights to govern over their own territories, must
find avenues for cooperation to solve issues of com-
mon concern when these cannot be dealt with solely
through national politics (Wendt 1992). In the case of
international environmental law, there is no equiva-
lence to enforcement institutions such as police.
Further, only weak dispute settlement procedures
exist. Internationally defined legal obligations there-
fore heavily depend on their legitimacy among states.
The literature focusing on the procedures at inter-
national negotiations – that we engage with here –
underscores the significance of states to endorse
MEAs with at least a minimum level of legitimacy to
foster compliance (Koh 1997; Hurd 1999; Bernstein
2005). The concept of legitimacy interrelates with that
of fairness: if an agreement is seen as having come
about in a procedurally just manner, it is usually
endorsed with legitimacy and therefore a Party to the
agreement feels a sense of ownership over, and a
responsibility to implement it (Depledge 2005:
Bernstein 2012). For the GCF to be effective in its
support of NAMAs, it needs to develop governance
arrangements that are seen as legitimate by its end
users. If not, it may neither be capitalised nor will it
receive NAMA proposals – conditions that we believe
are vital for the GCF to become effective in support-
ing NAMAs. We will elaborate on how the GCF is
trapped between different expectations on NAMAs,
while attempting to effectively support mitigation
action in developing countries by matching funds
from (sovereign) developed countries with NAMA
proposals from (sovereign) developing countries. We
will evaluate how the sovereignty issue may play out
in the GCF by analysing the willingness of states to
delegate some of their sovereignty to a multilateral
setting, and the challenges for effective NAMA sup-
port that may arise if the delegation of powers to the
GCF is done without sensitivity to countries expecta-
tions regarding NAMAs.
3.3 Scope and data collection
The study is based on document analysis and covers
COP, GCF Board and SCF negotiations. Through
decision 7/CP.18, the COP requested the GCF Board
and the SCF to develop arrangements between the
COP and the GCF, negotiations that are significant to
understanding the governance capacities of the GCF
(UNFCCC 2013a). We focus on the COP since the
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Durban decision on the governing instrument of the
GCF (UNFCCC 2012a), as well as the SCF and the
GCF Board negotiations, since it is in these forums
that the details of indicative governance capacities
have been developed and agreed. While avoiding a
dichotomous distinction between hard and soft law
and instead maintaining focus on levels of obligation,
precision and delegation, we give precedence to the
decisions over ongoing policy developments in sub-
missions, compilations, and consolidated negotiating
texts of the COP, the SCF, and the GCF Board. This
‘desk-top research’ is informed by our longstanding
observations of the UNFCCC process, covering more
than 15 negotiating sessions, granting us capacity to
navigate the various documents coming out of the
processes.
4. Effective GCF support of NAMAs:
Governance challenges and capacity
It is worth recalling that we are indeed quite aware
that the GCF is not prompted to support NAMAs in
particular; only that it will support mitigation actions
that may – as the governing instrument explicitly
notices at several instances – include support of
NAMAs. However, we think that it could support
NAMAs, and should support NAMAs. The analysis we
propose below is one where, from a legal perspective,
the GCF can expect challenges to effective support of
NAMAs. We are also interested in the indicative gov-
ernance capacities that the GCF already has, as well
as is expected to be bestowed with to resolve such
challenges. Our conclusions underscore the need for
further analysis of governance options available to the
GCF for effective (performative) support of NAMAs.
4.1 Sovereignty, and the governance
challenges facing the GCF
To address how the issue of sovereignty is played out
in the GFC in relation to support of NAMAs, we focus
on its obligation and precision functions, which in this
particular case means the level of ‘bindingness’ of a
state to an agreement by the GCF and its accompany-
ing level of unambiguous definition of an obligation.
(The context of delegation, will be explored below in
relation to governance capacities.) From this perspec-
tive, the GCF faces a ‘balancing act’. It needs to act as
a weighbridge between developed and developing
countries’ expectations on how NAMAs should be
governed. Developed countries argue for greater
access to information regarding mitigation for provid-
ing higher NAMA support. At the same time, devel-
oped countries have not been fond of measuring,
reporting and verifying the support they provide, or to
commit to certain levels of support. In absence of reli-
able and predictable support, developing countries
are reluctant to take on NAMAs (Yamineva & Kulovesi
2013). At the same time, they would like to view emis-
sions reduction as add-on to other overriding priori-
ties such as development and poverty eradication.
The GCF must accommodate both perspectives. The
balancing act must be carried out both in relation to
support being provided and to mitigation actions that
are being proposed. 
First, on support: The GCF Board must build cri-
teria, including on how to select one NAMA over
another, that make developed countries trust the GCF.
The crux is that ‘wise spending’ means different things
to different Parties, with a general divide between
developed and developing countries. Having devel-
oped countries trust in the GCF will capitalise it at
higher volumes, and could possibly check the tenden-
cy to influence decision making, over their money. At
the same time, developing countries must be con-
vinced that the level of support provided, as well as its
transparency and reliability, is adequate. As expressed
by a representative for New Zealand in relation to dis-
cussing NAMA support during the UN Climate
Change Conference in Warsaw: ‘When you’re dealing
with taxpayers money, there’s a certain amount of dis-
cipline required’ (Friman 2013a).
Second, and contrary to the first, on mitigation
action: The GCF, to be effective in supporting NAMAs,
must be designed to instil confidence in developing
countries to agree on internationally defined criteria
for deciding to support one NAMA and not another. If
developing countries are not convinced that these cri-
teria are good, they will either not agree to them or
they will simply not file NAMA proposals to the GCF.
During the meeting referred to above, a representative
for Vietnam raised concerns that ‘the eligibility criteria
is impossible for us to fulfil’, resulting in missing out on
possible mitigation actions that are seen by multilater-
al development banks as, strictly speaking, not bank-
able (Friman 2013a). A Brazilian representative cau-
tioned that the Parties must make sure that further
elaboration on methodologies of NAMAs does not
interrupt the ability of developing country Parties to
propose mitigation actions. Instead, they argued that
it is due time to focus more on how to match mitiga-
tion actions with support (Friman 2013b).
The governance challenges for the GCF in sup-
porting NAMAs essentially has to do with balancing
the sovereign right of countries to decide over their
national resources and priorities against the benefits of
entering into an agreement that provide, on the one
hand, mitigation actions in developing countries, and,
on the other hand, a redistribution of international
support from developed to developing countries. If
this balancing act is unsuccessful, it cannot be expect-
ed that GCF support to NAMAs will be effective.
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Building a consensus that is seen as legitimate
among all Parties will provide at least three benefits.
First, it will foster a sense of responsibility within the
GCF; secondly, the implementation of commitments
related to the GCF will be taken seriously; and, thirdly,
the GCF will be actually put to use as it will be able to
attract both support as well as NAMA proposals.
Developed Parties are collectively obliged to provide
support to developing Parties, but the Convention
does not specify individual commitments. Support
provided is therefore based on voluntary contribu-
tions. The developed Parties joint pledge of mobilising
USD100 billion per year, from 2020 onwards, in so
called ‘long-term finance’ is still not linked to the GCF.
The level of precision in terms of how much money
will be made available to the GCF is therefore low,
currently based on voluntary contributions rather than
commitments tied to finance targets for individual
countries. The COP also encourages developing
countries to submit NAMA proposals, also on a volun-
tary basis. However, the GCF Board is working on
regulating both eligibility criteria for deciding which
NAMAs to fund and which not to fund. Funding deci-
sions will be taken based on, inter alia, how a NAMA
proposal contributes to the performance of the fund,
which in turn is evaluated using performance indica-
tors. These indicators will guide how the fund disburs-
es its support (GCF 2013c, 2013d). 
Currently there is nothing to indicate that either
the provision of certain volumes of support or the sub-
missions of a certain level of NAMA proposals will
become binding by international law. The GCF Board
must therefore focus on the challenge to preserve sov-
ereignty of countries to build trust and foster agree-
ments that are seen as legitimate and that evoke a
sense of responsibility to act accordingly. At the same
time, it needs to ensure the precision of obligations to
the extent that the actions of the institution maintain
efficacy. Precision and obligation are important, but
striking the balance is essential for any precise obliga-
tion to become effective. Since legality of the GCF
Board decisions cannot be enforced, the decision has
to be built on mutual trust; a perception among states
that the GCF is a legitimate broker of perspectives will
encourage using the multilateral mode provided by
GCF for supporting and implementing contracts
emerging out of the GCF. We therefore turn to the
question of whether the GCF has the governance
capacity required to deal with these challenges.
4.2 Governance capacities of the GCF 
Having established that challenges the GCF faces in
effectuating its task to support NAMAs, we turn to the
issue of capacity of the GCF to solve such challenges.
To understand what governance capacity that are
being granted to the GCF, we focus on the level of
precision, particularly in regards to delegation of deci-
sion-making powers to the GCF. To understand dele-
gation, we pinpoint the legal status of the GCF, a sta-
tus that determines to what extent it operates as an
independent public international organisation or as
an organ dependent on its mother organisation, the
COP to the UNFCCC. Given that the GCF is an oper-
ating entity to the Convention’s Financial Mechanism,
this might seem a clear-cut case of a thematic body
within the UNFCCC regime. The direction in which
the GCF seems to be evolving raises questions with
respect to its independence and the consequent gov-
ernance capacities that the level of independency is
granting the GCF in relation to its birthplace – that is,
the COP. 
The GCF is currently not defined through, and is
only partly regulated by, international law in the for-
mal sense; it is defined through a COP decision rather
than through ratified treaty text. Yet it is indeed an
operating entity under the Financial Mechanism of the
UNFCCC, which is defined through treaty text (hard
law) in Article 11 of the Convention. In other words,
the GCF is defined through soft law but intertwined
with hard law. As a result of constituting it through soft
law, states’ obligations in relation to the GCF become
non-enforceable. The COP may change this by
inscribing core functions and capacities of the GCF in
future treaties or, although much less likely, through
amending the Convention, making ratifying states
bound by international law to perform according to
such operating paragraphs. On the other hand, the
flexibility that is granted to states by defining the GCF
through soft law can indeed make its operation
smoother. As long as the GCF is defined through a
decision, and not established in ratified treaty text, the
flexibility for compromise between states is, relatively
speaking, high. The fact that the GCF is linked to, and
structured under, ratified treaty text also provides the
institution some weight. 
The GCF is established as an operating entity of
the Financial Mechanism. However, besides the fact
that states are not bound by decisions even if they are
expected to follow the same, the legal status of the
GCF is less clear. It is unclear whether the GCF is
more of an independent intergovernmental organisa-
tion (IGO) or more of an organ under the COP. On the
one hand, it makes the GCF more free-floating in the
realm of international environmental law. Given that
the COP, though the GCF’s governing Instrument
(UNFCCC 2012b, para. 7, 8), provides the GCF with
legal personality and privileges and immunities of the
GCF and to its officials, the GCF is one step closer to
becoming a formal and more independent IGO with
far-reaching abilities to take decisions. Judging by this,
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the indicative governance capacity of the GCF, in
terms of delegated powers, is rather high. In fact, the
GCF fulfils all formal criteria to be judged as an IGO
(Schermers & Blokker 2011): first, it is founded on
international agreement; secondly, it has an organ
with a will of its own; and, thirdly, it is established
under international law. This indicates that the delega-
tion of power to the GCF and its independence from
the COP is quite high. 
Before turning to why this is significant for our
analysis, let us further nuance this picture. The fact
that GCF is to be ‘accountable to and function under
the guidance of the COP’ (UNFCCC 2012b, para. 4)
points to it being more of an organ rather than an
independent public IGO with a will of its own. The
agreement between the GCF and the COP on
arrangements between the two bodies indeed speci-
fies that the ‘GCF shall receive guidance from the
COP, including on matters related to policies, pro-
gramme priorities and eligibility criteria’ (UNFCCC
2013b: Annex 2). Article 11 of the Convention regu-
lates such decisions. The agreement on arrangements
between the COP and the GCF indeed reaffirms that
the Board has full responsibility for funding decisions
(UNFCCC 2013b, para. 6). However, this is not the
same as saying that the Board is free to decide. It
functions under guidance by the COP, including on,
for example, programme priorities and eligibility crite-
ria. The financial mechanism determines that the
arrangements between the COP and operating enti-
ties of the financial mechanism shall include modali-
ties to ensure that funded projects are in conformity
with the policies, programme priorities and eligibility
criteria established by the COP (UN 1992: Article
11.3(a)). The arrangements, however, do not address
details of such modalities; they instead rely on specifi-
cation through the Convention itself and clarification
of it by COP decision 11/CP.1 (UNFCCC 1995).
Neither of these decisions (that is, relating to such
modalities and arrangements between the COP and
the GCF) specifies what to do in the event of conflict
between the COP and the GCF. Nor can the arrange-
ments between the COP and the GCF be changed or
terminated without agreement by both the COP and
the GCF (UNFCCC 2013b, para. 23–25). Depending
on the composition of the Board, the situation may
indeed occur where the COP and the GCF Board
have differing opinions. Still, the GCF does not auto-
matically draw the short end of the stick in such cases.
Any recommendation of COP decisions by the
GCF Board would require sanction by the COP to
become effective. Such recommendations will run
into the same procedural wrangle that the COP finds
itself in. This is mostly relevant in cases where the
GCF Board may want to recommend the COP to gov-
ern through formal law. However, this is an unlikely
strategy. For decisions by the Board itself, which con-
stitutes soft law, the GCF is not granted the ability to
adopt any far-reaching decisions on matters of sub-
stance without clear guidance from the COP. And if it
does, the COP, to which the GCF is held accountable,
can revisit such decisions. If the COP wants to, they
have the capacity to demand from the GCF to revise
its decisions in the light of further guidance by the
COP. Thus, for substantive decision coming out of the
GCF, the GCF, only in part relies on the sanction of
the validity of their decisions by the COP. 
Firstly, the GCF Board is indeed, granted full
responsibility for funding decisions, although ques-
tions relating to the potential or not of using COP as
an arbitrator of last resort in the case of conflict
between individual Parties and the GCF Board over
specific funding decisions remain unresolved (UNFC-
CC 2012b, para. 5–6). Addressing the so-called
Independent Redress Mechanism that would regulate
procedures relating to appeals on funding decisions
remains an issue for future sessions.
Secondly, the independence of the GCF is
strengthened by the fact that it has been allowed by
the COP to have its own independent Secretariat,
with its own budget, separated from that of the
UNFCCC Secretariat’s budget. In summary: the fact
that the GCF Board is functioning as a decision mak-
ing organ with at least a certain will of its own, even if
somewhat limited by guidance from the COP and
having its own legal personality, clearly distinguish the
GCF from being merely an organ under the UNFC-
CC. Whether an organ or an IGO (we treat it as an
hybrid), what the GCF is in fact developing into is
similar to what Eckersley (2012) labels as ‘inclusive
minilateralism’; a multilateral body with constrained
membership representing the universal membership
of the UNFCCC. As a body with constrained member-
ship and a potential future possibility to vote, the GCF
Board can be procedurally much more efficient than
the COP. 
Thus it is fair to say that the indicative governance
capacity of the GCF, to address governance chal-
lenges related to support of NAMAs, is high. The GCF
is defined more or less as an independent public IGO.
Its relation to the COP puts theoretical constraints on
its ability to decide on matters of substance. However,
in practice, the GCF is designed in a way that gives it
an advantage. As an example of inclusive minilateral-
ism, the GCF Board is procedurally more efficient. In
the event that the GCF Board and the COP disagrees
on an issue of substance agreed by the Board, there
will be representatives of member states in the Board
that also have representatives in the COP. Agreeing in
consensus on further guidance from to COP to the
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GCF Board on the matter of disagreement is likely not
an easy exercise, therefore the GCF Board trumps the
COP. In short: large powers are currently being trans-
ferred from the COP to the Board with regards to
funding decisions, but also in practice in regards to all
other decisions of substance.
If the GCF is later sanctioned through a treaty,
hopefully by the COP21 in 2015 (Paris), confirming
these rather far reaching delegations of powers from
the COP to the GCF, the stage is set for a more clearly
defined public IGO with independent powers; i.e. test-
ing ground for an indicatively speaking, procedurally
efficient IGO in the UN MEA-family. It could develop
into a testing ground for a new kind of minilateralism,
with universal representation, for effective environ-
mental governance. The current analysis of the
indicative governance capacity of the GCF indicates
that it will likely have quite some scope for manoeuv-
ring among various governance options. The preci-
sion by which it is granted this capacity is high, and so
are the delegated powers. However, what is lacking is
agreement on states’ obligations in relation to the
GCF. Currently, developed countries should capitalise
it on a voluntary basis and developing countries
should submit NAMA proposals on equally voluntary
basis, without internationally defined guidelines. The
criteria for decision making on supporting NAMA pro-
posals is still unclear. Under such circumstances, it is
uncertain if NAMA proposals will start flowing to the
GCF. Funding from developed countries towards GCF,
however, is less likely to be particularly high in the
absence of clearer guidelines or criteria for evaluation
of proposals.
To sum up the discussion thus far and to direct
attention to the tentative discussion on governance
options available for the GCF, we conclude that: 
• As long as the GCF is not established through hard
law (defined through a treaty), it does not formally
withdraw any exercise of powers from the sover-
eignty of states. The decisions are guiding with
Parties expected to comply. However, states’ obli-
gations in relation to the GCF cannot be enforced.
We presume that development in the current
UNFCCC negotiations, through soft law, may be
used to encourage broader adhesion to decisions
and eventually to inscribe GCF (at least parts of it)
into a legally binding international agreement by
2015.
• Secondly, behind the veil of granting the GCF
legal personality, privileges, and immunities, it is
clear that the sovereign members of the GCF
remain visible. The membership of the GCF
Board, and provision of observer participation, is
based on a very traditional, state-centric model
(Abbott & Gartner 2011; UNFCCC 2012b; GCF
2013e). The GCF cannot be expected to function
as a strong institution in itself with the ability to
affect an individual state’s behaviour. It will do so
only to the extent that actions are sanctioned by its
member states. As such, it is to be viewed as a plat-
form for negotiations between states on how to
cooperate on issues under its mandate. However,
as we have shown, it fulfils all the fundamental
requirements to become an unusually efficient
negotiating platform in comparison to multilateral
environmental negotiations in general. As such, its
capacity to be performative on NAMAs seems
high.
Both of these facts place the GCF in a position
where states can be quite flexible, while the GCF
Board is granted quite high leeway to govern through
soft law. Perhaps even more importantly, the delega-
tion of powers to the GCF (UNFCCC 2012b; 2013a)
and the rules of procedure for the GCF (UNFCCC
2012b; GCF 2013f) give the Board a greater say in
decision-making compared to the COP. The GCF
Board decisions do not have to be acceptable by all
Parties in the COP. This puts the Board in a position
to be much more flexible than the COP; the Board
can take decisions that are favoured by the majority of
the contracting Parties to the UNFCCC without hav-
ing to convince all Parties in the COP. As such, it can
raise ambition above the least common denominator
of environmental multilateralism while still maintain-
ing close to universal support and legitimacy, paving
the way for its operation to become more effective.
On voting, the rules of procedures that are additional
to those set out in the governing instrument for the
GCF makes clear that ‘the Board will adopt voting
rules’ (GCF 2013f, para. 2). If such are agreed, the
governance capacity to agree will be even higher
compared to the COP. Reaching agreement on voting
procedures, though difficult, would be still easier in
the GCF than in the COP.
Currently, however, it should also be noted that
the president of the COP has more leeway to interpret
the concept of consensus than does the chair of the
Board. In the Board, ‘consensus exists when no objec-
tion is stated by any Board member or alternate mem-
ber acting on behalf of a Board member’ (GCF 2013f,
para. 1). In the COP, it is possible, but highly contest-
ed, to use so-called flexible consensus to adopt a deci-
sion despite an outspoken objection by a Party
(Friman 2013c). This is strictly speaking impossible in
the GCF. As long as voting procedures are not agreed,
the GCF will have to agree by clearly defined consen-
sus among its 24 members. The impossibility for the
GCF chair to exercise flexible consensus still grants the
GCF higher capacity to agree than the COP but, at
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least on the margin, nuances the picture of the GCF
as having higher capacity to agree than the COP.
The high governance capacity granted to the GCF
Board places it in a good position to resolve gover-
nance challenges. However, as our analysis also
shows, a huge task still lies ahead of the GCF Board:
to design the GCF in a way that successfully balances
the expectations of developed and developing coun-
tries, particularly for NAMAs. This is no easy task, as
the expectations highlighted in this analysis continue
to remain contentious. 
5. Conclusions 
The fact that Parties to the UNFCCC have the sover-
eign right to govern their own initiatives poses chal-
lenges for the GCF in supporting NAMAs. It needs to
be seen if the GCF can strike the balance to attract
both funding and NAMA proposals to become effec-
tive on a performative basis. To capitalise the fund,
developed countries require some comfort that the
money will be well spent. Such comfort may be grant-
ed by clearly defined eligibility criteria for funding. On
the other hand, developing countries stress the nation-
al appropriateness of NAMAs, and want to avoid too
much international regulation of what can be eligible
as a NAMA. If the GCF Board manages to strike the
balance between most of developed and developing
country Parties’ diverging expectations on its support
of NAMAs, it can indeed develop into an exciting and
promising innovative multilateral climate-funding
agency for NAMAs. If not, it will likely remain in the
margins of the multilateral landscape of supporting
NAMAs.
The issue of matching design and support of
NAMAs through a multilateral setting has been diffi-
cult to resolve through the COP to the UNFCCC. The
lack of adopted voting procedures, the inability of
Parties to file reservation, and poorly developed con-
flict resolution mechanisms makes this particular
issue, with highly diverging interests, particularly chal-
lenging for the COP. On the other hand, the indicative
governance capacity of the GCF to address the gover-
nance challenges arising from matching design and
support of NAMAs seems to be high. In a traditional
perspective from international law, effectiveness is a
function of the existence of law. We argue that if this
perspective is applied to the GCF, it will be viewed as
having weak governance capacities that in turn limits
its likelihood of being successful in effectively support-
ing NAMAs. Of course, all aspects of the GCF could
become an integral part of the upcoming 2015 agree-
ment. Aiming for such an approach, however, is likely
to impede on the possibility to agree on the GCF with
a great level of precision in defining obligation and
delegation. Hence, instead of a binary divide of soft
and hard law we seek to understand the level of ‘hard-
ness’ or ‘softness’ of the GCF based on the three cri-
teria of obligation, precision and delegation. 
We suggest that the GCF is defined more or less as
an independent public IGO as it meets all formal cri-
teria of an IGO; that is, it is founded on an interna-
tional agreement, it has an organ with a will of its
own, and it is established under international law. This
indicates that the delegation of power to the GCF and
its independence from the COP is quite high. As the
GCF will operate under guidance of and be account-
able to the COP, its relation to the COP puts theoreti-
cal constraints on its ability to decide on matters of
substance. However, in practice, the GCF is designed
in a way that gives it an advantage over the COP in
ultimate decision-making. In case of conflict between
Parties on a GCF Board decision that does not relate
to a funding decision, the GCF currently has the gov-
ernance tools needed to wrangle a way out. On fund-
ing decisions, the relationship to COP is still unclear.
The extent to which the COP will function as the arbi-
trator of last resort, for judging in conflicts between
Parties that appeal a funding decision and the GCF
Board, will ultimately depend on the redress mecha-
nism that it is expected to be set up. As an example of
inclusive minilateralism, the GCF Board is procedu-
rally more efficient. It can take decisions under agreed
rules of procedures including the possibility to vote.
This in no way makes the challenge redundant.
However, it does provide a setting where most but not
all Parties can agree. Such a setting paves the way for
more efficient decision-making processes and thus
forms the foundation for effective NAMA support pro-
vided that the expectations of developed and devel-
oping countries can be addressed. GCF is on its way
to becoming the strong shell needed to tackle chal-
lenges of climate change, but the threat of it becoming
a strong empty shell still exists.
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Notes
1. By NAMAs we refer to policies, programmes as well as
specific project that a developing country undertakes or
intends to undertake, in order to address its domestic
challenges while contributing to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions.
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2. By climate finance we refer to the financial support flow-
ing from developed to developing countries, with pri-
mary objective of supporting climate change mitigation
and adaptation activities in developing countries.
3. COP16 defined a ‘Standing Committee’ renamed by
COP18 to the ‘Standing Committee on Finance’.
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Abstract
The concept of sovereignty has been considerably redefined by the environmental challenges,
particularly those with global implications. While the sovereign right of countries to exploit nat-
ural resources (and protect the environment) within national boundaries has been recognised,
how this right may be exercised by countries has been facing increasing threat of restrictions
on account of the possible negative impacts it may have on other countries and global envi-
ronment. For developing countries a multilateral regime to address global problems is better
suited than a bilateral regime on account of sovereignty concerns. Space to bargain for legiti-
mate space for determining national development agenda, as well as for negotiating a capa-
bility enhancing non-intrusive arrangement towards contributing to the global solutions, is rel-
atively wider under multilateral processes – more so, because developing countries can benefit
from collective bargaining power. These options are either not available or restricted in a bilat-
eral setting. In the context of climate change, provision of financial support to developing
countries under the UNFCCC is one such capability-enhancing non-intrusive arrangement.
However, the many bilateral channels of climate finance have reduced the effective bargaining
space for developing countries. Many of the terms of these bilateral channels to support
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions are in conflict with the long standing negotiating
positions of developing countries on climate finance. Hence, implementation of bilaterally
supported climate action puts developing countries’ negotiating stances in a contradictory
position. Moreover, these terms may be influencing the development agenda in favour of mit-
igation over development.
Keywords: climate finance, multilateralism, bilateral initiatives, NAMAs, sovereignty
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1. Introduction 
Recognition of national sovereignty and the derivative
right to develop is embedded in all international envi-
ronmental agreements, to the effect that the right to
develop comes across as a manifestation of sovereign-
ty (Tarlock 1997; Weiss 1993). Broadly, the story of
climate change negotiations could be summarised as
countries trying to maintain their freedom to decide
upon domestic climate actions and development
pathways while ensuring that the aggregate impact
does not hinder global interest. The global nature of
climate change has put two types of demands on
countries. The first, of course, is to alter their develop-
ment pathways in line to meet the ultimate objective
of the Convention. The second is an implicit demand
to redefine sovereignty. Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration (UN 1972) recognises that countries have
sovereign rights over their natural resources but that,
at the same time, all countries need to be watchful of
the impacts of their decisions on the global environ-
ment. 
It is important to note that for the newly independ-
ent third world countries, sovereign rights over their
natural resources were integral to their new-found
freedom and struggle to self-determination (Anand
1987). Reducing and avoiding any form of depend-
ence on, and interference from, Western countries in
matters of domestic policy making hence became a
core strategic goal, which broadly manifested in build-
ing domestic technological capabilities (Parthasarthi
1987). They did not want the industrialised world to
dictate the terms of their development. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that developing countries made it
clear during the preparation of the 1972 United
Nations Conference on Human Environment at
Stockholm that it would be impossible for developing
countries to participate in a global initiative on a pure-
ly environmental basis and that for them environmen-
tal degradation is always integral to their development
challenges (Strong 2001). 
The concern of sovereignty was again at the centre
of debate at the UN General Assembly on the issue of
how the negotiations to develop a framework for
global climate policy should be organised. Developing
countries opposed the idea of negotiations for climate
convention being organised under the auspices of the
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) car-
rying forward the IPCC process, and argued for nego-
tiations under the UN process. Here the concerns of
sovereignty were expressed in terms of ability to par-
ticipate in the global decision-making process.
Developing countries believed that they would have
equal say in decision-making under the United
nations General Assembly process, based on equality
of sovereign states as compared to a process under
the WMO and UNEP where technical expertise played
an important role. Overall, developing countries,
which felt excluded from the scientific work by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
argued that climate change is a political and not mere-
ly a technical issue (Bodansky 1994). It is important to
note that the language of Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration, particularly the relationship
between the scope and limits of sovereignty, develop-
ment and global environmental concerns, was echoed
in the various UN resolutions that led to the establish-
ment of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well as the UN
Conference on Environment and Development in
1992 at Rio.1 These resolutions laid the foundation of
the core principles of the Rio Declaration as well as
the UNFCCC, particularly the principle of equity and
common but differentiated responsibility and respec-
tive capabilities. 
At the core of these debates was the question of
control over resources and choices of actions. During
negotiations under the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee (INC) towards drafting the UNFCCC as
well as towards the Kyoto Protocol, countries insisted,
particularly the developed countries, that a ‘menu of
options’ be listed as part of the agreement instead of
prescriptions. Driving the concern for this insistence
was that countries wanted to keep their sovereign
rights intact in deciding which options they wanted to
implement in line with their ‘national circumstances’.
Of course, many countries were also concerned that
such sovereign actions might have negative impacts
on their national development. Particularly, the oil
exporting countries were concerned that unilateral
actions by countries might affect their fossil fuel
exports, primary source of their economic growth.
Hence, as precaution, they demanded compensation
for any losses caused by unilateral actions
(Shrivastava 2012; Rowlands 1995). The questions of
control, and implications for developing countries,
were more pronounced in the discussions that went
into the structure of the Global Environment Facility
(GEF). At the Rio Earth Summit, developing countries
were not in favour of giving the World Bank control of
the GEF, raising concerns over the legitimacy of World
Bank’s governance structure (Najam 2005). Over the
years, the disbursement of GEF funds by the World
Bank in the form of combining the GEF grants with
World Bank Loans has received sharp criticisms.2
Current debates on the issues surrounding the ‘pledge
and review approach’, ‘international consultation and
analysis’ (ICA) and ‘measurement, reporting and ver-
ification’ (MRV), also resonate similar concerns
regarding control and judgement. 
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Arguably, the concept of sovereignty has been
considerably redefined by the environmental chal-
lenges, particularly those with global implications.
While the sovereign right of countries to exploit natu-
ral resources (and protect environment) within nation-
al boundaries has been recognised (UN 1972), how
this right may be exercised by countries has been fac-
ing increasing threats of restrictions on account of the
possible negative impacts it may have on other coun-
tries and global environment (Shue 1995). The extent
to which the global community can ask a country to
limit its sovereign right to make national decisions is at
the heart of any attempt to draft a global climate
regime. The principles inscribed in Article 3 and com-
mitments listed in Article 4 of the UNFCCC provide a
framework for defining global claims on individual
countries. From the developing countries’ point of
view, the principle of equity and common but differ-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
and the obligation of developed countries to provide
financial, technological and capacity building support
to developing countries are extremely important.
Particularly ‘new’, ‘additional’ and ‘predictable’
finance which is broadly captured by the phrase ‘full
agreed incremental costs’ in the Article 4 and 11 of the
UNFCCC is considered fundamental in full and effec-
tive implementation of the Convention. Although
negotiations are still grappling with the definition of
climate finance, a lot is already under progress in the
name of bilateral climate finance, most of which may
not be ‘new’ or ‘additional’. 
This paper examines the recent developments
related to finance for nationally appropriate mitigation
actions (NAMAs) in light of the conceptual linkages
‘climate finance’ has with the idea of development
and sovereignty. It argues that recent developments
may not be in line with the idea of development and
sovereignty that climate negotiations, particularly the
UNFCCC, have been respectful of. The rest of the
paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines a
general framework explaining relationship between
the idea of development, sovereignty and need for
finance in the context of climate change. Section 3
summarises the negotiations on climate finance and
discusses briefly the recent developments. Section 4,
analyses the current landscape of climate finance in
light of the discussion in section 2. General conclu-
sions are drawn in section 5.
2. Climate finance, sustainable development
and sovereignty 
From developing countries’ perspective, the idea of
sovereignty, the objective of sustainable development,
and the provision of climate finance are inseparably
linked through the operational significance of ‘capa-
bilities’ to follow a desired development path, as well
as through meeting the ethical demands of ‘equity’
and ‘freedom of choice’. This relationship is deeply
grounded in the principles of the Convention, partic-
ularly the principles of equity, common but differenti-
ated responsibility and respective capabilities, and the
right to promote sustainable development. However,
as Sen (1999) argues, the recognition of equality in
principle may remain hollow if the ‘real opportunities’
set remains unequal. The term ‘real opportunity’
implies that an agent not only has a set of opportuni-
ties available but also possesses necessary capabilities
to exploit those opportunities. The choices are not free
if the ‘real opportunities’ are restricted on account of
limited capabilities. In international politics, the
demand for sovereignty is also a demand for equal
treatment and freedom of choice. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the right to development in internation-
al law is grounded either in the concept of ‘exclusive
territorial sovereignty’ or in ‘the duty of equity’ that
developed countries owe to developing ones (Weiss
1993). Arguably, this demand for the right to develop-
ment, and claims on developed countries to support
enhancement of the ‘real opportunities’ for develop-
ment, is a negotiated arrangement to protect and
enhance the sovereignty of developing countries so as
to enable them to fulfill the imperatives of national
development while simultaneously attuning to the
needs of increasing scope of, and responsibilities
towards, global governance regimes. 
Access to unconditional and enhanced finance is
one of the prerequisites for developing countries to
meet the general obligations under the Convention.
Access to finance depends upon the strength of
domestic financial markets and the attractiveness of
an economy to foreign finance. While the former is an
integral component of the level of development, the
latter is a function of the former, at least partially.
However, experience shows that the conventional
flow of finance from industrialised countries comes
with a potential sovereignty cost. A major policy con-
cern for developing countries, particularly in the post
East-Asian crisis, has been to not only attract global
finance but also to ensure that it is not volatile (Grabel
2003). Financial liberalisation has resulted in a con-
siderable amount of influence and negotiating power
accruing to international investors in national policy
making. A recent example is Nokia threatening to
withdraw its investment in opposition to the Indian
government’s tax policies (India Times 2013), an area
which is the sovereign right of national governments.
A more explicit violation of sovereignty was experi-
enced by some developing countries during the early
1990s when they had to accept a range of ‘condition-
alities’ in return for financial support from the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of a ‘struc-
tural adjustment programme’ (Vreeland 2004). Recent
initiatives of the BRICS countries towards setting up a
USD 100 billion fund to protect them from financial
shocks (Castro 2013), is being interpreted as a strate-
gic step by these countries to avoid the sovereignty
costs that came with IMF support.
It is in this context that climate finance has been,
and remains, a core issue in climate change negotia-
tions. It continues to be a problematic issue in the
negotiations because of different readings by devel-
oped and developing country parties of its objectives
and functions. In our understanding of climate
finance, we refer to the finance that developed coun-
tries are expected to provide to developing countries
so as to enable the latter to meet their obligations
under Article 12 of the UNFCCC (1992). This defini-
tion locates the understanding of climate finance in
the north-south context.3 Article 4 provides the con-
tours within which the specific aspects of delivering
climate finance and other means of supporting devel-
oping countries need to be negotiated and agreed
upon. Paragraph 4.3 refers to new and additional
financial resources as well as adequacy and pre-
dictability in the flow of the funds. Paragraph 4.7 fur-
ther underlines the importance of international sup-
port by explicitly stating that ‘The extent to which
developing country Parties will effectively implement
their commitments under the Convention will depend
on the effective implementation by developed country
Parties of their commitments under the Convention
related to financial resources’. It also acknowledges
the overriding priorities of developing countries.
Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol also referred to these
provisions of the convention (UNFCCC 1998).
Subsequently, the Bali Action Plan in 2007 recognised
finance as one of the four building blocks for the
future climate regime and suggested that mitigation in
developing countries can be enhanced by means of
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs),
to be ‘supported and enabled … in a measurable,
reportable and verifiable manner’ (UNFCCC 2007).
The Bali Action Plan also acknowledged the different
social and economic conditions of parties. 
Whether a global agreement on climate regime will
successfully deliver the ultimate objective of the
Convention is critically dependent upon the magni-
tude of financial flows from North to South. More
than the argument of historical responsibility, this crit-
ical role underlines the fact that the developing world
cannot change their course of economic progress, in a
way conducive to avoiding climate change, on its
own. Immediate development imperatives, and con-
current domestic political pressures, do not allow the
governments of most countries to give priority to cli-
mate action. Poverty eradication from the global
south is already on top of the global political and eco-
nomic agenda. The terms of financial flows, however,
have been the subject of fierce debate in climate
change negotiations. These debates have taken a
more concrete shape ever since developed countries
pledged to provide USD 100 billion by 2020.
Estimates indicate that this figure is much less than the
finance actually needed for effective adaptation and
mitigation in developing countries (Sterk et al. 2011).
Differences also exist on what is eligible to be counted
as climate finance, who is to provide this finance, and
by what means can this money be raised (Clapp et al.
2012). The various suggestions offered for mobilising
this volume of financial support have included a range
of options blurring the distinction between ‘climate
finance’ and any other mode of financial flows.
Broadly, developing countries consider grants provid-
ed by the developed countries through budgetary pro-
visions, over and above their overseas development
assistance (ODA) commitment disbursed through a
multilateral arrangement under the Conference of
Parties (COP) as climate finance, whereas developed
countries tend to include and report, commercial
lending, ODA and other financial flows as climate
finance (Fransen et al. 2012).
The longstanding position of developing countries
that climate finance should flow from developed
countries in the form of grants, over and above ODA
commitments, has been justified by the historical
responsibility argument. However, the emphasis on
flow of climate finance from developed to developing
countries and various qualifications of the mitigation
actions by developing countries are grounded in the
principles of equity and common but differentiated
responsibilities and capabilities (arguably more than
in historical responsibility considerations) and consid-
erations of varying national circumstances. Asking
developing countries to do more than their contribu-
tion to the problem, as well as their capabilities to do
so, is perceived to be unfair. True, the developing
world too is equally vulnerable, or perhaps more so,
to the impacts of climate change, but asking them to
assign climate change a priority over their other
domestic political and economic pressures is akin to
interfering with their freedom of ‘choice’, telling them
what is more important for them and hence infringing
upon their self-determination. 
In this context, the provision that actions by devel-
oping countries are dependent upon the extent to
which developed countries provide financial support
appears to be a fair contract between two or more
sovereign parties. Of course, other forms of support
which may have financial implications, such as tech-
nological and capacity-building support, are also
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acceptable. The operational aspect of it remains the
non-willingness to pay or acquiring these capacities in
the absence of support. In that case, this is an interest-
ing example of exercising freedom of choice for devel-
oping countries to not take actions which are not ‘real’
for them and, at the same time, an expression of will-
ingness to give global concerns equal priority if the
‘sovereignty gap’ is reduced by means of adding to
their financial capabilities, directly or indirectly. 
From this perspective, the overriding priority given
to social and economic development in Article 4.7 of
the Convention does not necessarily imply neglect of
climate concerns but a strategic promise that, once the
‘capability gap’ is closed through enhanced financial
resources, a higher sustainable development trajecto-
ry would become a real opportunity for developing
countries and climate change would automatically
become a priority concern. It is interesting to note that
in the Convention, ‘promotion of sustainable devel-
opment’ has been treated both as an objective (Article
2), the right of all Parties (Article 3), and the obligation
of all parties (Article 4), whereas social and economic
development is recognised as the ‘overriding priority
of developing countries’ (UNFCCC 1992). The lan-
guage of ‘right’ for sustainable development makes it
imperative that countries can claim compensation if
their path to sustainable development is obstructed.
But, at the same time, the language of obligation for
all and explicit lesser priority to the environmental
arm of sustainable development in the context of
developing countries allows developing countries to
claim support to bridge the ‘capability gap’.
3. Status of ‘climate finance’ 
Despite continuous emphasis on the element of sup-
port in the agreed outcomes and an acknowledge-
ment of the developmental prerogatives of the devel-
oping countries, climate finance continues to be a
contested topic. The High-level Advisory Group on
Climate Change Financing (AGF) undertook an
assessment of climate change financing. However, by
categorically stating that it ‘did not seek consensus on
all issues and concepts’ (AGF 2010) it acknowledged
the complexity and difference in opinions on various
issues surrounding climate change. Instead, the AGF
report provides a platform for presenting various per-
spectives without taking any sides. 
Buchner et al. (2012), in their overview on the
landscape of climate finance, estimate that the annual
global climate finance flows at USD 343–385 billion in
2010/2011. This figure includes funding from both
public (USD 16–23 billion) and private (USD 217–
243 billion) sources and funding into both developed
countries (USD 193 billion) and developing countries
(USD 172 Billion). Public and private financial institu-
tions contribute by raising and channelling some USD
110–120 billion in this estimate. Most of the finance
(USD 330.7–369.3 billion) was aimed at mitigation
activities, with adaptation failing to attract any sort of
private finance. An important point which the study
makes is that domestic private actors contributed up
to 83% of private investments in developing coun-
tries, and private investors from OECD countries con-
tributed for 15% of the remaining investment. As
highlighted in section 2, our understanding of climate
finance differs from this particular definition.
Nevertheless, as one of the most comprehensive stud-
ies on climate finance flows, this provides an impor-
tant point for our argument. 
The study indicates that public intermediaries such
as multilateral, bilateral, national development banks
and dedicated climate funds distributed some USD 77
billion in total, out of which multilateral and bilateral
funds accounted for USD 34 billion.4 National entities
accounted for USD 42.7 billion and majorly invested
in the country where such institutions were based.
Although the study indicates that multilateral and
bilateral agencies account for only 10% of overall cli-
mate finance, it is important to note that this data
comes with a greater degree of confidence. It is much
more difficult to provide information about the private
sources of finance with this degree of confidence
(Stadelmann et al. 2013; Pereira et al. 2013). Indeed,
there is a need to go beyond just reporting the num-
bers (Stadelmann et al. 2013) to get a better under-
standing of how climate finance is evolving and
whether it has implications for changing geopolitics
and vice-versa (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). It is, howev-
er, clear that the focus of climate finance at the
moment is primarily on mitigation. Another useful
source of information is the website Climate Funds
Update (CFU) (Heinrich Böll Foundation & ODI
2013). The website tracks the international climate
finance initiatives that have been designed to address
the challenges of climate change. The data main-
tained by CFU indicates that bilateral and multilateral
funds have pledged close to USD 30 billion, of which
Japan’s ‘fast-start finance’ fund alone accounts for
USD 15 billion. The data confirms that most of the
money is spent on mitigation, particularly in Asia and
the Pacific region. Most of the initiatives reported by
CFU are bilateral in nature. Differences in the figures
provided by these oft-cited reports also point to the
inconsistency in the various estimates, and hence the
uncertainty inherent in quoting any study on climate
finance. Evidently, the flow of finance from developed
countries to developing countries has been far lower
than needed and promised. 
In the context of the relationship that climate
finance has with sovereignty and sustainable develop-
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ment, as discussed above, the issue of volume of cli-
mate finance, its use and terms and conditions of
access to it are critical. However, with reference to vol-
ume of climate finance, ‘what is to be counted as cli-
mate finance?’ (Watson et al. 2012) is the central issue
which has been delved into in a number of studies
(Sterk et al. 2011; Buchner et al. 2011; Buchner et al.
2012; Stewart et al. 2009; Haites 2011). Still the
debate is far from settled. Due to the definitional
ambiguity on climate finance it is difficult to reach a
consensus on key issues such as: a) climate finance
needs in developing countries; b) sources of finance;
c) amount of finance made available to developing
countries; and d) the potential uses that climate
finance can be put to (Clapp et al. 2012; Sterk et al.
2011; Stadelmann et al. 2011). Questions such as
whether USD 100 billion is to be treated as gross or
net flow; usage of the same terms to mean different
things, or different terms to mean same things
(Upadhyaya et al. 2012) make it difficult to reach con-
sistency on how the term climate finance can be used.
In the Green Climate Fund (GCF) discussions, terms
such as capital/total investment, incremental invest-
ment, and incremental costs have been used to clarify
what the GCF should focus on. This ambiguity origi-
nates from different readings of the texts in the differ-
ent UN documents that provide broad context for cli-
mate finance and avoids getting into its specific
aspects. One expects that operationalisation of the
GCF would clarify issues to some extent. But the
ongoing negotiations to finalise the Business Model
Framework for the GCF have been slow to reach
agreement on such crucial aspects (Schalatek 2013).
As of now, while the volume of finance is settled in
principle in the form of USD 100 billion by the 2020
pledge taken by developed countries at Copenhagen,
how that 100 billion is to be mobilised is not the con-
cern of the GCF. But tension was visible in the Fourth
Board meeting in Songdo, where Parties differed on
the choices presented on GCF’s: a) objectives, results
and performance indicators; b) financial instruments;
c) private sector facility; and d) enhanced direct
access. 
In its fifth meeting, the GCF Board finally man-
aged to resolve many of these key issues (GCF
2013b).Some of these agreements concerned the
principles and factors for the terms and conditions of
grants and concessional loans (GCF 2013a) and
arrangements between the COP and the GCF (GCF
2013c). 
3.1 NAMA finance: Emerging trends
NAMAs are expected to be a crucial vehicle to
enhance mitigation in developing countries. How
NAMAs  can be supported is still not agreed. The
NAMA registry, developed by the UNFCCC, was
expected to establish matchmaking between support
available for NAMAs and the NAMAs seeking support.
Although the registry now hosts substantial informa-
tion on NAMAs seeking support, the same cannot be
said about the support being made available. Based
on the information that is available on the registry it
seems that most of the action is taking place outside
the UNFCCC domain. Annexure 1 presents a snap-
shot of the information made available at the NAMA
registry website on the support available for NAMAs
(UNFCCC, 2014). To date, seven initiatives have pro-
vided information regarding NAMA support. None of
these initiatives are part of the NAMA registry but use
it as a platform to share information about their scope,
sectors targeted, funding channels, purpose of the
support and the principles or criteria for selecting a
NAMA to be financed, whether for preparation or for
implementation.
All of these initiatives originate in European coun-
tries and target different developing countries.
Initiatives such as EU-Africa Infrastructure Fund, Latin
America Investment Facility (LAIF) and Neighbour-
hood Investment Facility (NIF) are regional in nature,
whereas the GEF, climate-related ODA funding,
International Climate Initiative and NAMA Facility
focus on almost all developing countries. Out of all
these initiatives only GEF – by virtue of being under
UNFCCC – is multilateral in nature. The rest of the ini-
tiatives are primarily bilateral initiatives. The regional
initiatives provide limited information, if any, on the
type of actions they support, the organisations that
will channel the support they provide and the extent
of country consultation that is promoted. But they do
provide information on the number of projects that
they have supported or the finance that they have
made available to date. Some of the initiatives pro-
vide support for preparation of NAMAs, whereas oth-
ers provide information on their implementation; only
GEF provides support for both preparation and
implementation.
The most important development that is reflected
in the information collated in Annex 1 is that all the
different funds have their respective selection criteria.
It is also important to note that none of the funds pro-
vides any information on the extent of financial, tech-
nological or capacity-building support that would be
made available for supporting NAMAs. Without pro-
viding any information on the extent of support made
available, it is expected that developing countries
would spend resources in designing NAMAs while tak-
ing into account different criteria for accessing NAMA
support. This complicates the process to access sup-
port for NAMA implementation and can create
avenues for developing countries to become intellec-
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tually dependent on developed countries to meet
these requirements. All these funds have substantial
overlaps in terms of sectors and type of actions being
supported as well as the means by which the support
is being provided. Due to substantial overlaps, it
should not be difficult to agree on and follow a com-
mon funding channel for supporting NAMAs.
On the contrary, there are certain features where
these criteria vary from one to another. Some criteria
do not exclude any specific country from accessing
support, as in the case with the GCF; yet some are
regional in nature and expect support of existing pri-
orities, for example with the NIF; whereas some
expect the projects to meet the ODA eligibility criteria,
as is the case with climate-related ODA funding,
International Climate Initiative and NAMA Facility.
The latter three funds are bilateral mechanisms,
designed to reach out to all the developing countries.
By insisting that the funded projects should meet ODA
eligibility, these funds broadly violate the condition of
being ‘new and additional’ as most of this support can
be easily relabelled as ODA money and used to meet
multiple commitments. This in our understanding is a
serious issue and needs to be addressed so as to
ensure additionality of climate finance and to ensure
that multilateralism is followed in word and spirit. 
4. Implications for developing countries 
The financial flows supporting climate action, by and
large flowing through bilateral initiatives and private
support, may affect developing countries in three
ways. Firstly, the acceptance of bilateral support for
actions, particularly with explicit and stated mitigation
objectives, weakens the negotiating stance of devel-
oping countries for ‘new’ and ‘additional’ finance. It
has been observed that developed countries have
reported all types of financial flows, including com-
mercial loans and ODA, as fulfilment of their commit-
ment of USD 30 billion during 2010-2012 as fast-start
finance. This has been acknowledged also in the deci-
sion taken at COP 18. Acceptance of such financial
flows may imply that even commercial flows and ODA
can be treated as ‘new’ and ‘additional’ and are
equivalent to meeting financial obligations by devel-
oped countries as per the principle of the Convention,
which is not correct. In fact, a corollary to this devel-
opment is that flow of such finance for mitigation is
not bound to follow the principles of the Convention.
The most important deviation is from the notion of
‘self-determination’ and choice of actions for which
‘full agreed incremental cost’ is to be provided by
developed countries as climate finance. Since these
funds are not ‘new’ and ‘additional’ but a re-labelling
of ODA, those developing countries that choose to
stick to their longstanding position on climate finance
are excluded by design from access to these resources.
This support then comes at the cost of compromising
countries’ independent foreign policy on climate
change, arguably the strongest indicator of a country’s
sovereignty in international matters, reflected in con-
tribution to the conceptual understanding of the terms
of the global agreement. 
The second way in which the proliferation of bilat-
eral mitigation support may affect developing coun-
tries is by way of implicitly suggesting that developing
countries align their low-carbon development strate-
gies, of which NAMAs are one component (Lütken et
al. 2011), to the criteria as defined by the channel
delivering climate finance. Although details of the cri-
teria and their application are yet to unfold, the broad
structure of it is in direct conflict with the negotiating
positions of developing countries that have manifest-
ed their sovereignty over determining developmental
priorities. For example, the criterion of the NAMA
facility regarding the ‘ambition’ level of a proposed
NAMA is in clear conflict with the COP 16 decision on
international consultation and analysis (ICA) of miti-
gation actions, which clearly notes that the purpose of
ICA shall not be to adjudge ambition level of actions
being analysed. Further, the criterion of ‘transforma-
tion’ has the potential of being ‘intrusive’. In fact,
when a South African negotiator questioned the
NAMA Facility representative at the technical work-
shop organised by the SBI during COP19 on why the
same money could not be put into the GCF, the rep-
resentative of the NAMA facility categorically men-
tioned that through the NAMA facility they were seek-
ing clear control over how the money is used by the
host countries.5
Along the same lines, it has also been argued in
justifying the NAMAs outside UNFCCC process that
these experiences will give empirical evidence of how
NAMA mechanisms should look, one of the key fea-
tures of which is a donor-driven MRV framework.6
This is in clear violation of the idea of climate finance
as defined under the Convention. In addition, a likely
corollary of such support to mitigation actions is diver-
sion of bilateral aid away from traditional social devel-
opment sectors such as education, health and water.
One may argue that the development co-benefits
approach for supporting NAMAs is likely to also take
care of traditional lines of bilateral support. While this
may be true in many instances, it locks social sectors
with ‘ambitious’ mitigation potential and by implica-
tion excludes the regions from receiving support
where mitigation potential is low. Moreover, this sup-
port also requires that the proposed activity has some
level of financial commitment from other sources.
Collectively, it may add to the already existing region-
al developmental inequalities within individual devel-
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oping countries by encouraging convergence of finan-
cial flows to certain areas and sectors. Together, it
amounts to setting the agenda for developing coun-
tries, which, contrary to the developing country asser-
tion, prioritises mitigation over development.
The third route through which the proliferation of
bilateral flow of finance of climate action can under-
mine sovereignty of developing countries is the possi-
bility that the commitments for bilateral support also
leave the GCF empty. This does not have to be nec-
essarily true, but so far this has been the case.
Currently, the progress on building the corpus to oper-
ationalise the GCF does not seem promising. It has
been reported that both France and EU have retreated
from their respective commitments of Euro 110 mil-
lion in 2014 and Euro 100 million in 2020 (EurActiv
2013). In sharp contrast stand the proliferation of
bilateral commitments and its rather fast delivery. The
German and United Kingdom governments launched
the NAMA Facility with up to Euro 15 million support
early in 2013. This is in line with what has been
referred to as ‘get on with it’ sentiment in the GCF
negotiations (Schalatek 2013). An empty GCF along
with a concrete, although ambiguous, flow of climate
finance through bilateral channels leaves both multi-
lateralism as well as the collective negotiating power
of developing countries weakened in three ways.
Firstly, the explicit requirement of the NAMA Facility
that this support be recognised as ODA support
invites developing countries to give up their long-
standing negotiating position that ODA support
should not be part of climate finance (UNFCCC
2012). Secondly, and most importantly, developing
countries have no say in determining the governance
and terms and conditions of disbursement of these
resources as they have in case of the GCF or any
other mechanisms under the UNFCCC. Thirdly, it
delays the operationalisation of the GCF, which can
play an important role in developing a more inclusive
mechanism which eliminates the negative conse-
quences of proliferation of large number of funds, and
provides a focal point through which the efforts to
address climate change can be amplified, more so if it
engages developing countries at the national level,
and engages with parties at a partner level (Gomez-
Echeverri 2013). Operationalisation of the GCF can
possibly result in finding the middle ground between a
highly centralised system and a decentralised system
that will be crucial to ensure highest ownership of the
GCF’s governance structure balancing national sover-
eignties with global imperatives.
5. Conclusion
For developing countries, a multilateral regime to
address global problems is better suited than a bilater-
al regime on account of sovereignty concerns. Space
to bargain for legitimate space for determining a
national development agenda as well as negotiating a
capability-enhancing, non-intrusive arrangement
towards contributing to the global solutions is relative-
ly wider under multilateral processes; more so,
because developing countries can benefit from collec-
tive bargaining power. These options are either not
available or restricted in a bilateral setting. In the con-
text of climate change, provision of financial support
to developing countries under the UNFCCC is one
such capability-enhancing, non-intrusive arrange-
ment. However, the many bilateral channels of cli-
mate finance have reduced the effective bargaining
space for developing countries. Many of the terms of
these bilateral channels to support NAMAs are in con-
flict with the longstanding negotiating positions of
developing countries on climate finance. Hence,
implementation of bilaterally supported climate action
puts developing countries’ negotiating stances in a
contradictory position. Moreover, these terms may be
influencing the development agenda in favour of mit-
igation over development. While one can only hope
that capitalisation of the GCF will counterbalance this
trend, it is difficult to conceive that developed coun-





1. See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
A/RES/42/186 (Environmental Perspective to the Year
2000 and Beyond, adopted on 11 December 1987);
A/RES/ 42/187 (Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, adopted on 11
December 1987); A/RES/43/53 (Protection of global cli-
mate for present and future generations of mankind,
adopted on 6 December 1988); A/RES/ 44/228 (United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
adopted on 22 December 1989); A/RES/45/211 (United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
adopted on 21 December 1990); and A/RES/45/212
(Protection of global climate for present and future gen-
erations of mankind, adopted on 21 December 1990).
2. Personal communication with Dr Prodipto Ghosh, for-
mer climate negotiator for India.
3. We use north-south and developed-developing termi-
nologies interchangeably. The latter is more frequently
used in the UNFCCC context than the former but the
north-south framing is important to provide historical
context.
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4. Multilateral finance institutions (USD 21.2 billion);
Bilateral finance institutions (USD 11.3 billion).
5. Personal notes.
6. Laura Würtenberger during a side-event presentation
on NAMAs at COP18.
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Abstract
South Africa is one of the top twenty emitters in the world and, like many middle-income
countries, is facing the challenge of pursuing low-carbon policies in the context of high levels
of unemployment, inequality and poverty. Renewable energy investments and the imple-
mentation of a carbon tax are two key issues on the low-carbon policy agenda for South
Africa. This paper uses a dynamic-recursive general equilibrium model to evaluate the
potential implications of these mitigation actions for economic growth, emissions, employ-
ment and inequality in South Africa. Results indicate that both the implementation of a car-
bon tax and investment in greener energy options are unlikely to have a ‘devastating’
impact on the economy. The introduction of renewable energy has a positive impact on
direct employment in the electricity sector, although indirect job losses, mostly by low-skilled
workers, drown out this effect and lead to a slight decrease in overall employment growth
and a negative impact on income distribution. This study finds that the introduction of a car-
bon tax is an effective mechanism for emissions reduction. The proposed tax-level, howev-
er, even coupled with an aggressive renewable energy build plan, is still too low to allow
South Africa to reach its emissions reduction target of 42% by 2025. If South Africa is to
meet the challenge of decreasing emissions as well as decreasing inequality and eradicating
poverty a higher carbon tax should be introduced, along with a revenue-recycling mecha-
nism that would result in increased welfare.
Keywords: Renewable energy, employment, carbon tax, mitigation, economy-wide, CGE
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CARBON PRICING, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
1. Introduction
A number of developing countries have realised the
importance of reassessing their energy demand, hop-
ing to benefit from ‘green growth’ in the renewables
sector. South Africa is amongst the top twenty emitters
(in tonnage of CO2) in the world and, with the target
of peaking emissions by 2025, is in the process of
implementing greener energy options. The electricity
sector is heavily reliant on coal-fired generation, con-
tributing to over 90% of the country’s current genera-
tion capacity. South Africa has committed to an emis-
sions reduction of 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025 rel-
ative to a business-as-usual (BAU) baseline (RSA
2010). In order to reach these targets, alternative
energy options need to be explored. The country’s
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) shows a move in the
right direction with a decrease in the reliance on coal-
fired plants and an increase in renewable energy gen-
eration capacity. 
The current process of the IRP is influenced by a
number of policy goals, including emissions reduc-
tions; these policy goals act as ‘inputs’ into the opera-
tional process. The intention of the IRP is to address
these and propose an electricity supply plan that is
aligned with these policy goals and that also ensures
the supply of affordable, reliable electricity to the
region. Three easily quantifiable indicators form the
basis of decision-making in the IRP, namely invest-
ment cost, emissions reduction and water usage.
There are, however, a number of important economic
and social policy goals that should also form an inte-
gral part of the decision-making process, namely: (1)
economic growth or GDP growth; (2) employment;
(3) regional development; (4) localisation; (5) good
terms of trade; (6) and low electricity price. The mod-
elling approach used in the IRP is limiting in terms of
analysing the plan’s ability to address some of these
policy goals. This is a major gap in the planning
process, as these policy goals are important consider-
ations for economic growth and development nation-
ally as well as regionally. An interim attempt was
made during the IRP process to quantify the possible
effects of scenarios on these policy goals. The process
followed a multi-criteria decision-making methodolo-
gy informed by various stakeholder meetings. An
important drawback of this method is that it is difficult
to prove that there is solid theoretical backing for the
results and that these results are not influenced by
subjectivity. However, under time and budget con-
straints it was difficult to include a thorough economic
analysis in the IRP process, and the need for this type
of analysis was mentioned in the draft report for the
IRP (DoE 2010)
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by
using a highly disaggregated economy-wide model to
analyse the potential socioeconomic implications of
introducing renewable energy and implementing a
carbon tax in South Africa; addressing the impacts on
two of the policy goals in the IRP, namely, economic
growth and employment. The chosen methodology is
appropriate for the analysis as it is theory-based and
consistent with the current structure of the South
African economy. 
There are a few existing studies that use similar
methodologies to simulate mitigation actions in South
Africa. Pauw (2007), Devarajan et al. (2011) and
Alton et al. (2012) explore issues surrounding a car-
bon tax in South Africa. Devarajan et al. find that the
implementation of a carbon tax in South Africa is like-
ly to lead to a decrease in welfare but is, however,
more efficient than other tax instruments in curbing
energy use and emissions. An important limitation of
this study, highlighted in Alton et al., is that there is no
differentiation between energy technologies or inclu-
sion of the country’s long-term electricity investment
plan. Pauw, on the other-hand, distinguishes between
different types of energy technologies and uses a par-
tial-equilibrium energy model to derive an optimal
electricity investment schedule. This study finds small-
er welfare reductions from the introduction of a car-
bon tax in comparison to Devarajan et al. Alton et al.
follow Pauw by including detailed energy technologies
and deriving electricity investment paths from an
energy sector model. Secondly, they address a num-
ber of limitations of the aforementioned studies: the
use of a dynamic computable general equilibrium
model to overcome the lack of time dimension; indus-
tries are allowed to invest in less energy-intensive
activities in response to higher energy prices; labour
and capital market rigidities are captured; a number of
tax-recycling options are simulated. A carbon tax of
R12 per ton of CO2 is introduced in 2012 and project-
ed to rise linearly to a value of R210 per ton in 2022,
sufficient to meet the national emissions reduction tar-
get. This study highlights the importance of both the
design of the carbon tax and the method of revenue-
recycling. In comparison, the use of tax revenues to
fund corporate tax reductions is favourable for eco-
nomic growth and high-income households but results
in decreased welfare for the majority of the popula-
tion. An alternative option of expanding social trans-
fers, intuitively, improves welfare for low-income
households but results in less economic growth. 
The methodology used in this paper follows on
from that used in Alton et al. (2012). The model
design is extended to include a highly disaggregated
renewable energy sector. Three scenarios, based on
scenarios derived from a partial equilibrium energy
sector model used in the IRP process, are simulated in
this paper. They depict different levels of renewable
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energy investment and, since they are derived from
an energy model, are consistent with South Africa’s
electricity system requirements. The results will
include a comparison between potential impacts of
these scenarios on economic growth, inequality,
employment and emissions reduction. 
2. Electricity generation options in South
Africa
2.1 Description of the model scenarios
The IRP broadly describes the process of modelling
and decision-making for the future of South Africa’s
electricity generation. The main objectives are to, first,
estimate the long-term future demand for electricity
and secondly, to identify possible scenarios of genera-
tion capacity that are able to meet this demand (DoE
2011). The long lead times and high investment costs
associated with electricity generation capacity provide
obvious motivation for the importance of integrated
resource planning. A number of other concerns
accompany these in the case of South Africa; eco-
nomic uncertainty due to the long time horizon, pend-
ing emissions reduction targets, and security of supply
concerns due to the country’s dominant reliance on
coal, to name but a few. (DoE 2011)
The scope of the IRP spans over the total demand
and supply for electricity in South Africa, and includes
Eskom as well as non-Eskom sources of generation
capacity. The foundation of the plan is built on a num-
ber of policy recommendations, such as cost-minimi-
sation and emissions constraints. The initial stage of
the IRP requires the generation of a base case, or ref-
erence scenario. This base case represents the least-
cost option and is considered the optimal option in
terms of meeting capacity needs when the only limita-
tion is the cost factor (DoE 2011). There are a number
of other scenarios that are then compiled in light of
explicit policy and the consideration of risk adjust-
ments that eventually lead to the determination of a
proposed electricity build plan for South Africa.
A number of policy requirements govern the IRP.
These form the foundation on which the IRP is built.
Three particular elements of policy are crucial to the
determination of the plan. Firstly, the Energy White
Paper (DME 1998) specified a preference for the
movement away from reliance on coal and towards a
more diverse electricity generation mix with the inclu-
sion of nuclear, natural gas and renewable options.
Secondly, in light of potential future international cli-
mate change obligations, the IRP is considerate of
South Africa’s climate change policy. With regard to
this, the importance of accounting for the environ-
mental impacts of electricity generation technologies
is noted and should be accounted for in the IRP.
Thirdly, there is a considerable amount of political
pressure to ensure that electricity provision remains at
the least possible cost to the consumer. In light of this,
the purpose of the IRP is to provide additional capac-
ity through a build plan in order to meet the expected
demand growth at the minimum social cost; the cost
should include the costs associated with the impact of
externalities. 
The ultimate goal of the IRP process is to present
a build plan that is accepted by the Ministry as the
most optimal scenario taking into account a number
of constraints and policy interests. The plan is not
fixed and it should be revised every two years in an
attempt to mitigate the effects of the uncertainty and
allow the plan to evolve to meet revised demand
growth and include any technological developments
that may occur over the period. The current scenario
is the policy-adjusted plan; considered to be a com-
promise between the least-cost scenario (Base-case)
and the scenario with the strictest emissions target, but
is also the most costly - the Emissions 3 scenario. The
use of these three scenarios in this paper allows an
appropriate contrast between employment projections
under a low-carbon trajectory and under a BAU tra-
jectory, where there is no need to reduce emissions.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the
total new capacity builds under these scenarios over
the period of analysis, 2010 to 2030. 
The least-cost technology option in South Africa is
coal, with coal-fired plants now supplying over 90% of
its electricity. This is apparent in the baseline scenario,
where capacity for coal-fired electricity generation
almost doubles over the period to 2030. There are a
number of capacity build plans that are considered
‘firm commitments’ and are either in the process of
being built or in the final stages of planning. Two large
coal-fired plants, Medupi and Kusile, make up the
bulk of the committed builds and are planned to add
8760 MW of capacity by 2020 (dependent on delays).
A number of small renewable electricity generation
plants are also considered ‘committed’, but their con-
tribution is minor in comparison, with an estimated
2400 MW by 2030. 
The Policy-adjusted scenario displays a more
diversified electricity build plan, with the inclusion of
9600MW of nuclear power, and 8400 MW each of
wind and solar photovoltaic (PV). There is also an
increase in peaking capacity, open-cycle gas turbines
(OCGT) and closed-cycle gas turbines (CCGT), with
6280 MW of capacity in total. The Emissions 3 sce-
nario relies heavily on the use of renewable energy,
contributing to approximately 60% of total electricity
capacity by 2030. As with the policy-adjusted sce-
nario, 9600MW of nuclear power is planned to come
online during the period, with no additional base-load
capacity from coal-fired plants. The emissions reduc-
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tions in this scenario, although substantial with an
annual emissions limit of 220MT CO2-eq, still will not
get South Africa to the targeted emissions reduction of
42% from baseline by 2025. Alton et al. (2012) esti-
mate that, given domestic demand forecasts and pro-
duction quotas, at least an additional R0.46 trillion of
investment would be needed for South Africa to reach
its emissions reduction target. The emissions path-
ways for the three scenarios is given in Figure 2.
In order to ensure that the scenarios are compara-
ble, we simulate the same total electricity supply in
GWh for all scenarios. Renewable options for electric-
ity generation currently have low capacity factors, in
comparison to nuclear power and coal-fired plants.
The rest of this section will expand on the technology
options available in the IRP. 
2.2 Technology options for electricity
generation
There are a number of alternative electricity gener-
ation options outlined in the IRP. Each option pro-
duces the same good, electricity, but with different
technology coefficients – i.e., they have different fac-
tor and intermediate inputs. Table 1 provides a sum-
mary of the technology options in terms of cost,
demand for intermediates and factor demand. 
3. Measuring economy-wide impacts
3.1 Structure of South African economy and labour
markets
Table 2 outlines the structure of the South African
economy and labour market in 2007. South Africa
has a dominantly services-based economy, with serv-
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Figure 2: Emissions pathways for the Base-case, Policy-adjusted and Emissions 3 scenarios
Source: Based on IRP calculations
Figure 1: The planned capacity builds for all three scenarios (GW)
Source: Based on the IRP (2011)
ices accounting for over 66% of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and approximately two-thirds of employ-
ment. The electricity sector is a relatively small sector,
with a contribution of around 1.8% of GDP and 0.3%
of employment. Historically cheap electricity prices
coupled with a mineral-rich country has aided the
development of energy-intensive sectors in the econ-
omy. For this reason, we believe that the importance
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Table 1: Intermediate and factor estimates for electricity generation technologies
Source: Based on EPRI (2010) 
Coal Nuclear Hydro PV CSP Wind Waste Gas Diesel
Base year 2007
Electricity supply  (GWh) 229 571 11 317 5 845 213 319 32 204 1 86
Gross operating surplusa 55 749 2 480 1 369 140 103 8 76 0 16
(ZAR mil)
Total employment (people) 33 014 2 071 2 063 64 96 7 56 0 12
High-skilled (people) 15 054 795 990 32 48 3 26 0 6
Assumptionsb
Build cost (ZAR mil/GWh) 17 785 26 575 9 464 37 225 37 425 14 445 9 464 4 868 4 868
Levelised costc of plant 0.40 0.74 0.13 1.43 1.42 0.70 0.54 0.96 2.25
(ZAR mil/GWh)
O&M (jobs/GWh) 0.14 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.14 0.14
Construction/installation 10.40 10.80 19.40 52.30 10.80 4.50 6.90 6.20 6.20
(job years/MW)
Manufacturing 1.50 1.20 0.90 16.80 7.20 22.50 0.80 0.07 0.07
(job years/MW)
Imported content (%) 35 % 35 % 35 % 70 % 50 % 70 % 50 % 35 % 35 %
Valued (ZAR/GWh) 6 225 9 301 3 312 26 058 18 713 10 112 4 732 1 704 1 704
Fuel (ZAR mil/GWh) 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 2.39
Notes:
a. Gross operating surplus is the portion of income that is earned by the capital factor from production by incorporated enterprises.
b. These assumptions are based on the lifetime of the plant and are based on EPRI (2010) and, for renewable energy options, 
REIPPPP announcements (DoE 2013).
c. Levelised cost of plant is the unit cost of electricity generation over the life of the plant. It includes all the costs needed to build and 
operate a power plant over its lifetime, normalised over the total net electricity generated by the plant.
d. The portion of investment assumed to flow out the economy through imported content requirements during the build phase. Based 
on weighted averages for imported content over the first 2 bids (DoE, 2013).
Table 2: Structure of South Africa’s economy and labour market
Source: South Africa 2007 social accounting matrix (own calculations)
Share of total (%) Exports/ Imports/ 
output (%) output (%)
GDP Employment Exports Imports
Total GDP 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 11.21 15.28
Agriculture 3.11 3.74 2.64 0.95 11.14 5.65
Industry 30.77 29.08 83.73 84.22 21.49 27.53
Mining 8.83 8.79 33.41 10.47 65.07 40.75
Coal-mining 1.59 1.61 4.49 0.21 43.82 4.31
Manufacturing 16.83 15.88 48.75 72.47 16.55 30.04
Petroleum 1.15 0.20 2.17 3.67 8.41 21.84
Electricity 1.81 0.31 1.57 1.29 15.22 14.43
Coal-fired 1.63 0.28 - - - -
Nuclear 0.15 0.02 - - - -
Hydro 0.02 0.01 - - - -
Services 66.12 67.18 13.63 14.83 3.11 3.91
of the electricity sector is understated when looking at
the direct contribution to GDP; the indirect effects of
changes in the electricity sector are more pronounced
given the forward linkages associated with the sector.
Eskom is the state utility and runs a monopoly in
the electricity sector, generating approximately 95% of
the electricity used in South Africa and an estimated
45% of the electricity used in Africa (Eskom  2011).
Electricity generation is highly reliant on the use of
coal, which remains the cheapest generation option
given that South Africa is a coal-rich country. There
was not much diversity in terms of electricity genera-
tion in 2007, with approximately 93% of electricity
generated by coal-fired plant, 1.8GW (5%) generated
by Koeberg, Africa’s first nuclear power station; and
the remainder mainly from hydropower (Eskom,
2011).
3.2 Description of the static E-SAGE model
A number of CGE models have contributed to the
local policy-making process in areas including trade
strategy, income distribution, and structural change in
low-income countries. There are several features of
this class of models that make them suitable for this
type of analysis (Arndt et al. 2011). Firstly, the struc-
ture of CGE models ensures that all economy-wide
constraints are respected and provide a theoretically
consistent framework for welfare and distributional
analysis (Arndt et al. 2011). Secondly, CGE models
simulate the functioning of a market economy, and
provide a platform for analysis on how different eco-
nomic conditions affect markets and prices (Arndt et
al. 2011). One of the drawbacks of this type of mod-
elling, however, is that the credibility of the results is
highly dependent on the accuracy of the data and
assumptions made when calibrating the model. It is
possible to mitigate this limitation through transparen-
cy and disclosing the assumptions made and data
used in building the economy-wide model. 
The South African General Equilibrium (SAGE)
model used in this analysis is derived from neoclassi-
cal tradition originally presented in the seminal work
by Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). A number
of extensions and adaptations have been made to this
framework, including the ability for producers to pro-
duce more than one commodity and the explicit treat-
ment of transaction costs (Lofgren et al. 2001). The
dynamic-recursive energy extension to the SAGE
model, developed by Arndt et al. (2011) is used in this
paper. The SAGE model was extended to reflect the
detailed structure and workings of South Africa’s ener-
gy sector – the E-SAGE model. In addition, the model
was developed further to capture a detailed factor
demand for the electricity sector. The SAGE model is
a dynamic recursive model; in simple terms a
sequence of static model runs that are solved to simu-
late the passing of time. The static model is solved
‘within-the-period’ with the use of non-linear equa-
tions that are solved simultaneously to capture link-
ages that exist in the real economy. This is followed by
a ‘between-period’ run where a number of parameters
are updated according to exogenous behavioural
changes over time as well as the results from the pre-
vious static run. The E-SAGE model simulates the
period between 2010 and 2030 and each static run
represents one year. 
There are 46 productive sectors, or activities, iden-
tified within the model; as well as six factors of pro-
duction including, capital, crop land and labour.
Labour is disaggregated further into four factors by
level of education – primary, middle, secondary, terti-
ary.
The production schedule for a sole producer is
provided for simplicity, although in reality, the SAGE
model contains 46 sectors, each of which are assigned
a representative producer. The behaviour of the rep-
resentative producer is such that they will maximise
profits subject to a given set of input and output prices
(Thurlow 2004). The model follows neoclassical theo-
ry, and assumes constant returns to scale and hence a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function is
used to determine production (Arndt et al. 2011):
                  (1)
where QA is the output quantity of sector i, αp is the
shift parameter reflecting total factor productivity
(TFP), QF is the quantity demanded of each factor f
(i.e., labour and capital) and  is a share parameter of
factor f employed in the production of good i. The
elasticity of substitution between factors σ is a trans-
formation of ρp.
The use of a CES function allows producers to
respond to changes in relative factor returns by
smoothly substituting between available factors to
derive a final value-added composite (Thurlow
2004). 
Profits pi in each sector i are defined as the differ-
ence between revenues and total factor payments
(Arndt et al. 2011):












)                         (2)
where PV is the value-added component of the pro-
ducer price, and WF is factor prices (e.g., labour
wages and returns on capital). Profit maximisation
implies that factors will receive an income where mar-
ginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, based on
endogenous relative prices (Thurlow 2004).
Maximising sectoral profits subject to Equation 6, and
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rearranging the resulting first order condition provides
the system of factor demand equations used in the
model (Arndt et al. 2011):
           (3)
According to Arndt et al. (2011), the SAGE model
assumes a Leontief specification for technology when
calculating the intermediate demands of individual
goods as well as when merging aggregate factor and
intermediate inputs. This use of fixed shares is due to
the belief that technology, and not the decisio-making
of producers, determines the mixture of intermediates
per unit of output, and the ratio of intermediates to
value-added (Thurlow 2004). In light of this, the com-
plete producer price PA is (Arndt et al. 2011):










)                                 (4)
where io
ij
represents the fixed input-output coefficient
used in the demand for intermediates, which defines
the quantity of good j used in the production of one
unit of good i (Arndt et al. 2011).
The SAGE model represents an open economy
and hence the model recognises the two-way trade
that exists between countries for similar goods (Arndt
et al. 2011). Substitution possibilities, governed by a
CET function, exist between the production for
domestic and for foreign markets (Thurlow, 2004). A
CET function is used to allow the distinction between
domestic and imported goods in terms of differences
in time and/or quality that may exist between them
(Thurlow 2004). 
Producers are driven by profit-maximisation and
therefore choose to sell in the market that offers the
highest returns. Exported commodities are disaggre-
gated further using a CES according to the specific
region under a CES specification. The assumption
that the substitution between regions is governed by a
CES specification is fair as one would expect that pro-
ducers would react to changes in relative prices across
regions. This would therefore change the geographical
composition of their exports accordingly (Thurlow
2004). 
The import market is treated in the same regard.
Substitution possibilities exist between imported and
domestic goods under a CES Armington specification
(Armington 1969). This is true in the use of both final
and intermediate goods (Arndt, Davies & Thurlow
2011).
The SAGE model distinguishes between different
institutions in the South African economy, namely,
households, government and enterprises. Households
are disaggregated according to income deciles, with
the top decile divided into five income categories
(Thurlow 2004). 
The factor income generated from production
forms the primary source of income for households
and enterprises (Thurlow 2004). In addition, due to
the model representing an open economy, household
incomes consist of transfers from the government,
other domestic institutions as well as from the rest of
the world.  Factor returns in South Africa have been
found to differ across both occupations and sectors. In
this light, the SAGE model utilises a fixed activity-spe-
cific wage-distortion term combined with the econo-
my-wide wage to generate activity-specific wages that
are paid by each activity (Thurlow 2004). There are a
number of assumptions governing the factor market.
Firstly, the supply of capital is fixed over a specific
time-period, i.e. fully employed, but is considered
immobile across sectors (Thurlow 2004). Energy cap-
ital, however, is treated as fully employed and activi-
ty-specific. There is assumed to be unemployment for
the unskilled workers, however, the other three labour
categories are assumed to be fully employed and
mobile. Remittances are also received by factors from
the rest of the world and therefore also contribute to
factor incomes (Thurlow 2004). 
The SAGE model follows general equilibrium the-
ory in that households within a certain income cate-
gory are assumed to share identical preferences, and
are therefore modelled as ‘representative consumers’
(Thurlow 2004). According to this theory, equilibrium
is reached when the representative household max-
imises their utility subject to a budget constraint. In the
model, each representative household has its own util-
ity function, in which QH is the level of consumption
is income-independent and constrained by the house-
holds’ marginal budget share (Arndt et al. 2011).
Utility is maximised for the consumer subject to a
budget constraint, in which PQ is the market price of
each good, YH is total household income, and sh and
th are marginal savings and direct income tax rates,
respectively (Arndt et al. 2011). By maximising the
above utility function subject to a household budget
constraint, a linear expenditure system (LES) of
demand is derived (Arndt et al. 2011).
The LES of demand represents the consumer pref-
erences captured in the model, given prices and
incomes. These demand functions define households’
real consumption of each commodity. The LES spec-
ification is used in the model as it allows the identifi-
cation of excess household income and therefore
ensures a minimum level of consumption (Thurlow
2004). 
The government is considered to be a separate
agent with income and expenditure, although it is not
considered to have any behavioural functions (Arndt
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et al. 2011). Most of the income earned by the gov-
ernment is from direct and indirect taxes and its
expenditure is assumed to be on consumption and
household transfers (i.e., grants) (Thurlow 2004). 
Household and enterprise savings are collected
into a ‘savings pool’ from which investment in the
economy is financed (Thurlow 2004). It is assumed in
the model that government borrowing can diminish
this supply of loanable funds and that capital inflows
from the rest of the world are able to increase it
(Thurlow, 2004). There is no specified behavioural
function governing the level of investment demand in
the model, although the model assumes that the total
value of investment spending must equate the total
amount of investible funds TI in the economy (Arndt
et al. 2011). 
The SAGE model assumes full employment and
factor mobility across sectors at an aggregate level.
Thus the following factor market equilibrium holds
(Arndt et al. 2011):






                                               (5)
where QFS is fixed total factor supply. Assuming all
factors are owned by households, household income
YH is determined by (Arndt et al. 2011):












                     (6)
where ω is a coefficient matrix determining the distri-
bution of factor earnings to individual households,
and tf is the direct tax on factor earnings (e.g., corpo-
rate taxes imposed on capital profits).
The model is set up with a number of closures that
govern macro adjustments. The selection of appropri-
ate closures should ensure that the model reacts to
shocks in a way that is representative of the real econ-
omy under investigation. There are considered to be
three broad macroeconomic accounts in the SAGE
model: the current account, the government balance,
and the savings and investment account (Thurlow
2004). The macroeconomic balance in the SAGE
model is governed by a number of closure rules,
which provide a mechanism through which adjust-
ments are made to maintain this balance, or equilibri-
um (Arndt et al. 2011).
According to Arndt, et al. (2011), the current
account is considered to be the most important of
these macro accounts. A substantial amount of
research pours into this topic, although in this case,
due to the single-country open economy CGE model,
it is considered an exogenous variable (Arnd et al.
2011). It is assumed that a flexible exchange rate
adjusts in order to maintain a fixed level of foreign
borrowing for the current account macro closure rule
(Thurlow 2004). South Africa’s firm commitment to a
flexible exchange rate system and idea that foreign
borrowing is unlimited ensure that the chosen closure
rule is realistic (Thurlow 2004). 
The second closure rule concerns the government
balance. Government consumption spending in the
SAGE model is considered to be exogenous. In
response to this the fiscal balance, or government sav-
ings are flexible and adjust accordingly (Arndt et al.
2011). 
The third closure rule, perhaps the least obvious,
involves the choice of a savings-investment closure
(Thurlow 2004). The relationship between savings
and investment continues to be a highly debated and
controversial topic in macroeconomics (Nell, 2003).
Neo-classical theory, along with new endogenous
growth theory, maintains the view that it is former sav-
ings that decide an economy’s investment and output
(Thurlow 2004). Conversely, from a Keynesian per-
spective it is investment that is exogenous and savings
that adjust accordingly (Thurlow 2004). Although,
according to Nell (2003), recent works have estab-
lished that, in the case of South Africa, the long-run
savings and investment relationship is associated with
exogenous savings and no feedback from investment.  
Along with these three macroeconomic accounts,
there is a factor market closure in the model. The var-
ious factors in the economy require specification in
terms of how they are to be treated in the model. The
SAGE model assumes full employment for high-
skilled labour and unemployment amongst low-skilled
labour with labour being mobile across sectors - a suit-
able closure for the South African context (Pauw
2007). Capital stock is assumed to be fully employed
and activity-specific for the electricity sector, as the
simulations impose a structural shift on production
capacity.  Land is assumed to be fixed and immobile
as it is generally treated. 
The consumer price index is assumed to be the
numeraire in the SAGE model. In other words, all
prices are considered relative to the weighted unit
price of household’s initial consumption bundle
(Arndt et al. 2011). 
3.3 The energy sector and carbon tax
simulations
Electricity is defined as a single commodity in the
SAGE model, comprised of the separate supply of
each electricity subsector (nuclear, hydropower, etc) to
the national grid. The model assumes that each of
these subsectors has its own distinctive production
technology, based on estimates from an earlier study
by Pauw (2007). It is also assumed that each subsec-
tor requires a different mix of factor inputs (Arndt et al.
2011). Hence, there are a number of different electric-
ity ‘activities’ and a sole electricity commodity. This is
a realistic assumption, as consumers in South Africa
are not able to demand certain ‘types’ of electricity as
it all comes from the national grid; electricity subsec-
tors have very different supply processes and costs. 
There are a number of adjustments that were
made in order to allow multiple energy subsectors to
produce the same commodity. The updated produc-




where QAS is the output of subsector s within aggre-
gate sector i, PAS is the subsector producer price, and
io reflects each subsector’s unique production technol-
ogy. Factor demands QF are also defined at sector
level.
A high elasticity of substitution is assumed to exist
between energy subsectors in order to replicate their
product homogeneity. However, switching between
different energy subsectors is constrained by the fixed
installed capital in each subsector, due to the immobil-
ity of this capital. The speed at which South Africa can
exchange between energy sources is determined by
new capital investment as installed capital is assumed
to depreciate at a fixed rate. In the current extension
to the SAGE model, new investment in each subsec-
tor is determined exogenously and follows the IRP
(Arndt et al. 2011). 
Energy is treated as an intermediate input in the E-
SAGE model, aggregated with other intermediates
using a Leontief production function. Producers are,
however, able to respond to energy price changes by
the use of a ‘response’ elasticity (ρ). The energy prod-
uct input coefficient (io
ij
) falls either when energy
prices rise (provided there is some new investment) or
when the new investment share (s
j
) is positive (provid-
ed the price rises). This relationship is: 
The carbon tax simulations were applied domesti-
cally, similarly to an ad valorem tax placed only on
fossil fuels burned within the South African borders.
We assumed that there was a uniform reduction in
indirect sales tax rates to have a less severe, distribu-
tion neutral simulation. An important next step would
be to model tax recycling options, especially in light of
the findings from Alton et al. (2012) that show that the
choice of revenue-recycling is a main driver of the
economic impact of a carbon tax in South Africa. The
modelling of alternative recycling options was not
conducted in this paper because of time constraints;
however, based on the results from Alton et al., men-
tion will be made of the potential impacts of these
alternative options on our results.
The carbon tax design proposed by the National
Treasury for South Africa is highly complex (RSA
2013). At first glance, the proposed ZAR 120 per ton
of CO2 seems to be a significant tax allocation,
although it is only half of the carbon tax value estimat-
ed by Alton et al. (2012), if South Africa is to reach
emissions reduction targets. The Treasury proposed
an initial phasing-in period from 2015 to 2019 with
the rate increasing at 10% annually until the end of
2019. The rate of increase for the second period,
2020 to 2025, will be announced in February 2019.
All sectors will benefit from a ‘basic tax-free threshold’
of 60% of emissions as well as a number of complex
exemptions for energy-intensive users. The electricity
sector will benefit from an additional 5% to 10%
exemption whilst the petroleum sector will be exempt
from an additional 15% to 20% for being a trade-
exposed sector. Energy intensive sectors – such as
chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, ceramics and
fugitive emissions from coal mining – will benefit from
exemptions of up to 85%. The effective tax rate is
therefore much lower, at between ZAR 12 and ZAR 48
per ton of CO2 – likely to be too little to transform
South Africa’s emissions pathway.
The carbon tax simulated in this analysis is
designed in a more simplistic manner. The carbon tax
is also assumed to phase in between 2015 and 2019,
increasing linearly over the period until a total of ZAR
120 per ton of CO2 is levied on all sectoral emissions.
Given that the effective tax rate is significantly lower
than this, the scenarios will overestimate the proposed
carbon tax. The decision not to include the exemp-
tions is, first, to simplify this initial analysis and, sec-
ondly, because existing literature suggests that an
effective tax rate of between ZAR 12 and ZAR 48 per
ton is not enough to have a significant impact on
South Africa’s emissions trajectory. 
4. Results and discussion
The simulations were run under two conditions: one
without a carbon tax and a second with a simplified
carbon tax. The next step would be to model the exact
tax design proposed by the Treasury and compare the
socioeconomic implication with this simplified version
of the tax; an interesting modelling exercise for the
future. As previously noted, alternative revenue-recy-
The socioeconomic implications of renewable energy and low-carbon trajectories in South Africa 98
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION FORUM 2014 
The socioeconomic implications of renewable energy and low-carbon trajectories in South Africa 99
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION FORUM 2014 
cling options have not been modelled in this paper,
and are also on the agenda for future work.
Table 3 presents the results for the simulations run
without a carbon tax. All three scenarios fare quite
favourably in terms of growth in South Africa, with a
slightly lower average growth rate for the Policy-
adjusted scenario and more so for the Emissions 3
scenario. It should be noted that the assumptions gov-
erning the financing of the electricity build plan might
be resulting in an overly optimistic economic growth
projection. It is assumed that the build plan is financed
by a foreign loan, of which an annual interest pay-
ment of 5% is made; none of the principal payment is
made over the modelling period to 2030. This may be
a contentious assumption. However, given that econ-
omy-wide models are not predictive but rather are a
valuable tool for comparing possible futures, the rela-
tive burden on the economy should be sufficient for
our analysis. It would be interesting to explore differ-
ent financing options and analyse the potential
impacts of these on the economy - a topic that should
be noted for future work.
Table 3: Simulation results without a carbon tax
GDP Inequality Emissions Employ-
growth reduction ment
Base 3.90% 1.10% 0% 1.32%
Policy-adjusted 3.82% 1.01% -11% 1.31%
Emissions 3 3.67% 0.85% -18% 1.29%
The Emissions 3 scenario requires significantly
more investment in comparison to the Base-case and
to a lesser extent the Policy-adjusted scenario.  This is
shown in the slight contraction of the economy rela-
tive to the base case; economic growth is still positive,
but the higher investment cost results in a decrease in
the investment funds available for other, more prof-
itable sectors in the economy. 
The second indicator is titled ‘inequality’; in this
instance, the values refer to the relative increase in
income growth for poorest decile in comparison to the
richest decile.2 In the base case, the income of the
poorest decile increases by 1,1% over the simulation
period, in relation to the richest decile; the income gap
is narrowing slightly and therefore inequality is
decreasing. The Policy-adjusted and Emissions 3 sce-
narios are less favourable for income distribution.
There are a number of reasons for this. The first
relates to a higher cost of investment, the relative
decrease in growth of other sectors in the economy
has an impact on employment and, ultimately, house-
hold income. There is a negative impact on the
growth of all sectors, except the electricity sector (as
one would expect) and natural gas mining; driven by
the increase in demand for gas turbines in the two
alternative scenarios (Policy-adjusted and Emissions
3). Coal-mining, for instance, contracts by 1,14% rel-
ative to the base; as a sector with a high employment
multiplier, especially for low-skilled labour, this would
detract from the gains in the electricity sector.  The
second reason is directly linked to the decrease in
employment of the various labour groups over the
period. Renewable energy options are more labour-
intensive, per GWh of electricity, in comparison to
baseload coal, although they do require a larger pro-
portion of high-skilled labour. There is a slight
decrease in overall employment from the investment
in the alternative plans, relative to the base case, with
most of the impact falling on low-skilled workers. In
the Emissions 3 case, there was a reduction of 5% in
employment of low-skilled labour, compared to the
base, while high-skilled labour remained fully
employed. This, in turn, has a negative impact on
income distribution. 
The reduction in emissions, as one would expect,
is significantly higher for the Emissions 3 scenario,
with a reduction of 18% compared to the base.3 As
previously mentioned, at least ZAR 0.46 trillion would
be required for the electricity sector to reach its emis-
sions plateau by 2025, in addition to the ZAR 1.3 tril-
lion already estimated for the Emissions 3 scenario.
The relatively high allocation of renewables in the pol-
icy-adjusted scenario does make a dent in South
Africa’s emissions, however, with a reduction of 11%
compared to the base.
Table 4: Simulation results with a carbon tax
GDP Inequality Emissions Employ-
growth reduction ment
Base 3.90% 1.06% -29.26% 1.31%
Policy-adjusted 3.79% 0.97% -39.66% 1.30%
Emissions 3 3.64% 0.81% -43.62% 1.28%
The simulation results with a carbon tax are shown
in Table 4 and indicate that the tax is likely to have a
slightly contractionary effect on the economy, with
some sectors actually becoming more profitable given
the changes in relative prices that occur as a result of
the tax. Biomass, for example, grows by 2.38% with
the introduction of a carbon tax in the Base-case sce-
nario. We found a similar result for growth in other
less energy-intensive sectors, with lower growth for the
Policy-adjusted scenario, and even less for the
Emissions 3 scenario. This is an intuitive result, given
our assumption that all investments are funded from
the savings pool; the higher the investment required
for the electricity sector, the less funds available for the
rest of the economy. Given that the effective tax rate
is overestimated in these simulations, a conclusion
can be made that the tax may not have a detrimental
effect on the economy and could incentivise growth in
‘cleaner’ sectors; highlighting the potential benefit of
moving to a low-carbon trajectory.
The reduction in emissions is significantly
increased for all three cases, with approximately a
44% reduction in emissions in the Emissions 3 sce-
nario by 2030, relative to the base. The tax is also
very effective in reducing emissions in the Base-case
scenario, with a reduction of 30%. The results echo
those found in previous studies, that even at the full
ZAR 120 per ton of CO2 and with a very costly elec-
tricity build plan based on a carbon limit for the sector,
South Africa is unlikely to reach their target of a 42%
reduction in emissions by 2025, relative to a BAU
baseline. One can conclude that the proposed tax
level, even without the ‘basic tax-free threshold’ and
complex exemptions for energy-intensive users, is still
too low and needs to be revised if South Africa wants
to reach its emissions targets. 
The distributional impact of a carbon tax is not as
favourable; however, the income gap is still narrow-
ing. Employment also remains positive, albeit less
than the employment growth rate without a carbon
tax. The slight decrease is attributed to the marginal
contraction of the economy due to increased energy
prices. 
There are a number of tax-recycling mechanisms
that are available to increase the distributional impact
of the carbon tax – referring back to Alton et al.
(2012) where it was found that the revenue recycling
option is an important driver of the economic impact
of a carbon tax. Given the findings of their study one
would expect that the distributional impact of the car-
bon tax would be more favourable if the revenue was
recycled to fund social grants and less favourable if it
were coupled with a decrease in corporate tax. A
complete analysis of potential revenue recycling
options has been noted for future work.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the introduction of renewable energy
and low-carbon trajectories is likely to have a slightly
negative impact on employment and a marginally
contractionary impact on the economy. This is a key
finding, as it indicates that the implementation of
these mitigation actions is not likely to cripple the
economy and that there are benefits that South Africa
should capitalise on. 
Renewable energy options, unfortunately, still
have relatively high investment costs; this is the main
driver for the results in this study. The higher cost of
renewables causes a slightly contractionary effect on
the economy from the decrease in the investment
funds available to other more profitable sectors. This
impact ripples into employment where, even though
some renewable energy options have higher job years
per MW (approximately 52 job years per MW for PV
compared to 10.8 for coal-fired plants), the positive
impact on direct employment is drowned out by the
negative impact on indirect employment. The loss of
low-skilled jobs dominates this effect, which results in
higher income inequality. 
In terms of emissions reduction, one can conclude
that the introduction of renewable energy, even to the
extent proposed in the Emissions 3 scenario, is not
sufficient for South Africa to meet its emissions reduc-
tion target of 42% against a ‘business-as-usual’ base-
line by 2025.
The implementation of a carbon tax is likely to
have less of a ‘devastating’ impact than was previous-
ly thought. Higher energy prices might incentivise the
development of ‘cleaner’ sectors such as the biomass
industry. The addition of a carbon tax proves quite
effective in terms of lowering total emissions; howev-
er, the tax level (even without the exemptions) is still
too low and will not be enough to get emissions down
to the target trajectory. Modelling a carbon tax of
around ZAR 12 to ZAR 48 per ton of CO2, the effec-
tive tax rate taking all proposed exemptions into
account, would have even less of an impact on the
emissions. The argument that an increased tax level
will cripple the economy seems unjustified and South
Africa should capitalise on the growth of sectors that
could become profitable with the introduction of a
carbon tax.
The distributional impact of a carbon tax is not
favourable in this case, albeit the income gap is still
narrowing and employment is still positive. Revenue-
recycling options are a key driver of impact of a car-
bon tax on the economy. Designing the carbon tax
with a revenue-recycling option to fund social grants
is likely to lead to more favourable welfare effects, but
less economic growth.
In conclusion, this paper shows that current renew-
able energy plans and the proposed carbon tax level
are not enough to allow South Africa to reach its emis-
sions reduction target of 42% by 2025. Both of these
mitigation actions are found to have a less ‘devastat-
ing’ impact on the economy than was previously
thought. If South Africa is to meet the challenge of
decreasing emissions as well as decreasing inequality
and eradicating poverty, a higher carbon tax should
be introduced along with a revenue recycling mecha-
nism that would result in increased welfare.
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Notes
1. The IRP has recently been criticised for being ‘out-of-
date’, especially in terms of the demand forecasts and
the cost assumptions for the technology options; the
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer
Procurement Programme provides more realistic
employment, local content and cost data. The estimates
given in the table will be updated to reflect these in the
near future.
2. The use of this form of inequality measure may be criti-
cised for being over-simplified and vulnerable to the
effects of outliers. For the purpose of this paper it is suf-
ficient and more complex inequality measures could be
used in future modelling exercises.
3. These are economy-wide emissions, not only for the
electricity sector.
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Abstract
Ghana’s economy, though energy-poor, consistently grew over the past two decades, reach-
ing 14.4% in 2011. This growth far exceeded the global average during 2011 of about 4%,
from about 5.1% in 2010, making Ghana one of the fastest-growing economies in the world
at that time. The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010–2013) projects
further growth to a per capita income of USD 3000 by 2020, which is more than double the
current per capita income. Since traditional biomass accounts for over 60% of total energy
consumption in Ghana, attaining this target through a business-as-usual household energy
approach assumes insensitivity of economic growth to energy poverty, a deceptively harm-
less development issue. Diversification of energy supply and demand should, however, be
inevitable in the wake of climate change shocks and low-carbon development requirements.
This paper assesses climate change-induced energy behaviour of households in Ghana,
who contribute 32% of total energy sector emissions of greenhouse gases. It also assesses
climate change-induced welfare change for households in a low carbon-development sce-
nario as against business as usual. The net welfare effect for the scenario to switch from fuel-
wood to mitigate climate change was negative. The results indicate that Ghana is in an ener-
gy poverty trap, providing mixed effects for climate change mitigation. To effectively miti-
gate climate change under energy poverty, Ghana should promote the cultivation of energy
forest plantations, introduce and use improved charcoal stoves and improved charcoal pro-
duction kilns. These could lead to greater efficiency in the energy sector and create jobs for
rural communities involved in the plantations for sustained growth, while at the same time
delivering benefits from mitigation funding.
Keywords: Climate change mitigation, economic welfare, energy poverty, fuelwood, Ghana
ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Wood-based biomass is the dominant source of ener-
gy for sub-Saharan Africa, and fuelwood consump-
tion per capita in Africa is higher than any other con-
tinent. In Ghana, the bulk of energy consumption is
based on fuelwood, and 90% is obtained directly from
natural forests. The demand for fuelwood is thus a
major driver of forest degradation and the release of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (UNEP Risoe
2013). Reducing the demand for fuelwood as a low-
carbon development (LCD) measure is, therefore, an
important strategy to reduce drivers of deforestation
and forest degradation to mitigate climate change,
while generating financial flows from forest carbon
activities under the Clean Development Mechanism,
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation), and Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Activities (NAMAs).
Ghana’s energy sector shows signs of high suscep-
tibility to climate change (World Bank 2009), an indi-
cation that achieving its targeted middle-income sta-
tus of US$3000 per capita income by 2020 (NDPC
2010) would require a reorganization of generation,
processing and use of energy resources due to climate
change shocks. In line with projections for attaining
and sustaining middle income status by 2020, total
energy requirements have been growing from about
seven million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2004 and are
expected to reach 22 million tonnes of oil equivalent
by 2020 (Ghana Energy Commission 2006). Current
trends in energy use show that this energy require-
ment is to a large extent met through traditional bio-
mass sources, accounting for about 63% of total ener-
gy consumption (NDPC 2010). Ghana has one of the
strongest economies of sub-Saharan Africa, due to its
wealth in natural resources, coupled with political sta-
bility. However, the exploitation of resources through
subsistence agriculture and cutting fuelwood has
resulted in significant deforestation and degradation
of the country’s forests (UNEP Risoe, 2013). Gillis
(1988) also found that one of the two principal
sources of deforestation in Ghana was fuelwood har-
vesting, driven by rural and urban poverty.
Energy poverty can be defined as ‘the absence of
sufficient choice that allows access to adequate energy
services, affordable, reliable, effective and sustainable
in environmental terms to support the economic and
human development’ (Reddy 2000). It concerns peo-
ple that have low income, low energy consumption
and no access, or limited access, to modern energy
fuel (petroleum products and electricity).
Approximately 1.6 billion people do not have access
to modern energy fuels globally (Chevalter &
Ouedraogo 2009). The high dependence on fuel-
wood therefore shows the prevalence of energy
poverty in Ghana, since such a trend appears highly
unsustainable for continued economic growth, partic-
ularly in the wake of recent and projected climate
change shocks and persistently high levels of defor-
estation. Also, the threat to climate change mitigation
is expected to be high under such circumstances.
Ghana’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions repre-
sent about 0.05% of the total global emissions and
rank 108 in the world. This represented a total per
capita emission of nearly 1tCO2e as at 2006. At the
continental level, Ghana ranks equally with Senegal
and Mali as the 21st most GHG-emitting country in
Africa (Ghana EPA 2010). Though GHG emission
levels appear relatively low compared to other major
developing economies, Ghana’s Environmental
Protection Agency (2010) cautions that the emission
trends clearly indicate a strong peaking potential in
the near-to-medium-term horizon, as the economy
continues to grow. Also, the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, one of the world’s largest carbon markets,
considers Ghana to be one of Africa’s largest potential
emitting countries (Hanrahan & Morton 2012). Thus,
the development of new frontiers dominated by agri-
culture, forestry and the oil and gas industry are
expected to pose further challenges for climate change
mitigation efforts in Ghana. This paper therefore
assesses the limiting consequences of energy poverty
on climate change mitigation and development in
Ghana. 
Energy poverty and development
Even though modern energy has been accepteded as
necessary for economic growth and development,
several reasons can be given to explain why it took so
long to identify energy poverty as a major develop-
mental challenge. For a long time the real impact of
energy poverty was not assessed because of several
misleading indicators. This was further reinforced by
the largely non-market nature of most of the biomass
used for energy purposes, being essentially environ-
mental commodities and as such taken for granted.
One main misleading indicator was that energy pover-
ty-endemic countries did not seem to show serious
signs of de-development through energy poverty.
Some of these countries, like Ghana, had for the past
two decades recorded commendable gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rates and had actually been
commended as doing well by the standards of devel-
opment partners. Ghana’s impressive GDP record
over the past two decades were achieved while tradi-
tional biomass accounted for over 60% of total energy
consumption and over 80% of energy for cooking.
Table 1 shows the relationships among key macroeco-
nomic variables and fuelwood consumed in Ghana
since 2002.
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The growth rate of 14.4% in 2011 made Ghana
one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in
that year (ISSER 2012). Figure 1 indicates an overall
positive correlation between fuelwood use in Ghana
and GDP growth rates. This trend is also confirmed by
data from the Food and Agriculture Organisation in
the United Nation’s State of the world’s forests report
of 2009.
Figure 1: Relationship between real GDP growth rate
and fuelwood consumed in Ghana for 2002–2012
Source: Based on Table 1
The most recent development agenda of Ghana,
the Shared Growth and Development Agenda
(GSGDA) projects a per capital income of US$ 3000
by 2020, without targeting the over-dependence on
fuelwood in the economy. This confirms the treatment
of the fuelwood variable for the period 2012-2020 as
operating on a business-as-usual basis as the case has
been since time immemorial. It is also worth noting
that Ghana’s energy outlook for 2012 did not discuss
fuelwood. The fact is that if in the midst of over-
dependence on biomass the economy was making
substantial progress then there would be no incentive
for change, particularly if change was going to mean
more government expenditure from already scarce
monetary and material resources. Thus, energy poor-
countries like Ghana for a long time did not realise the
direct economic welfare effects of their energy poverty
due to growth in GDP, which most of these countries
and their assessors considered the most important
indicator of progress. This probably contributed to
these countries not making a big issue of energy
poverty as they had of income poverty. 
Another misleading indicator has been the overly
open-ended definition of energy ‘access’ which is the
sole baseline for determining energy poverty. The
United Nations Development Programme/World
Health Organisation (UNDP/WHO) define energy
access as ‘access to various forms of modern energy’
comprising access to electricity, modern fuels,
mechanical power and improved cooking stoves
(Legros et al 2009). Although the UNDP/WHO further
recognise the need to include measures related to
quality, quantity, appliances and equipment, services
provided, socioeconomic profiles of users and afford-
ability, these elaborate measures were left to the dis-
cretion of each country. If in a country electricity was
extended from the national grid to a community
which afterwards realised that it could have electricity
only two days in a week on aggregate through energy
rationing, this surely falls below energy access.
However, no developing country left to determine
energy access will consider this scenario as lack of
access. Thus through various arrangements like the
above, global reports about energy access have been
seen to be encouraging. What the case now shows is
that the overly open definition is producing negative
feedback. While efforts to provide access to modern
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Table 1: Some major macroeconomic variables and fuelwood consumed in Ghana for 2002–2012
Sources: GSS (2012); NDPC (2011); Energy Commission (2007)
Years Per capita GDP Population Nominal GDP Real GDP growth rate Fuelwood onsumed
(USD) (million US) (million tonnes)
2002 310.86 19.9 6 184.81 4.5 15.05
2003 372.54 20.41 7 604.6 5.3 15.6
2004 423.84 20.94 8 876.67 5.8 15.85
2005 497.39 21.49 10 687.9 5.9 17.3
2006 923.1 22.03 20 331.5 6.4 17.31
2007 1091.07 22.58 24 631.9 6.5 17.94
2008 1218.85 23.14 28 204.7 8.4 18.9
2009 1095.67 23.1 25 962.7 4.7 19.9
2010 1235.97 24.24 29 960.8 6.6 19.91
2011 1384.34 24.8 34 329.2 14.4 22.93
2012 1478.1 24.34 37 460.6 7.1 31.9
energy should be commended, the baseline must be
clearly established such that a commendable effort is
not mistaken for ‘access’, to the eventual detriment of
the welfare of the energy poor. The omission of ener-
gy poverty as one of the world’s leading developmen-
tal issues until 2012 was one of the greatest oversights
in the history of development.
Energy poverty and carbon dioxide emissions
One way to assess the implications of fuelwood use
for the global environment is to estimate the associat-
ed GHG emissions. Though combusting wood emits
carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, regrowth
of wood captures CO2 from the atmosphere, showing
that fuelwood use is CO2 emissions-neutral. Arnold et
al. (2003) explain that this assertion holds in two
ways. First, with fuelwood from forest and non-forest-
ed lands the same amount of CO2 emitted by wood
combustion is recaptured from the atmosphere by
regrowth of wood. Second, leftovers from non-sus-
tainable logging and land conversion, if not used as
fuel would simply decompose by natural processes,
and lead to the same amount of carbon emitted into
the atmosphere if the woody material were to be com-
busted. If fuelwood were not utilised, some alternative
energy source like fossil fuels and in a few cases hydro
power would be required and used with accompany-
ing CO2 emissions. This, however, does not imply that
energy poverty is CO2 emissions-neutral. As a result of
decreased access to fuelwood, the incomes of fuel-
wood users, their livelihoods and forest conservation
can be adversely affected (Arnold et al. 2003), making
low-carbon development activities relevant towards
energy poverty reduction and vice versa. 
The adverse impact on poor subsistence users aris-
ing from reduced access to fuelwood is mainly a rural
issue and predominantly relates to fuelwood, as char-
coal is not a subsistence fuel (Arnold et al. 2003). In
urban areas, diminished access to supplies can nega-
tively affect many poor households. However, this
relates largely to purchased rather than gathered sup-
plies. In most rural areas on the other hand, gathered
supplies of fuelwood still constitute the main source of
domestic energy for rural households (Barnes & Floor
1996) and hence these users are more vulnerable to
changes that affect their ability to access fuelwood.
Where access to fuelwood supplies is reduced for
some reason, this implies a welfare loss for those
affected. How serious this is depends on each house-
hold’s ability to adapt to the new situation (Arnold et
al. 2003). 
Most of the fuelwood trade among the energy
poor is on a small scale, accessible to the urban poor
and is a major source of income. Townson (1995)
found that in the forest zone of southern Ghana,
approximately 258 000 people were involved in the
fuelwood trade from 38% of the households in the
region. However, many instances are recorded where
fuelwood-gathering and -trading activities are associ-
ated with land clearance and the formation of farms,
and therefore this declines as the farmers involved
move beyond that phase in the farm cycle (Townson
1995; Wunder 1996).
The application of location theory in explaining
spatial patterns of agriculture and other land uses indi-
cates that woodfuel demand in large and growing
urban areas is likely to lead to large-scale tree removal
in periurban zones, spreading progressively further
out into a given city’s hinterland as the population
increases (Arnold et al.. 2003). The analysis in the
ESMAP study (Barnes et al. 2001) of data from 46
cities shows a pattern of forest depletion that is initially
heavy near urban areas but this slows down as cities
get larger and wealthier. The periurban areas in which
fuelwood production is likely to be concentrated in the
early stages of urban growth are likely to be areas that
are also under pressure from clearance of agriculture.
Therefore the patterns of deforestation could be
explained just as much by this as the growing urban
demand for fuelwood which may not be depleting
wood stocks beyond what would have been cleared
anyway (Arnold et al. 2003). However, growing pop-
ulation pressure on dwindling forest resources near
energy poor communities definitely raises the risk of
forest degradation on a daily basis. The annual rate of
change in the forested areas of Ghana over the period
1990–2010 has been negative, with a deforestation
rate of –1.99%. The deforestation rate increased
between 2005 and 2010, reaching 2.19% (FAO
2010). Forest and grassland conversion through
deforestation activities has been the major cause for
the declining CO2 removal capacity (sinks) and
increased emissions in the forestry sector of Ghana
(UNEP RISO 2013). 
Climate change and energy behaviour in
Ghana
A major piece of evidence of Ghana’s energy sector’s
susceptibility to climate change has been the effect of
highly variable precipitation patterns on hydropower
production. In recent times over 65% of electricity
generation in the country has come from hydropower
and 33% from petroleum-fired thermal generation
(Ghana Energy Commission 2006), with a contribu-
tion of less than 1% from small-scale solar systems.
The drought of the early eighties (1980 to 1983), and
also recent times, not only affected export earnings
through crop losses but also caused large-scale
human suffering and called into question the nation’s
continued dependence on large hydroelectric power
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systems. As a result, the development of petroleum-
fired thermal plants is now viewed as an energy secu-
rity necessity in Ghana. The current rate of electrifica-
tion presents the challenge of providing energy in a
suitable form to a large population, primarily rural but
increasingly urban, while at the same time minimising
greenhouse gas emissions (low-carbon development)
to contribute to global climate change mitigation
efforts.
System losses in electricity distribution are about
25%, with wastage in the end-use of electricity also
estimated at about 30% (Ghana Energy Commission
2006). Losses in energy supply and inefficient use of
energy contribute to the high levels of energy con-
sumption. Higher ambient temperature levels due to
climate change are a contributing factor to the
increased transmission losses. Under a changed cli-
mate, lower precipitation, enhanced evaporation, and
more frequent droughts will diminish water availability
in the Lake Volta reservoir. In addition, the Akosombo
Dam, which typically provides about 70% of the
country’s electricity needs, produces only 30% during
periods of low water levels in the dam, which poses
serious implications for industrialisation and private
sector development. These periods of drought result
in high CO2 emission levels as Ghana resorts to ther-
mal systems for electricity.
The residential sector was the second-largest con-
tributor to total energy emissions between 1990 and
2006, contributing 32% of the total energy sector
emissions (Ghana Energy Commission 2006). This is
due to the increasing population and subsequent
increase in consumption of biomass to meet domestic
energy needs. Thus mitigation strategies for the ener-
gy sector will have to be closely linked with measures
taken in the forestry sector. Broadhead et al. (2009)
suggest that achieving climate change mitigation
through forestry requires that forests are managed in
ways that fundamentally reduce carbon emissions.
The simplest way to mitigate climate change in this
case would be to reduce all the uses of the forest that
make it lose its reservoir and sink capacities unsustain-
ably. Mitigation practices include maintaining or
increasing forest land area, reduced deforestation,
increased forestation and reforestation, reduced
degradation, wildfire management, and increased use
of wood products from sustainably managed forests.
For society to benefit fully, forests must be managed
for both mitigation and adaptation purposes. To effec-
tively mitigate climate change in the context of energy
poverty, Ghana would need to promote the cultiva-
tion of forest plantations, introduce and use improved
charcoal stoves and improved charcoal production
kilns. These could lead to greater efficiency in the
energy sector and massively create jobs for rural com-
munities involved in the plantations for sustained
growth while at the same time delivering benefits from
mitigation funding.
Energy poverty and climate change in Ghana
Household energy consumption in Ghana is primarily
for lighting and cooking. About 67% (24 890 GWh/yr)
of total energy consumption in the household is used
for cooking (Ministry of Energy 2008). The UNDP
(2011) estimates that 90% of households in Ghana
rely on traditional biomass (fuelwood and charcoal). It
further estimates that every person in Ghana currently
uses around 1 cubic metre or 640 kilograms of fuel-
wood per annum. The statistics indicate a strong
attachment to fuelwood by households in Ghana,
which must have contributed strongly to the activities
responsible for the rate of economic growth recorded
so far. The repercussions of such a fuelwood con-
sumption pattern on forest resources are immense.
High deforestation and forest degradation have result-
ed in a loss of biomass in Ghana and depleted the
capacity for carbon sequestration as a means of com-
bating climate change through the natural forests.
Sustainable economic growth, however, requires a
growth policy that also mitigates climate change.
Users of natural resource goods like fuelwood
often find it difficult to adjust to potential reductions in
their availability, because of the lack of affordable sub-
stitutes. Thus even though in Ghana fuelwood use
should have been sensitive to availability, there is cur-
rently little tendency to switch to other sources of ener-
gy for cooking, even in the wake of climate change
shocks. Land is directly affected by temperature
increases and drought, floods leading to erosion, loss
of fertility, and crop and resource damage. Vegetation,
particularly forests, is thus affected, accounting for
shortages in the availability of fuelwood or at least
increasing the difficulty of accessing it. Biomass is a
climate-sensitive renewable source of energy. This
makes it more vulnerable to climate variability than
other renewable sources of energy like solar and wind.
The inelasticity of fuelwood use in relation to the cost
of acquisition will mean a loss of welfare as the cost of
acquiring fuelwood continues to increase for the aver-
age Ghanaian household through climate change
shocks. This means breaking out of energy poverty
could become more difficult than ever for Ghana
unless very determined measures are employed to
mitigate climate change through the forestry sector.
Importance of low-carbon development
to Ghana
The evidence of climate change vulnerability indicat-
ed above has rendered Ghana’s development more
complicated than ever before. It is expected that GHG
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emissions can be reduced at a much lower cost than
the cost of energy poverty caused by business-as-
usual actions. This requires a change in the way
development policies are made, to include low-carbon
development (LCD) strategies towards climate change
mitigation. Specifically, a LCD plan which must be the
starting point for LCD implementation is important to
Ghana because it will: provide an effective tool to
examine realistic climate change mitigation options;
help policy makers identify low-carbon growth scenar-
ios and opportunities; and facilitate informed deci-
sion-making in LCD. Afforestation and reforestation
(A/R) of degraded forest lands and mangrove restora-
tion present significant potential for climate change
mitigation in Ghana, while generating financial flows
from forest carbon activities under the CDM, REDD+,
and possibly NAMA projects. 
However, A/R CDM activities have remained
underdeveloped compared to other CDM sectors,
mainly as a result of the complexity of the A/R CDM
procedure and the limited market demand for A/R
CDM credits. Nonetheless, Africa holds a significant
share in the global CDM forestry sector by hosting
30% of all A/R CDM activities, which represents 8% of
CDM activities in Africa (UNEP Risoe 2012), altogeth-
er reflecting the continent’s potential for abatement in
the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF
sector. Despite efforts to enhance forest biomass,
activities in agriculture and forest sectors are showing
increasing trends in emissions. Avoiding just defor-
estation in Ghana has the potential to contribute
approximately 38 million tons in CO2 emission reduc-
tions every year. Reversing the trend, and adding
reforestation to these estimates would increase this
number even more (UNEP Risoe, 2013). The cumu-
lative total cost of climate change adaptation from
2012 to 2050 is estimated to be $2.7 billion with real
GDP projected to decline from negative 5.4% per
annum (Global dry) to negative 2.1% per annum
(Ghana wet) by 2050 (Ghana EPA 2010).
Thus, mitigation strategies in the forestry sector
will to a large extent lead to a reduction in the cost of
adaptation and ultimately address energy poverty. It is
always true that forest conservation actions to mitigate
climate change will reduce the cost of adaptation. For
instance, in the case of soil erosion prevention due to
floods, even if others decide not to cooperate, we
would still be better off having implemented forest
mitigation measures than not. Thus forest resource-
based mitigation will always be beneficial, no matter
what the outcomes of climate change-related actions
of various actors. 
For the household sector, the primary option for
LCD is energy efficiency, making the sector a potential
source of LCD in Ghana. The following areas can be
potential LCD points for action in households in
Ghana:
• switching to energy-saving light bulbs;
• replacing inefficient appliances with more energy
efficient appliances;
• designing houses in such a way as to lower the
need for cooling; and
• a cooking fuel switch from biomass to a low-car-
bon alternative.
It is worth noting that, among the action points iden-
tified, only cooking fuel-switching is directly related to
energy poverty, making it the preferred example in the
forestry sector based economic welfare analysis in the
following sections. Fuelwood constitutes about 80%
of the energy demand for cooking in Ghana. In rural
areas the demand for fuelwood can be as high as 90%
in some cases. These allow for reductions in the fuel-
wood needed for energy consumption, thereby hav-
ing both positive economic welfare and GHG reduc-
tion effects (UNEP Risoe, 2013).
The Ghana Energy Commission (2006) estimated
the average life cycle cost per annum for using fuel-
wood in Ghana to be USD 53.00. Ghana Statistical
Service (GSS) (2008) data shows that 80% of house-
holds in Ghana use fuelwood, which translates to
about 4.4 million households. This brings the house-
hold expenditure on fuelwood to USD 233.20 million
per annum (ie.USD 53 × 4.4 million households).
Since the expenditure expresses the revealed mone-
tary value of the demand for fuelwood, if all the fuel-
wood is collected very close to consumers’ homes,
then the USD 233.2 million is the monetary value
which fuelwood users place on the commodity per
annum. (A travel cost model approach has been used
to derive an alternative value for fuelwood in Ghana,
and is provided as an appendix to this paper.) This is
also a measure of the benefit they will lose per annum
if they cannot have access to fuelwood. Thus any pol-
icy which seeks to move fuelwood users from fuel-
wood use must be in the position to compensate them
with this amount of money to ensure their welfare
does not decrease.
Household switching from fuelwood 
In considering a switch from fuelwood to more mod-
ern and efficient energy forms for the Ghanaian econ-
omy, two key sectors will be crucial – the informal and
commercial/service sectors and households. The dis-
cussion is therefore based on these two sectors
because they constitute over 95% of the users of fuel-
wood for energy in Ghana. All the official data in this
section were obtained from Ghana Energy
Commission (2006) publications, the only body man-
dated by the Government of Ghana to produce such
data for official purposes. 
Energy poverty and climate change mitigation in Ghana 107
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION FORUM 2014 
For the household sector, cost considerations and
availability seem to be the most prominent issues in a
shift from firewood to charcoal and then to other
cooking fuels such as LPG, kerosene and electricity.
Costs involved in the various cooking modes as com-
puted by the Ghana Energy Commission are indicat-
ed in Table 2.
Table 2: Costs of using various cooking devices
in Ghana
Source: Ghana Energy Commission (2006)
Device Initial Total
investment annual 
cost (USD) cost (USD)
Three stone – mud firewood stove 0 44–62
Traditional charcoal stove 1.5–3 67–80
Improved ‘Ahibenso’ charcoal stove 10 37–43
LPG (1-2 burner) cooker 30–50 83–98
Electric (one-two burner) cooker 20–50 81–93
Kerosene (1-2 burner) cooker 17–25 138–161
Even though there is no initial capital investment
in making a three-stone or mud firewood stove, par-
ticularly in rural areas, it is more expensive to use
when compared with improved charcoal stove in the
case where firewood is purchased. Otherwise, the
three-stone or mud firewood stove is the least expen-
sive cooking device and has the lowest life-cycle cost
as well. For health reasons, however, it will be wise to
encourage a switch from firewood stove to charcoal
stove usage, but that involves an initial capital invest-
ment of about USD 10.00. 
On the environmental front, charcoal usage con-
sumes more wood than firewood does, and is not an
attractive option for CDM and other large climate
change-related financial facilities. Charcoal usage
leads to higher GHG (methane) emissions because it
takes between four and six units of wood to make a
unit of charcoal, whilst firewood is used directly from
the field.
A switch from fuelwood usage to kerosene for
cooking is the most expensive option in terms of
annual expenses. Secondly, kerosene is a fossil fuel
and so the shift is not environmentally attractive. A
switch from fuelwood to electricity for cooking pres-
ents the cleanest option in terms of indoor pollution.
However, it is not climate change-neutral if the elec-
tricity is a product of thermal-based generation.
Carbon dioxide emission from fuelwood is neutral in
terms of global warming whilst emissions from fossils
are non-biogenic. There is also the issue of availabili-
ty, since national electricity access is still less than 55%
in real terms (UNEP Risoe, 2013). The most advocat-
ed option is the switch from fuelwood to liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG), since the latter is quite ‘environ-
mentally’ friendly. LPG is a cleaner fuel in terms of
indoor pollution, with far less emissions of particulate
matter, acidic and other pollutants. Other renewable
sources of energy are not viable yet due to cost and
technical reasons, and hence are not discussed.
The LPG required to substitute for fuelwood in a
LCD scenario will be 750 000–1.9 million tonnes by
2012–2015; and 950 000–2.8 million tonnes by 2020
(Ghana Energy Commission 2006). This additional
LPG demand is likely to put a lot of pressure on the
crude oil refining capacity of the country, unless the
LPG shortfall is imported. This can create an oppor-
tunity to increase the refinery capacity of the country
and boost gas cylinder manufacturing in the country.
Introducing LPG to rural users will, however, require
an efficient distribution network and back-up support
to control potential gas accidents associated with it
and occasional shortages due to distances from retail-
ing centers. Mobile LPG retailers exist but have higher
premium than stationary retailers. For rural areas
(where the effect may be greatest), it will be a signifi-
cant extra payment to make, unless rural supplies are
targeted and subsidised.
The switch from fuelwood use to LPG for residen-
tial cooking and heating has probably been the bold-
est step taken so far to mitigate climate change in the
energy sector of Ghana. Such a policy had the capac-
ity to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. It
also led to the creative and increased use of LPG as
fuel in the road sector. Many commercial drivers rap-
idly converted their gasoline-based commercial pas-
senger vehicles to LPG, realising it was more cost-
effective. However, the adoption of LPG for commer-
cial vehicle use has of late created some shortages for
household users and has tended to defeat the purpose
of promoting LPG use. Net benefit comparisons are
made for the switch from fuelwood to LPG as a
demonstration of the net welfare effect of an energy
poverty-based LCD initiative in Ghana, in the next
section.
Welfare analysis: Net benefit comparisons for
LCD
Even though the switch from fuelwood has been
analysed for various energy sources in the previous
section, the switch from fuelwood to LPG is consid-
ered the most feasible alternative (Ghana Energy
Commission 2006) due to cost and technical issues. It
is, however, worth assessing whether the net benefit of
LPG use as a LCD measure surpasses that of fuel-
wood (business-as-usual) in Ghana. Ghana’s LPG
programme was initiated in 1990 to promote the use
of LPG as a substitute for charcoal and firewood in
order to slow down the rate of deforestation caused
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partly by the production and use of wood fuels
(Damptey & Mensah 2008). The programme has,
however, been derailed to a large extent as a result of
cost, organisational and structural deficiencies.
Nonetheless, the net benefit implications are relevant
to inform policy on the possible way out, which can
ensure continued growth in the face of climate change
challenges.
The use of fuelwood does not come with any
installation cost, since the tripods used are moulded
out of common clay found in abundant quantities in
Ghana. The total cost of use per year, as computed by
the Ghana Energy Commission (2006), in cases
where fuelwood is bought as shown in Table 2, is a
maximum of USD 62 per annum. LPG (with a one-
two burner cooker) however has a maximum initial
installation cost of USD 50 and then a cost of use of
USD 98, making a total of USD 148. Thus the cost dif-
ference in switching from fuelwood to LPG is about
239% of the cost of using fuelwood. This will be high-
er in cases where fuelwood is collected near con-
sumers’ homes and not bought.
Since the expenditure on fuelwood in the busi-
ness-as-usual case derived earlier is USD 233.2 mil-
lion per annum, the expenditure on LPG will be 239%
of USD 233.2, which is equal to USD 557.35 million
per annum. This means for LCD action to provide the
same benefit as fuelwood in a business-as-usual case
a subsidy of USD 324.15 will be required annually to
ensure households use LPG instead of fuelwood in
Ghana. This subsidy will excessively add to the
already heavy government subsidy burden in the
energy sector, which the government is trying to
offload to consumers to improve efficient use of avail-
able energy resources. 
The current subsidy for LPG of USD 110 million
from the government of Ghana (IMANI Ghana 2011)
is for all users of LPG. Based on use patterns, it has
been estimated that USD 80 million of this subsidy
goes to urban and peri-urban users, whose use of it is
of less LCD value than for those who will need to
switch from fuelwood (IMANI Ghana 2011). Thus,
only about USD 30 million of the subsidy goes to sup-
plement LPG for a supply that meets only about 45%
of the domestic need. To meet the full domestic need,
the remaining LPG must be imported, considering the
current operational challenges of refinery activities in
Ghana. This comes with a huge cost to growth, with
the potential of creating a worse situation of export
dependency. Currently the greatest problem with LPG
use even by the affluent in Ghana is the lack of avail-
ability. The uncertainty that has come to be associated
with LPG shortages in Ghana has not been a good
sign for the switch from fuelwood to LPG. Clearly the
net benefit of switching to LPG from fuelwood is neg-
ative given the current income and energy situation in
Ghana. This implies a switch imposed on the status
quo will lead to a decrease in welfare. Ghana appears
trapped in a fuelwood energy trap and therefore ener-
gy poverty in the short-to-medium term. The only
alternative left is to continue to use biomass; this com-
pounds the issue of GHG emissions through persistent
deforestation and degradation of forest resources,
posing a serious threat to climate change mitigation. 
Conclusion
Forest and grassland conversion through deforestation
activities has been the major cause for the declining
CO2 removal capacity (sinks) and increased emissions
in the forestry sector of Ghana. The drought of the
early eighties (1980 to 1983), and also in recent times,
not only affected export earnings through crop losses
but also caused large-scale human suffering and
called into question Ghana’s continued dependence
on large hydroelectric power systems. As a result, the
development of petroleum-fired thermal plants is now
viewed as an energy security necessity in Ghana. This
trend, which will increase due to climate change,
remains one of the threats to LCD in Ghana’s energy
sector.
Mitigation strategies for the energy sector will have
to be closely linked with the forestry sector. This
makes policy coordination essential between the
forestry and energy sectors of Ghana’s economy, to
prevent deforestation while simultaneously supporting
better energy security. 
There is currently no competitive alternative to
fuelwood as the most important household fuel in
Ghana. A subsidy worth three times the current sub-
sidy will be needed to ensure fuelwood users switch to
LPG and remain as well off as they were before the
switch, so as to mitigate climate change. Such a meas-
ure will also serve the purpose of getting the country
out of energy poverty. However, Ghana’s practical sit-
uation shows it is not prepared enough to eradicate
energy poverty. This means the high dependence on
fuelwood by households is bound to continue.
Growth policy projects an increase in fuelwood use as
incomes and population increase. This trend makes
the Ghanaian energy sector very vulnerable to climate
change shocks, a major contributor to forest degrada-
tion, an increasing contributor to GHG emissions, and
eventually a source of decreasing welfare. Promoting
cultivation of energy forest plantations, introduction
and use of improved charcoal stoves and improved
charcoal production kilns could lead to greater effi-
ciency in the energy sector and create massive jobs for
rural communities involved in the plantations for sus-
tained growth while at the same time delivering bene-
fits from climate change mitigation funding. 
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Appendix: The travel cost model
A travel cost model was used to determine the eco-
nomic value of fuelwood (though other methods like
the contingent valuation method, the loss of produc-
tivity and the hedonic price models could have been
used to derive this value). This could subsequently be
used to derive the net welfare change for households
switching from fuelwood as a potential LCD policy.
The use of the travel cost model yields a welfare value
for fuelwood based on fuelwood collected for use - the
most practical way of capturing the value of current
fuelwood demand in Ghana. For LCD policy purpos-
es, a similar study needs to be done for charcoal,
which potentially has an equally devastating effect on
LCD actions, particularly in urban Ghana. For a fuller
appreciation of the drivers of household energy con-
sumption, further research is suggested using the con-
tingent valuation method, which captures total eco-
nomic value unlike the travel cost approach which
reveals only use value (which was the most relevant
value concept for this paper). The following sections
provide the travel cost model application.
The model
The travel cost model portrays a simple concept of the
cost of fuelwood collection. This concept is embedded
in the fact that every collector and or user of fuelwood
pays a price measured by his/her travel costs
(Johansson  1987).Thus a change in travel cost to col-
lect fuelwood results in a change in economic welfare
due to changing costs that the household has to bear.
This principle was first used by Clawson (1959) after
being proposed by Hoteling to the director of the US
Park Service in 1947 (Johansson  1987). The model
is widely used by government agencies in the United
States and increasingly in the United Kingdom, for
example, by the Forestry Commission (Willis &
Benson  1989).
The travel cost model is technically and essentially
an example of a conventional household production
function model (Garrod & Gillis 2001). These models
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investigate changes in the consumption of commodi-
ties that are substitutes or complements for each other.
The application of this principle for evaluating prefer-
ences for fuelwood in Ghana over and above more
efficient alternatives allows the use of the travel cost
model. The early literature on valuation of non-mar-
ket resources abounds with the use of travel cost mod-
els for recreational values, but that was a very limited
use of the travel cost principle. With improved under-
standing of the model, recent literature has several
uses of the model for valuing clean water, fuelwood,
health care demand, etc. In principle, the model can
be applied to any good whose consumption involves
travel-related costs.
A methodological framework 
The travel cost model seeks to place a value on non-
marketed environmental goods by using consumption
behaviour in related markets. It is a survey technique.
A questionnaire is prepared and administered to a
sample of visitors at a site in order to ascertain their
place of residence, necessary demographic and attitu-
dinal information; frequency of visits to sites; and trip
information such as purposefulness, length and asso-
ciated costs. From these data, visit costs can be calcu-
lated and related, with other relevant factors, to visit
frequency so that a demand relationship may be
established. 
In the simplest case, this demand function can
then be used to estimate the value of the commodity
that attracted the consumer to the site or the value of
the whole site. Also, in more advanced studies,
attempts can be made to develop demand equations
for the differing attributes of sites and values evaluat-
ed for these individual attributes. The demand func-
tion estimated by the model is an uncompensated
ordinary demand curve incorporating income effect,
and the welfare measure obtained from it will be that
of Marshallian consumer’s surplus (Bateman  1992).
However by Willig’s approximation, specifically,
the costs of consuming the services of the environ-
mental asset which attracted a consumer to the site
are used as a proxy for price of consuming the com-
modity. These consumption costs will include travel
costs, entry fees, on-site expenditures and outlay on
capital equipment necessary for consumption. The
Model cannot estimate non-user values. An implicit
assumption made in most travel cost studies is that the
representative visitor’s utility function is ‘separable’ in
the activity being modelled. This means that, if the
activity of interest is fishing, then the utility function is
such that demand for fishing trips can be estimated
independent of demand for say hunting trips (alterna-
tive leisure activities). Travel costs (C) depend for a
given site ‘j’ on several variables. 
       Cij = c(DCij, TCij, Fi)
Where i=1,…,n, j=1,…,m. DCi are distance costs in
cedis for each individual ‘i’, dependent on how far
he/she has to travel to visit the site and the cost per
mile of travelling. TC are time costs in cedis: these
depend on how long it takes to get to the site and the
value of an individual’s time. F is the fee if any, which
is charged for entrance to site j. Travel costs (C) are
included in a trip generating function (TGF) which
predicts how may visits (V) will be undertaken by any
individual i to site j. Also included in the TGF for an
individual would be socio-economic characteristics
such as incomes, education and age level, as well as
variables giving information on the type of trip.
The alternative to the individual travel cost model
as described above is the zonal travel cost model. This
was the version employed by Wood and Trice (1958)
and Knetsch and Clawson (1966). The zonal
approach entails dividing the area surrounding the
site to be valued into ‘zones of origin’. These may be
concentric rings around the site, but are more likely to
be selected with regard to local government adminis-
trative districts (such as counties and states).
Measuring the area under the obtained demand curve
gives an estimate of consumers’ surplus per visit.
Travel cost models are often estimated for particular
sites, such as Hanley’s (1989) study of Achray Forest
in Central Scotland. However, the approach can also
be applied to groups of sites, for example, Willis and
Benson’s work on UK forests (1989). The literature
reveals a few basic problems. These include the
choice of Dependent Variable. Two basic options exist
for choosing the dependent variable. These are (i) vis-
its from a given zone; and (ii) visits made by a given
individual. Option (ii) is usually implemented by col-
lecting data on visits per annum for each respondent
(VPA). Option (i) is frequently expressed as visits per
capita V/pop. There is no consensus in the literature
as to which option is preferable on theoretical
grounds. Brown et al. (1983), for instance, advocate
V/Pop, while Common (1988) advocates VPA. 
Hanley and Spash (1993) used the model in a
study of a wildlife site in eastern England particularly
valued by bird watchers. They converted distances
into travel costs using a marginal cost per kilometre.
Time cost both on-site and travelling were set at zero.
Their regression equation which was a log- linear
function showed that the travel cost variable was sig-
nificant at 95% level and correctly signed (that is neg-
ative).
Smith and Kaoru (1990) examined 77 US travel
cost studies for which consumer’s surplus per visit fig-
ures were obtainable. To give an econometric expla-
nation of the figures obtained they related them to the
Energy poverty and climate change mitigation in Ghana 111
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION FORUM 2014 
treatment given to substitute sites, opportunity cost of
time, type of activity, type of site and functional form.
They were able to explain 43% of the variation in con-
sumer’s surplus figures and could also predict the
effect of the employment of a particular functional
from or treatment of travel time on consumer’s sur-
plus.
Distance costs
After data has been collected on the distance travelled
by respondents to the site in question, this variable is
converted into a ‘cost of distance travelled’ variable.
This involves setting a price per mile, which requires
choosing between two options:
• use of petrol costs only as an estimate of marginal
cost, or
• use of ‘full cost of motoring’, figures to include an
allowance for depreciation and insurance. 
Consumer’s surplus figures will depend on the choice.
It is assumed that Individuals, in maximising utility,
compare the marginal utility with marginal costs of
consumption; this makes option (1) more attractive,
since option (2) is a measure of average costs. In an
Achray forest study by Hanley (1989) when full cost
data was used he obtained a total consumer’s surplus
of GBP 402 023 per annum, while the use of petrol
costs only gave GBP 160 744 (Hanley & Spash
1993).
The value of time
In the household production function approach to
recreation demand modelling, consumers combine
several inputs to ‘produce’ recreation service flows.
Principal among these inputs are visits, equipment
and time. Time is expended both in travelling to a site
and while recreating on the site. As a scarce commod-
ity, time clearly has an implicit (or shadow) price. 
Chevas et al. (1989) provide recent estimates of
the value of time. They distinguish between the opp-
ortunity cost measure of travel time and the ‘com-
modity value’ measure of travel and on-site time.
Time has a positive commodity value if its consump-
tion directly generates positive utility. On-site time
clearly has a positive value, while travelling time may
have a positive or negative value. Chevas et al. used
a household production function approach to esti-
mate this commodity value for recreational boating in
East Texas, looking at travelling time alone. They
found the commodity value of travel time to be small
but positive, varying across sites and reaching a max-
imum of USD 0.41 an hour. 
After reviewing empirical evidence, Cesario (1976)
valued the opportunity cost for time to be one-third of
the hourly wage rate. Using a simulation process, and
choosing the value which maximised the R2,
McConnel and Strand (1981) and Common (1973)
also estimated a value for time. Comparing results
from the Cesario, McConnel/Strand and full-cost
(hourly wage) alternatives for 23 recreation sites in the
USA, Smith and Desvouges (1986) found that the full
cost and Cesario alternatives were rejected (at the
10% level) in 7 cases. However, the McConnel/Strand
method fared worse in terms of the variance of its esti-
mates (Hanley & Spash 1993).
Statistical problems
The dependent variable is both censored and truncat-
ed. ‘Truncated’ means that as only visitors to the site
are recorded, there is no information on the determi-
nants of the decision to visit the site. Also, visits are
only recorded during the sampling period and may
thus incorrectly describe the preferences of those visit-
ing at other times of the year. ‘Censored’ means that
less than one visit cannot possibly be observed. This
implies that the dependent variable (visits) is censored
at one, and that OLS estimates of demand parameters
will be biased (Smith and Desvouges, 1986). The
solution to truncated problems is to use a maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator instead of OLS. Data shows
that OLS gives larger consumer’s surplus estimates
than ML. The choice of the appropriate functional
form can also be problematic (Hanley and Spash,
1993).
The value of fuelwood in Ghana
The travel cost model therefore provides a measure of
willingness to pay for fuelwood based on travel cost
data. The two basic means by which travel costs are
computed are the individual travel cost and zonal
travel cost. The individual travel cost computes travel
cost for individuals, while the zonal travel cost com-
putes travel cost for groups of people based on their
average distance from the point where the facility to
be benefited from is located. The paper’s welfare
measure is equivalent to the consumers’ surplus
obtained through the consumption of fuelwood as a
household energy source (Johansson, 1987). 
Even though not heavily forested, the northern
savanna zone of Ghana has been well known for its
nationwide supply of biomass for energy. The Tamale
metropolis is the largest settlement in Northern Ghana
and acknowledged to be one of the fastest growing
cities in West Africa, with a population of about 293
881 (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2000). The
metropolis lies between the latitudes 90 181N and 90
261N and longitudes 10 151E and 10 231W. The
choice of Tamale was deemed appropriate since the
use of fuelwood there was well established and prob-
ably the largest in Ghana. Two main modes of acquir-
ing fuelwood exist in Ghana – through collection and
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purchases. In most urban centers commercial and
large household users purchase fuelwood from sellers
at very moderate prices depending on the season and
also tree species. However, most household users col-
lect fuelwood freely from nearby wooded vegetation.
Face-to-face interviews were used to elicit respons-
es from respondents who were household heads in
2010. The number of trips to fetch fuelwood from var-
ious sites was the sum of trips of all members of the
household who went to fetch fuelwood. Communities
were selected by simple random sampling, while
households were selected through a second stage sys-
tematic sampling. The total number of communities
which used fuelwood was 179, out of which 100 com-
munities were selected. Given a total population of
households using fuelwood in the Tamale municipali-
ty as 20 407 (GSS 2000) a sample size of 392 was
computed. The respondents provided the distances
they covered and the times used to collect fuelwood
as well as some socio-economic data. 
A zero price was assigned for fuelwood collected.
Sellers of fuelwood would normally price the product
based on where they went to collect the wood and the
cost of transportation to the point of sale. The wood
itself is normally freely obtained in most cases. The
travel cost (TC) in this case represents the cost of col-
lection, which is its implicit price. Travel distance costs
were based on fares of locally used means of transport
(called ‘tro-tro’), commonly used by low income earn-
ers in Ghana, while time cost (opportunity cost of
time) was one-third of the minimum wage as used by
Cesario (1976). Thus the functional form of the travel
cost model used was TC = f (TN + TM) where TC is
total cost of travel to collection site, TN is cost of trans-
portation to site and TM is time cost to site.
Results of travel cost estimation
Using the zonal travel cost estimation, households
were grouped according to their distances from the
places of fuelwood collection: Zone 1 being the near-
est with mean distance of less than 2 km, Zone 2 with
mean distance of 3 km, Zone 3 with a mean distance
of 6 km, Zone 4 with mean distance of 9 km and Zone
5 being the furthest with mean distance of 12 km (a
detailed account of the use of the TC model can be
found in Garrod & Willis (1999).
Table A1 shows the computation of the TC per trip
of fuelwood for each household member in Tamale.
Based on the fact that it is mainly women and children
who pick fuelwood, and given an average family size
of 5.5 for the region, about 3 members of the average
household normally go out to fetch fuelwood. This
makes the TC per year 108 051.32 x 3 = GHS
324 153.96. About 80% of households predominant-
ly rely on fuelwood for their energy needs in Ghana
(GSS 2008). This brings the total number of house-
holds in Ghana using fuelwood to 4.4 million. Thus if
for the households sampled the TC to fetch fuelwood
per year is GHS 324 153.96 for 20  407 households,
this translates to GHS 15.88 per household.
Therefore, the total travel cost for the 4.4 million
households would be GHS 69.87 million, which is an
equivalent of USD 43.67 million per annum.
Since the travel cost model estimation shows the
value placed on the commodity, the USD 43.67 mil-
lion represents the value placed on fuelwood by its
users in Ghana per annum. This is also described as
the benefit derived from consuming fuelwood by
households in Ghana per annum. Thus the con-
sumers’ surplus (welfare value) of fuelwood use in
Ghana is USD 43.67 million per annum.
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Table A1: Computation of annual travel costs for fuelwood collection in the Tamale municipality in
Ghana cedis (GHS) [USD1.00 = GHS1.60]
Source: Author’s field work in 2010
Zone % of households Population of TC per visit No. of visits TC per year for
(a) (b) households (GHS) per year population (GHS)
(c ) (d) (e ) (f = d x e )
Zone 1 19.9 4 061 0.56 25 324 14 181.44
Zone 2 53.3 10 877 0.58 65 884 38 212.72
Zone 3 20.7 4 224 3.98 10 764 42 840.72
Zone 4 2.0 408 6.77 572 3 872.44
Zone 5 4.1 20 407 103 376 108 051.32
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Abstract
The historical institutional divide between development goals and tackling man-made climate
change is disappearing. On the one hand, development activities are increasingly being judged
against their compatibility with climate change and, on the other hand, the dialogue around cli-
mate change is being reframed to recognise the national priorities of developing countries to
improve their economies, societies and environment. An example of this can be seen in the
emerging United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change concepts of Low Emission
Development Strategies (LEDS) and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. In this context
there is a need to understand the impacts of countries’ actions from both a development and
mitigation perspective. To do this a development impact assessment (DIA) visual was developed
within the LEDS Global Partnership. It links an action’s development impacts with its mitigation
potential and cost, in order to provide a more comprehensive basis for decision making and
communication, as compared to mitigation analysis using marginal abatement cost curves
alone. The output can be used within government or with development partners and other
stakeholders to help demonstrate priorities, communicate impacts and compare different low-
carbon actions. This paper discusses the application of the DIA visual through three country case
studies in Ghana, Kenya and Montenegro. These pilot experiences demonstrate several strengths
of the visualisation: its flexibility to complement other planning processes; its ability to commu-
nicate qualitative information about development impacts; and its potential to support sector-
specific and economy-wide decision making. At the same time the experiences provided impor-
tant lessons around: the country and policy context sensitivity of development impacts; the chal-
lenges in using qualitative assessments of impacts; participatory stakeholder DIA processes; and
the practical limitations of using prioritisation tools in the policy making process.
Keywords: climate change, sustainable development, low emission development, assessment
frameworks, mitigation
TOOLS AND METHODOLOGIES FOR APPROACHING
DEVELOPMENT AND MITIGATION
1. Introduction
Development activities are increasingly being judged
against their compatibility with climate change, indi-
cating a growing need to understand the impacts of
actions from both development and mitigation per-
spectives. At the same time, the dialogue around cli-
mate change is being reframed to recognise the
national priorities of developing countries to improve
their economies, societies and environment. Although
there is a relatively long history of assessing sustain-
able development impacts of low-carbon projects, for
example in relation to the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), few tools are available to deci-
sion-makers at the national or sector level for high-
level planning and strategy.
Several tools have been used to help analyse and
present development and climate impacts. Examples
include cost-benefit analysis (CBA), with a focus on
quantifying various impacts in economic terms, and
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, which consid-
er the costs of achieving climate (specifically mitiga-
tion) impacts. These tools can provide valuable
insights, but they tend to exclude certain types of ben-
efits that are more difficult to include in the frame of
their analytical approach (for example, climate
impacts in CBA, or social impacts in a MAC curve). 
This paper reviews the development impact
assessment (DIA) visual, a tool that aims to link an
action’s development impacts with its mitigation
potential and cost. Developed within the Low
Emission Development Strategies Global Partnership
(LEDS GP), the tool is intended to provide a simple
way to communicate development benefits and facili-
tate decision-making around low-carbon interven-
tions. The output can be used within government or
with development partners and other stakeholders to
help demonstrate priorities, communicate impacts
and compare different low-carbon actions. The paper
first provides a brief discussion of the history of devel-
opment impact assessments, and how these assess-
ments have influenced decision making. Section 3
introduces the DIA visual, followed by a summary of
three case studies of the DIA visual in Montenegro,
Kenya and Ghana in Section 4. The Ghana case
study, as unpublished work and the first live applica-
tion on the visual in a workshop setting, is described
in more detail than the other two cases. Section 5
describes lessons learnt from the three pilot applica-
tions and the conclusions provide ideas for improving
the DIA visual, drawing on experience with the tool in
Ghana, Kenya and Montenegro; as well as input from
the LEDS GP meeting held in Manila in October,
2013.
2. The CDM and early LEDS experiences:
Assessment of development impacts
Low-emission, or low-carbon, development strategies
are expected to result in greenhouse gas (GHG) miti-
gation as well as help to meet broader national devel-
opment goals, such as poverty alleviation, economic
growth and energy security. DIAs can help govern-
ments determine if low-carbon actions contribute to
meeting these development goals. In addition, they
can be helpful in monitoring sustainable development
impacts by identifying the areas that need further
research, elaboration and development of detailed
indicators. Development impacts are typically
assessed using the three pillars of sustainable develop-
ment: economic, social and environmental impacts.
The term ‘sustainable development’ has existed
for decades, yet no coherent set of quantified goals,
targets and indicators exists to measure its progress
(UNEP 2012). Twenty-five years ago, the 1987 World
Commission on Environment and Development pro-
posed to develop new ways to assess this progress.
This was echoed in subsequent international summits
and agreements on sustainable development, includ-
ing the first Rio Summit in 1992, the Johannesburg
Plan of Implementation in 2002, the UN Commission
on Sustainable Development, and the Millennium
Development Goals. These efforts have influenced
sustainable development assessments, including those
taken under the CDM and early efforts to measure
development impacts under LEDS and Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).
This section provides a brief discussion of the his-
tory of development impact assessments. The review
draws on the experience of the CDM and early lessons
from low-carbon development strategies in Kenya and
Guyana, focusing on how the impact assessments
have influenced decision-making. 
Development impacts in CDM 
A variety of tools and approaches have been used to
assess development impacts in CDM projects, helping
host governments, developed country governments
and private sector investors select CDM activities that
bring positive sustainable development impacts. The
voluntary CDM sustainable development (SD) tool
was approved by the CDM Executive Board in
November 2012 to assist project participants in
describing the sustainable development co-benefits of
their CDM activities against established criteria. This
tool aims to provide sound qualitative and quantita-
tive criteria for describing sustainable development
impacts, consistency across SD evaluations, and a
means to report on aggregated performance of sus-
tainable development co- benefits for various types of
CDM activities in various host countries over time
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(UNFCCC 2012a; 2012b). Other important tools in
the CDM with staying power and broad reach include
the Gold Standard and the Climate Community and
Biodiversity Alliance for land-use projects. 
Developing-country decisions to pursue or
approve CDM activities have been influenced by out-
comes of sustainability assessments. For example,
early in the development of CDM activities, Uruguay
stressed the importance of sustainable development
benefits as a criterion for approval of CDM activities,
and developed and used the sustainability assessment
tool, Multi-Attributive Assessment of CDM Projects, to
facilitate a quantitative assessment of potential proj-
ects regarding their contribution to sustainable devel-
opment (Heuberger et al. 2008). Several studies have
attempted to determine if the CDM contributed to sus-
tainable development, and what types of projects cre-
ated the most benefits (see for example Cosbey et al.
2005; Olsen & Fenhann 2008; Sun et al. 2010; TERI
2012). This body of work generally determined that
the greatest level of co-benefits could be generated
through renewable energy, energy efficiency, agricul-
ture and forestry activities if they account for sustain-
able development early in the design phase. 
Two examples of how sustainable development
assessments have impacted country decisions are
described below.
• Example 1: Actions by the government of China
were influenced by initial studies of the sustainable
development impacts of CDM projects. China
decided to impose a tax on revenues from CDM
projects, with proceeds going to a sustainable
development fund. CDM activities considered to
contribute less to sustainable development were
taxed at a higher rate, with hydrofluorocarbon
decomposition projects taxed at rate of 65% com-
pared to 2% for renewable energy projects (KPMG
2009).
• Example 2: Early identification of CDM projects by
Sweden included an assessment of sustainable
development impacts (Arvidson 2002), and the
Swedish Energy Agency currently focuses invest-
ment on small and medium sized renewable ener-
gy or energy efficiency projects that make a strong
contribution to sustainable development. An
example is the purchase of credits from a
improved cooking stove project in Ghana. The
Agency paid above market price for the credits,
with the decision driven by a desire to invest in
CDM activities that demonstrate real development
benefits at the community level (Owino 2013).
Considering development impacts in LEDS
Most LEDS state the importance of sustainable devel-
opment in the identification of priority actions, yet few
strategies have a robust assessment of development
impacts to inform implementation decisions. Current
impact assessment approaches used for LEDS and
NAMAs are often based on ‘subjective scoring with lit-
tle knowledge about the data informing it’ (Olsen
2012: 17). The strategies often make the assumption
that low-carbon actions will always have helpful envi-
ronmental, social or broader economic effects, or that
that sustainable development needs and priorities will
be addressed through adaptation plans and actions.
Two examples are set out below. 
• Example 1: Brazil’s LEDS include commitments
to, and stressing the importance of, sustainable
development (de Gouvello 2010), but does not go
beyond broad assumptions that low-carbon
growth is good for economic development and will
generate multiple benefits. 
• Example 2: Ethiopia’s Green Economy Strategy
identifies priority actions using a screening process
that includes examining appropriate GHG abate-
ment technology as well as potential contributions
to and alignment with the Growth and
Transformation Plan’s objectives. An OECD
review cautioned that GHG abatement in agricul-
ture, livestock and forestry especially, but also in
power and transport, will not always have positive
development impacts. For example, proposals to
reduce emissions in the livestock sector by shifting
beef producers to poultry may result in GHG
abatement, but they are extremely challenging and
do not necessarily have positive sustainable devel-
opment impacts. Such actions could cause consid-
erable social upheaval and remove ecologically
optimal use of rangelands (Bass et al. 2013). 
LEDS and DIA are relatively new ideas, yet lessons
on how DIAs have influenced decision-making can be
learned from early actors. The three case studies dis-
cussed in this paper provide insights from the first
applications of one particular way of describing devel-
opment impacts, the so-called DIA visual.
3. DIA visual
The DIA visual was developed by the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, the Energy Research
Centre of the Netherlands, the International Institute
for Sustainable Development and the Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit within the LEDS GP
(Cowlin et al. 2012). The DIA visual links an action’s
development impacts with its mitigation potential and
cost in order to provide a more comprehensive basis
for decision making and communication – as com-
pared to mitigation analysis using MAC curves alone.
The process and results attempt to combine climate
impacts – which are often relevant to an international
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audience of negotiators and donors – alongside devel-
opment impacts – which are most relevant for domes-
tic stakeholders. 
The visual includes both the information found in
MAC curves and an assessment against different
development indicators based on an impact scale
(Figure 1). On this scale impacts can be depicted as
‘highly positive’, ‘positive’, ‘neutral or minor impact’,
‘negative’ or ‘uncertain / policy specific’. In its applica-
tion, the visual is flexible; it can be used with or with-
out MAC information and with various development
indicators and scales, depending on interests, circum-
stances and data availability. A key benefit of the DIA
visual is that it provides a framework for identifying
and assessing impacts through a structured process;
each low-carbon option’s impact, with regard to each
indicator, is assessed in turn, building up a fuller
understanding of overall impacts.
There is no predefined guidance for how these
impacts should be assessed. They can be assigned
through quantitative analyses (for example, a calcula-
tion of the number of jobs created) or qualitative
analyses (based on expert judgment and supporting
evidence, for example) depending on data availability
and method preferred by stakeholders. In that sense,
the application of the DIA visual is flexible, yet it pro-
vides a simplified method to compare options using
multiple criteria of most interest to stakeholders (Cox
et al. 2013). Reflecting this flexibility, Cox et al. con-
sider a case study that extends the DIA visual with
indicators for ‘Ease of implementation’; showing both
development impacts and barriers on the same visual.
The DIA visual, therefore, has a relatively open-
ended scope (in terms of what types of indicators or
impacts are considered) and can be more or less rig-
orous depending on how these impacts are estimated.
Figure 2 tries to show different tools (that could be
used for assessing climate or development impacts)
on two spectrums of scope and complexity, simply to
give a sense of where the DIA visual could be consid-
ered to ‘fit’ versus other tools. Nearly all of the tools in
Figure 2 can be applied in different levels of detail; for
example, accounting for more or fewer impacts, so
this picture should be considered as a conceptualisa-
tion only. The key point is that the DIA visual is
methodology-neutral, in terms of how impacts are
actually assessed, and flexible in terms of scope by
changing the number and nature of indicators used.
The main strengths of the DIA visual include the
following:
• It facilitates discussion and communicates findings
to assist in prioritisation exercises. The DIA visual
can facilitate comparison of technology and policy
options by providing information on the initial
assessment of development impacts and mitiga-
tion impacts.
• It raises awareness of the importance of assessing
development impacts, and helps to build consen-
sus among stakeholders that mitigation and devel-
opment impacts are both important components
of policy and programme decisions.
• It presents an overview of mitigation and develop-
ment impacts in a concise manner. The results of
the tool can generally be illustrated on one page,
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Figure 1: Conceptualisation of the DIA visual
which can be helpful in briefing senior level offi-
cials, conveying messages in stakeholder discus-
sions, and succinctly presenting the rationale for
action in a specific area in discussions with poten-
tial funders. 
• It provides information on positive and negative
impacts, rather than co-benefits. Not all impacts
are positive, and it is important to provide a bal-
anced view. This helps to improve the understand-
ing of benefits and trade-offs, recognizing that
work is still needed in this area.
• It identifies critical areas of potential development
impact, which can be an initial input into the
development of indicators, and the design of mon-
itoring and reporting systems for the implementa-
tion of technology and policy options. 
4. Case studies
This DIA visual has now been applied in Ghana,
Kenya and Montenegro and this paper presents les-
sons from these three country applications, with a
focus on the most recent study in Ghana. In Kenya
and Montenegro the assessment of impacts was devel-
oped based on stakeholder feedback and local input,
but the initial assessment was carried out by experts
involved in those efforts. In Kenya, a team of interna-
tional and local experts engaged to undertake a low-
carbon scenario assessment used expert judgment
and supporting evidence to complete the DIA visual.
The overall assessment of impacts was then validated
at sector stakeholder workshops and through written
responses (Cox et al. 2013). In Montenegro, the visual
was applied to summarise outputs from a technology
needs assessment (TNA) process and was largely pop-
ulated by expert consultants. While this approach did
leverage outputs from the stakeholder consultations
that took place during the TNA process, it was con-
cluded that the outputs would benefit from further
input and discussion with stakeholders to validate the
findings (Cox et al. 2013). In Ghana, the DIA visual
was applied as a case study to six options in the ener-
gy sector, with the explicit aim to apply the tool in a
‘live’ setting with stakeholder involvement. This was
the first time that an assessment of development
impacts was done collaboratively using the DIA visual
with a group of country stakeholders. 
The Kenya and Montenegro cases are briefly sum-
marised here. Cox et al. (2013) provide a more
detailed discussion of these two applications of the
DIA visual. The Ghana case study is considered in
more detail, as it has not been previously presented.
Kenya
Kenya’s low-carbon scenario assessment used a vari-
ation of the DIA visual. The assessment of both emis-
sions reduction and development goals was important
for Kenya, whose National Climate Change Action
Plan determines that a mitigation action is only con-
sidered a priority if it generates positive sustainable
development impacts in line with the government’s
long-term development plan and/or has climate
resilience benefits (Government of Kenya 2013: 26).
The low-carbon scenario assessment, which included
the results of the DIA visual, directly influenced
Kenya’s decision to move forward on NAMA develop-
ment in the geothermal sector. Geothermal was iden-
tified as one of six priority low-carbon options
because of substantial abatement potential and strong
sustainable development benefits. Geothermal had
the second largest mitigation potential of all low-car-
bon options in the assessment and contributed direct-
ly to the goals of Vision 2030, which states that ‘elec-
tricity is a prime mover of the modern sector of the
economy’, and aims to generate more energy at a
lower cost and exploit geothermal power as a new
source of energy (Government of Kenya 2007: 8). 
Montenegro
The government of Montenegro began a TNA in 2011
to assess technology needs for climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Approximately 25 abatement
technologies were identified by the Montenegrin TNA
task force and these, in the form of technology specific
fact sheets, were used as the input for the pilot of the
DIA visual. Development impacts were primarily
assessed by interpreting the results of the multi-criteria
analysis (MCA) tool that forms a part of the TNA
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Figure 2: Conceptualisation of the relative
complexity of different tools versus their scope (in
terms of considering impacts and interactions) 
(MACC = marginal abatement cost curves; CEA = cost
effectiveness analysis; CBA = cost benefit analysis;
CGE = computable general equilibrium; IAM =
integrated assessment model)
process, called TNAssess. Additional indicators were
defined to assess ease-of-implementation of the vari-
ous technology options and simple indicators for mit-
igation potential and costs were used in the absence
of MAC calculations. Although the TNA documenta-
tion was used to populate the DIA visual, the visual
itself was not integrated into the TNA process, which
uses its own MCA approach to prioritisation, but was
rather intended as a first pilot application of the visu-
al.
Ghana
Ghana has set ambitious targets to cover 10% of its
electricity supply with renewable energy by 2020 as
well as achieving ‘availability of and universal access
to energy services and for export’. At the current
moment the Government of Ghana is developing
concrete strategies and programmes in order to meet
these targets. Part of this process has included engage-
ment with the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All
(SE4ALL) initiative, which produced a Situational
Analysis Report and a Country Action Plan in 2012
(Energy Commission 2012; Government of Ghana
2012). 
The DIA visual was applied to improve the under-
standing of the potential, costs, development impacts
and trade-offs of the priority options considered in the
SE4ALL initiative, as well as other selected technolo-
gy options proposed by stakeholders. Following dis-
cussions with local stakeholders, the DIA visual was
applied as a case study to six technology options in
the Ghanaian energy sector.
1. Improved cook stoves: With a focus on improved
woodfuel stoves, as this is the dominant fuel
source in rural areas where LPG is less likely to
reach in the short term and where traditional cook-
stoves are dominant.
2. LPG for cooking: Replacing charcoal as this is the
most common fuel in urban areas where LPG dis-
tribution would be most effective in the short term
3. Productive uses of energy: For example, solar dry-
ing, wind pump irrigation, etc.
4. Biodiesel: Assumed to be for domestic use, taking
care to differentiate between productive and non-
productive crops; that is, does the feedstock have
an alternative market outside of biofuels?
5. Landfill gas for electricity: Based on managed
municipal solid waste landfills.
6. Charcoal production: Focus is on production for
domestic use, the largest single primary energy use
in Ghana. Production for export is already regulat-
ed to require sustainable sources.
A four-stage process was followed to apply the DIA
visual in Ghana. This process was designed to, first,
ensure alignment of the process with national needs
and, secondly, to obtain direct stakeholder input dur-
ing the assessment of development impacts. These
four stages are described in more detail here. 
Engagement and scope
The first stage initiated engagement with stakeholders
in order to both introduce the DIA visual and deter-
mine a relevant scope for the study. The case study
started from the priority options in the SE4ALL Action
Plan but with no agreed final scope, in terms of which
energy sector options should be included in the analy-
sis, nor an agreed set of indicators. The first action
was to hold a series of meetings with a wide range of
stakeholders across line ministries, relevant agencies,
NGOs, development partners, the private sector and
independent experts. These meetings aimed to intro-
duce the DIA visual, determine the detailed scope of
the work (such as which options to include in the
analysis) and define how the case study could best
support the decision making processes in Ghana. The
meetings suggested three additional options in addi-
tion to the SE4ALL Action Plan – biodiesel, charcoal
production and landfill gas – all of which were felt to
have a large potential in Ghana but were not reflected
in current energy policy. These three options had the
common characteristics that they were proposed by at
least two different stakeholder groups and had a rea-
sonable potential for implementation based on a
quick scan of the sector.
Indicators
Closely linked to the setting of scope, it was important
to develop a set of indicators with stakeholders that
was appropriate to the chosen technologies (and their
end-users) and Ghanaian priorities. This is key to the
use of the DIA visual as it is this set of indicators
against which each technology option is assessed. The
visual itself does not propose any particular set of indi-
cators and, although previous applications of the visu-
al could offer some insights, it is necessary to choose
indicators that are relevant for the country context and
scope.
Two main sources were used to develop inputs for
the final set of indicators – first, discussions with stake-
holders, and, secondly, a literature review of previous
experiences with development indicators. A final
review with stakeholders was undertaken before
adopting a final set of indicators. Stakeholders sug-
gested specific indicators and also gave input on a
preferred approach to indicator development. Two
main points were raised. First, indicators need to be
relevant to the target audience for each option; if
some of the technology options are targeted at the
rural population it will be important to have indicators
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that can reflect this. Secondly, indicators should not
be overly disaggregated; it is important that impacts
can be estimated and understood in a workshop envi-
ronment, which requires relatively straightforward cat-
egorisation. This input on specific indicators by stake-
holders was broadened to a full list of indicators based
on the results of a literature review of 8 existing set of
sustainable development indicators dating back to the
back to the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.
The final list was chosen to reflect stakeholder desires
for relevance and practicality (Table 1).
Table 1: Adopted DIA visual case study indicators
Category Indicator
Climate Abatement potential (ktCO2)
Abatement cost (USD/tCO)
Climate resilience
Economic GDP / macroeconomic impact
Energy security 
Rural economic impact / development






Environmental Aggregate (biodiversity, land, water, etc)
Impacts
Once a set of indicators had been agreed, it was pos-
sible to start on background work that examined the
impacts of the six technology options. Two different
approaches were used: first, a quantitative analysis of
mitigation impacts (i.e. abatement potential and cost)
based on 2020 scenarios for each option; and second-
ly, preparation of supporting, generally qualitative,
information on the impacts of each technology option
for all non-mitigation indicators.
It is also important to note that the SE4ALL Action
Plan was not developed as a mitigation strategy, but
rather to provide development benefits. Its focus is
predominantly on improving sustainable energy serv-
ices, in line with the overall objectives of the SE4ALL
initiative to i) increase access to energy, ii) improve
energy efficiency, and iii) increase the penetration of
renewable energy (UN Foundation 2013). The mitiga-
tion calculations made for the options were, therefore,
‘after the fact’ and were not the primary objective in
the design of Ghana’s SE4ALL actions. However, this
links back to the value of the DIA visual, the ability to
present both climate impacts alongside development
impacts. In this case study, the starting point were
options that were proposed due to their potential to
contribute positively to development, with a mitiga-
tion perspective applied afterwards. 
In order to estimate mitigation potentials and
abatement costs, a baseline scenario and low-carbon
scenario were developed for each technology option.
From these the abatement potential in 2020 could be
estimated. Marginal abatement costs were estimated
from existing studies in similar contexts, or through
calculation where estimates did not exist or were felt
to be non-representative of the Ghanaian context.
The assessment of development impacts was
undertaken later in the process by stakeholders in a
workshop environment. For a number of reasons,
however, it was considered important to provide
workshop participants with background information
to guide these discussions. First, not all participants
would be familiar with all technology options, partic-
ularly those that are in sectors where they have less
experience. Secondly, even those experts who spe-
cialise in a particular technology might not have expe-
rience in the full range of impacts that a technology
could have. Thirdly, an evidence base could help
facilitate discussion in instances where participants
disagreed about impacts. 
To build this evidence base, each of the technology
options was characterised for each of the indicators
(Table 1). Information was drawn from a wide range
of sources, including studies that had already been
considered development impacts in the Ghanaian or
similar contexts, as well as anecdotal evidence from
the previous bilateral stakeholder meetings.
This process gave long, referenced descriptions of
each of the technology options by indicator, focused
on the Ghanaian context. As a final check of this
background information, a second series of meetings
was held with local experts. These meetings involved
a trial, or mock, assessment of the DIA visual for those
technologies where they had expertise. This allowed
for final updates of the background study where
details may have been missed in the desktop research
or prior interviews. The long technology descriptions
were too detailed to be useful in a workshop environ-
ment, so concise one-page factsheets were created for
each option.
Assessment
The main objective of the case study was to apply the
DIA visual with stakeholders in order to assess devel-
opment impacts. Nineteen stakeholders from a wide
variety of backgrounds and interests attended the
workshop, allowing for representation of a range of
views and perspectives. The focus was, of course, on
the energy sector, but many of the options being dis-
cussed had implications for other sectors such as
forestry or central ministries such as planning.
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Two discussions sessions were held at the work-
shop. The first was in smaller groups, with each group
discussing two technology options. Each of these
groups was provided with the one-page factsheets
and asked to fill in the DIA visual for their two options,
based on the rating scale. Following this each group
reported back to the wider group on their discussions
and resulting assessment, including areas where there
was disagreement, or where there was difficulty in
assessing an indicator. In general the assessment
process found a high level of agreement amongst par-
ticipants. Only for some indicators or technology
options was there less agreement, typically due to lim-
itations of the DIA visual itself. 
In the second session the overall results for the six
technology options were discussed side by side with
the full group of stakeholders. Assessments that didn’t
make sense to others or were felt to be inaccurate
were questioned and discussed, leading to some
changes to the overall assessment matrix (Figure 3). In
general the level of change was minor and both sides
of an issue could be accommodated by clarifying the
interpretation of a scenario. 
It was notable that consensus could be reached,
suggesting that the process had assisted in building a
common understanding of the six technology options.
Observation of the initially divergent positions of
many of the participants in the first session suggests
that the DIA visual process is highly likely to have con-
tributed to building agreement. It was also interesting
to note that the final assessment broadly supported
the prioritisation of actions that was observed in the
SE4ALL Action Plan. The workshop and results
showed that a more formal DIA process could be used
to complement government planning or policy
processes and build consensus amongst stakeholders.
5. DIA visual: Lessons learnt 
The application of the DIA visual in Ghana, Kenya
and Montenegro has provided a number of insights
regarding the visual specifically, as well as the assess-
ment of development impacts more broadly (lessons
from the Montenegrin and Kenyan case studies are
partly drawn from Cox et al. (2013)). This section
summarises the lessons learnt and observations result-
ing from the case studies grouped into four categories:
1. Stakeholders – relating to which stakeholders are
included in the process, when this should be done
and how they are communicated with.
2. Indicators – the choice of indicators and their char-
acterisation.
3. Assessing impacts – in terms of the level of detail
and quantification provided, as well as how to
compare options.
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Figure 3: Completed Ghana case study visual resulting from the stakeholder workshop
4. Relevance – how the DIA visual can be used effec-
tively within the policymaking process.
Stakeholders
Stakeholder diversity
A sensitivity to stakeholder mix was recognised at the
workshop, with the question being raised as to what
would happen if the same exercise was undertaken by
a different group of stakeholders. It is, therefore,
important to include a diverse range of stakeholders
when applying the DIA visual, with experience across
different relevant sectors and the full range of devel-
opment indicators.
Common aims
It is important that the aims of the workshop and DIA
visual are clearly explained in advance and that, inso-
far as is possible, individual stakeholders have been
part of the process of developing a set of indicators
and providing information on technology options.
This makes it easier to have a discussion about
impacts, rather than spending time on building aware-
ness of the tool and agreeing on scope and indicators.
Supporting information
Most stakeholders will not be familiar with the full
range of technology options or development indica-
tors. It is important to provide supporting information,
in this instance through one-page factsheets, that will
allow participants to have a common minimum level
of understanding of each technology option. This
process of providing supporting evidence requires a
careful balance between a more neutral provision of
information versus guidance that could overly influ-
ence the assessment. 
Format
The use of smaller break-out groups encouraged
stakeholders to contribute to the discussions and
allowed a focus on a smaller sub-set of options with-
out overwhelming people with the full matrix. At the
same time, the process of subsequently building con-
sensus for the final matrix amongst the whole was
important to allow participants to take results from




In the Ghana cases study there was a strong aware-
ness amongst stakeholders of the types of develop-
ment impacts of low-carbon actions. However, it was
often the case that participants had not considered
these impacts in significant detail or in a structured
way. The structured assessment of impacts against a
common rating scale is therefore a valuable process,
as it forces stakeholders to think about each technolo-
gy and indicator in turn. 
Type and number of indicators
The indicators that are used need to be relevant to the
target audience, that is, the group that stands to be
impacted by the option. Equally, balancing pragma-
tism with detail was seen as important. Too many
indicators makes the assessment difficult and lengthy,
and crucially also makes interpretation of the results
difficult. Too few indicators runs the risk of overly sim-
plifying development impacts or providing insufficient
differentiation between options to be useful.
Complex indicators
It was practically very difficult to assess aggregate indi-
cators (such as GDP or climate resilience) which are
effectively composites of (or at least influenced by) a
number of other more specific indicators. There would
be significant value in having a more holistic assess-
ment of complex indicators, like GDP, that takes into
account interactions and indirect effects. The pilots of
the DIA visual in Kenya and Montenegro also high-
lighted the need to ‘unbundle’ complex indicators. For
both pilots, causal chains to link technologies to im-
pacts were not clearly defined. Development of causal
chains for impacts and technologies considered could
improve the robustness and reliability of the visual.
Uncertainty
Some indicators are associated with a significant
degree of uncertainty. As an example, Montenegrin
stakeholders found ‘unstable price development’ to be
a key issue related to choice of cooking fuels, particu-
larly natural gas. It is useful to provide a way of indi-
cating uncertainty when applying the DIA visual. In
the Ghana case study this was done by allowing




Impacts are not only influenced by technologies or
deployment scenarios, but also by the form of imple-
mentation (i.e. policy). Any technology scenario being
described should try to be as descriptive as possible
about the approach to implementation. Similarly,
impacts are often country- or region-specific. Taken
together, these considerations mean that it is difficult
to generalise about the development impacts of any
one technology. The calculation of MACs is also
linked to the approach to implementation, making
firm estimates of abatement costs difficult in the
absence of agreed policies. 
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The DIA visual is most relevant early in a strategy
or planning process, when decisions on priorities are
being made. Hence, it may not always be possible to
be prescriptive about policies. However, any technol-
ogy scenario should be as descriptive as possible
about the approach to implementation.
Judging scale
It is difficult to account for scale when comparing
impacts of different options. One option may have
large impacts per unit effort or cost when compared to
another, but the DIA visual is not normalised in this
way. Hence, a technology that is implemented at pilot
scale may look much less favourable when held up
against a full-scale implementation of a second tech-
nology. Increasing the level of quantitative assessment
of development impacts may be one way to help
overcome this challenge, but this may not always be
possible due to limited data or indicators that are dif-
ficult to quantify.
Absolute or relative impacts
It is clear that mitigation potentials and abatement
costs are calculated relative to a business-as-usual
(BAU) or reference case. However, this use of a base-
line technology as a reference is arguably less relevant
when assessing development benefits, particularly in a
workshop environment. An absolute approach to
assessing development impacts (i.e. ignoring the BAU
technology that is displaced) tended to be naturally
adopted by workshop participants and was more rel-
evant to the way in which people thought about
development impacts. Another solution to this chal-
lenge would be to include the BAU technology in the
DIA visual as one of the options to be assessed. This
would guarantee that impacts versus a reference tech-
nology are assessed.
Quantitative inputs
Although the DIA visual was applied through qualita-
tive processes in Ghana, Kenya, Montenegro, it may
be useful in the future to underpin the visual with
more quantitative analysis to justify the level of impact
assigned to technologies (e.g., highly positive versus
positive). Providing this information to stakeholders
before and during DIA workshops (including relevant
analytical assumptions, etc.) could support more
robust discussions and instill greater confidence when
prioritising options and presenting information to high
level decision-makers. Notwithstanding resource
requirements for a quantitative analysis, observations
from the three case studies in Ghana, Kenya and
Montenegro suggest that there will often be data limi-
tations that will limit the ability to perform such analy-
sis. In the absence of quantified local impacts, assess-
ments conducted elsewhere may provide a useful
basis for stakeholders to use in evaluating impacts,
provided due care is taken in confirming sufficiently
similar country contexts that allow the data to be
used. 
Timeframes 
The four-point rating scale (‘highly positive,’ ‘posi-
tive,’ ‘neutral/uncertain’ and ‘negative’) used to de-
scribe development impacts of different options pro-
vides a relatively simple scoring framework that is con-
ducive to stakeholder-led qualitative processes.
However, this scoring framework does not take into
account different timeframes. The visual may be
improved by including an assessment against different
temporal scales (whether, for example, impacts are
long- or short-term).
Weighting
Developing a process to weight priority impacts may
improve the usefulness of the visual for decision-mak-
ers. Weighting may also help to provide a numeric
mechanism for comparison across different options,
noting that such a process could be similar to tradi-
tional multi-criteria analysis  approaches.
Relevance
Relevant implementation scenarios
For the application of the DIA visual to provide value
to the decision-making process it is vital that relevant
implementation scenarios are chosen, which are
either grounded in current government ambitions or
based on a realistic potential for implementation. In
practice, this can mean that the visual is used to com-
plement planning and strategy processes already
underway in a country. In Montenegro, outputs from
a stakeholder-led TNA process fed into the visual to
allow for a more streamlined way to visualise and
compare impacts across technologies. Outputs from
the DIA visual and TNA process were also comple-
mentary in the sense that the DIA work focused more
on absolute scoring of technologies, while the TNA
process focused on ranking technologies relative to
one another. In the case of Kenya, the DIA visual was
used to complement the National Climate Change
Action Plan development process that was already
underway, by providing another approach for stake-
holders to assess and compare technology options. 
Recognition of limitations
It is important not to oversell the DIA visual and to
make it clear that it is a discussion and communica-
tion tool; an aid to decision-making rather than a for-
mulaic tool for prioritisation. Policy-makers may not
be receptive to the idea of using a ranking or prioriti-
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sation tool to make decisions, but are more welcom-
ing of an approach that summarises information and
communicates the rationale behind multi-criteria deci-
sions.
Expansion beyond impacts
It may be valuable to complement the development
indicators in the DIA visual with information on barri-
ers. Without these barriers, it was felt that there could
be a tendency for the results of the visual to look over-
ly positive. The prior case study in Montenegro
included a barrier assessment in the DIA visual (Cox
et al. 2013) and, although this added to its visual com-
plexity, the Ghana case study suggests that this may
be a useful addition. Closely linked to this is the
potential to consider measures of cost other than mar-
ginal abatement cost, such as total investment costs or
public funding requirements, which are often more
relevant to policymakers.
Cross-sector application 
Although the DIA visual can be used to compare tech-
nologies across sectors, in the cases of Ghana, Kenya
and Montenegro the application of the visual was lim-
ited to comparisons of technologies within sectors.
However, ministries of finance, development and
planning often have to consider actions across the
economy. Using the visual with a more sector-oriented
approach, for example by compiling the sectoral out-
puts into a cross-sectoral overview, Cox et al. (2013)
note that ‘[s]uch economy-wide analysis could also be
used as a means to bring together diverse stakehold-
ers and to break down traditionally siloed line min-
istries to build support for mutually beneficial LEDS
options.’ 
Influence
Further study is needed on how the DIA visual can be
most effectively used to inform prioritisation and high-
level decisions on LEDS actions. There is also a need
for further input from decision-makers on the useful-
ness of the DIA visual and areas for improvement. For
example: When in a policy process should the visual
be applied? What types of stakeholders are most rele-
vant to include in impact assessments? What level of
supporting analysis is most useful to complement the
presentation of impacts in a visual format?
6. Conclusions 
There are limited examples of how ‘formal’ DIA
processes affect government decisions, but important
lessons and insights are emerging from early work to
assess development impacts in low-carbon plans, as
well as lessons from the CDM. The lessons provided
from the DIA visual case studies and the resulting
observations set out below aim to improve the under-
standing of how best to assess both development and
mitigation impacts in a way that effectively informs
decision-making.
At the same time, previous experiences in the
application of development impact assessments pro-
vide some useful insights into limitations of such
approaches:
• As CDM impact assessments have determined,
many important elements of sustainable develop-
ment, such as technology transfer, employment
generation and poverty alleviation, can be very
difficult to quantify (Olsen 2012). The DIA visual
allows a range of approaches to be used in assess-
ing impacts.
• While countries attempt to strategically opt for
actions that generate positive development
impacts, there are few examples of integrated sets
of indicators that allow for analysis of the trade-offs
and inter-linkages across the economic, social and
environmental pillars of sustainable development.
It remains difficult to compare development
impacts across, for example, forestry and the trans-
port sectors. 
• DIAs often assumes that low-carbon actions will
create development benefits or ignores negative
impacts. The OECD notes that environmental
solutions can turn out to be ‘poverty traps’ rather
than ‘routes out of poverty’ (Bass et al. 2013: 23).
The DIA visual allows negative impacts to be
shown during assessment, but needs appropriate
indicators to capture these effects.
The case studies in Ghana, Kenya and
Montenegro showed that the DIA visual benefits from
the following: a diverse group of well informed stake-
holders with appropriate facilitation and workshop
format; a pragmatic set of development indicators that
allows uncertainty in assessment to be reflected and
provides a holistic assessment of complex indicators;
detailed technology or scenario descriptions, with
impacts assessed on an absolute scale with quantita-
tive analysis of key indicators; and policy-relevant
implementation scenarios that take into account bar-
riers and trade-offs and can be compared across sec-
tors. From this, some potential areas for improving the
DIA visual are:
• Development impact assessment is often qualita-
tive. Work needs to continue to identify quantita-
tive (measurable) indicators. 
• The consideration of interactions across a portfolio
of actions should be an important element of an
improved DIA that can inform decision-making
about how trade-offs in the short term need to be
managed and reconciled with anticipated long-
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term low-carbon benefits.
• The DIA tool provides a useful comparison of mit-
igation and development benefits within a sector,
but has limited application to compare develop-
ment impacts across sectors. Work is needed to
identify metrics to improve comparability across
sectors. 
• To properly inform decision-making, DIAs needs
to include information on winners and losers of
low-carbon actions. DIA should work to predict
such outcomes of policy and investment shifts
toward low-carbon options.
In addition to these ideas, the LEDS GP recently
held a half-day training on DIA at the Asia LEDS
Forum in Manila, Philippines (Asia LEDS Partnership
2013). The session brought together stakeholders
from a number of institutions engaged with DIA activ-
ities to produce the following suggestions for improv-
ing the DIA visual:
• Development of a guidance document to provide
information on use of the visual through stake-
holder processes.
• Incorporation of default values for certain tech-
nologies and indicators with supporting documen-
tation. This could provide a starting point for prac-
titioners trying to understand how to apply the DIA
visual, but needs to be balanced with the need to
consider local contexts when making final assess-
ments. 
• Adapting the visual into an online tool where users
can choose indicators and technologies of most
interest. 
• Application of the tool in more countries, particu-
larly with more quantitative analysis underpinning
the assessment of impacts.
Ultimately, the utility of the visual rests on its per-
ceived credibility by decision-makers. This, in turn,
depends on the transparency of the process used to
develop the information reflected and the stakeholder
group(s) involved. Although the visual has been pri-
marily used in more qualitative processes in the three
pilot studies, incorporation of quantitative information
could help to further strengthen objectivity of results
and build confidence in decision-makers when using
the visual to assess low-carbon options.
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